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Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a
Shifting Criminal Law
ALLEGRA M. MCLEOD*
A widely decried crisis confronts U.S. criminal law. Jails and prisons are
overcrowded and violence plagued. Additional causes for alarm include the rate
of increase of incarcerated populations, their historically and internationally
unprecedented size, their racial disproportionality, and exorbitant associated
costs. Although disagreement remains over the precise degree by which incarcera-
tion ought to be reduced, there is a growing consensus that some measure of
decarceration is desirable.
With hopes of reducing reliance on conventional criminal supervision and
incarceration, specialized criminal courts proliferated dramatically over the
past two decades. There are approximately 3,000 specialized criminal courts in
the United States, including drug courts, mental health courts, veterans courts,
and reentry courts. The existing scholarly commentary on specialized criminal
courts is largely trapped in the mode of advocacy, alternately celebratory or
disparaging, and insufficiently attentive to the remarkable variation between
different specialized criminal courts. In contrast, this Article takes a closer and
more critical look at the marked expansion of these courts as a peculiar
strategy to devise alternatives to conventional jail- and prison-based sentenc-
ing.
This Article reveals that specialized criminal courts have become significant
terrain for a contest between competing criminal law reformist models and that
different outcomes in this contest may portend starkly contrasting futures for
U.S. criminal law and governance. More specifically, this Article introduces a
typology and critical theoretical account of four criminal law reformist models
at work in specialized criminal courts: a therapeutic jurisprudence model, a
judicial monitoring model, an order maintenance model, and a decarceration
model. Part II argues that, whereas the first three of these models threaten to
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aggravate existing pathologies in U.S. criminal law administration—expanding
criminal supervision, diminishing procedural protections, and possibly even
increasing incarceration despite opposite intended effects—the fourth, less
predominant model, a decarceration model, holds the potential to bring about
substantial transformative change in U.S. criminal law. On a decarceration
model, specialized criminal courts function as experimental diversionary pro-
grams that assign otherwise jail- or prison-bound defendants mental health and
drug treatment, job and housing placement, along with other services in lieu of
incarceration. On this model, integration within social contexts outside criminal
justice systems substitute for the surveilling function of criminal supervision
and incarceration.
Part III provides a theoretical framework to capture the possibilities for
criminal law reform opened by a decarceration model, which may cognitively
reframe shared understandings of crime and punishment; engage in institu-
tional reinvention, transforming criminal law administrative institutions into
different configurations; and facilitate systemic change by spurring conceptual
shifts and freeing resources from criminal law administration for other sectors.
Part IV begins to explore the more general perils attending a specialized
criminal courts law reform strategy, including excessive legalism; dilution of
the retributive and deterrent features of criminal punishment; inefficient prolifer-
ating specializations; and legitimation of harshness in conventional courts and
unfairness toward less sympathetic, racial minority, or otherwise stigmatized
defendants.
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INTRODUCTION
Significant change is afoot in U.S. criminal law. There remain roughly seven
million people incarcerated, on probation, or on parole in the United States1—a
quantum of criminal law oversight roundly condemned by commentators across
the political spectrum and around the world.2 But by the turn of the twenty-first
1. See, e.g., LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2010, at 1 (2011); PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN
CORRECTIONS 1 (2009); see also Carol S. Steiker, Mass Incarceration: Causes, Consequences, and Exit
Strategies, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 1 (2011) (“The American rate of incarceration has increased more
than fivefold since 1972 . . . [and] [t]he current rate is more than 700 per 100,000 . . . . The United
States[’] . . . rate of incarceration [is] . . . higher than even the most violent societies and most
oppressive regimes on the planet[.] . . . The change in American incarceration rates is a shift relative to
a previously stable baseline that can only be described as revolutionary . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
2. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Trend To Lighten Harsh Sentences Catches On in Conservative States,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/us/13penal.html (noting increasing
support in traditionally conservative states for reduced incarceration, including on the part of prominent
conservatives such as Edwin R. Meese III, Grover Norquist, and Asa Hutchinson); see also Mass
Incarceration in the United States: At What Cost?: Hearing Before the J. Econ. Comm., 110th Cong.
1–2 (2007) (opening statement of Sen. Jim Webb) (“[T]he United States now imprisons a higher
percentage of its citizens than any other country in the world. . . . The growth in the prison population is
only nominally related to crime rates. . . . The racial composition of America’s prisons is alarm-
ing. . . . [W]e are spending enormous amounts of money to maintain [the prison] system.”); Erik Luna
& Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 3 (2010) (noting conservative
support for eliminating mandatory minimums); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Crimi-
nal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 509 (2001) (“As criminal law expands, both lawmaking and
adjudication pass into the hands of police and prosecutors . . . . The end point of this progression is
clear: criminal codes that cover everything and decide nothing, that serve only to delegate power to
district attorneys’ offices and police departments. . . . In a criminal justice system that incarcerates two
million people, criminal law is becoming a sideshow. It seems like, and is, an unhealthy state of
affairs.”); Loı¨c Wacquant, Class, Race & Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America, DÆDALUS, Sum-
mer 2010, at 74, 74 (“[T]he joint rolling back of the stingy social state and rolling out of the gargantuan
penal state . . . have remade the country’s stratification, cities, and civic culture, and are recasting the
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century, largely in response to growing censure and in the face of escalating
costs, states across the country committed to decrease reliance on incarcera-
tion.3 Alongside state-initiated reforms, federal prison conditions litigation con-
tributed further incentives to decarcerate. Most notably, the U.S. Supreme Court
in Brown v. Plata affirmed an order of a specially convened three-judge district
court, which mandated that California reduce its prison population by 40,000
prisoners over two years to eliminate unconstitutional conditions.4 Yet, while
pressures to decarcerate mount, it remains unclear how it will be possible to
achieve the larger scale shifts necessary to reach and sustain markedly lower
levels of criminal prosecution, criminal supervision, and incarceration.5
As one part of a broader effort to reduce reliance on conventional probation
and carceral sentencing, beginning in the early 1990s, state court judges began
to convene specialized criminal courts from Florida to California, Michigan to
Texas: drug courts, mental health courts, veterans courts, and reentry courts,
among others.6 These increasingly popular specialized criminal courts—of
which there are approximately 3,000 in the United States and its territories—
assume various legal institutional forms and divergent jurisprudential ap-
proaches.7 Nonetheless, despite considerable variation, what most of the courts
share in common is the goal of reducing reliance on conventional jail- and
very character of ‘blackness’ itself.”); Newt Gingrich & Pat Nolan, Op-Ed., Prison Reform: A Smart
Way for States To Save Money and Lives, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2011, http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/01/06/AR2011010604386.html (exploring the substantial potential of decarcera-
tion to reduce costs and crime).
3. See, e.g., JUDITH GREENE & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DOWNSCALING PRISONS:
LESSONS FROM FOUR STATES 1–2 (2010); see also David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarcera-
tion?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27 (2011).
4. See 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1944–47 (2011); see also Solomon Moore, California Prisons Must Cut
Inmate Population, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/us/05calif.html.
5. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Hyper-Incarceration and Strategies of Disruption: Is There a
Way Out?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 109 (2011); Robert Weisberg & Joan Petersilia, The Dangers of
Pyrrhic Victories Against Mass Incarceration, DÆDALUS, Summer 2010, at 124.
6. Several points of terminological clarification are in order. “Carceral” sentencing refers to prison-
and jail-based criminal sanctions. I use the term “specialized criminal court” to refer to courts that
specialize in a specific subset of criminal cases, such as matters in which defendants are veterans or the
charged conduct is drug related. This specialization is distinct from that of many state trial courts that
hear criminal cases exclusively and are specialized in that respect. See LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING
THE COURTS xi (2011). “Decarceration” refers to the consistent reduction of the number of people sent to
prison or jail, with the ultimate aim of abandoning imprisonment as a dominant mechanism for
achieving social order.
7. See, e.g., RACHEL PORTER ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, WHAT MAKES A COURT PROBLEM-
SOLVING?: UNIVERSAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE iii, 50–56 (2010). There is
overwhelming bipartisan endorsement of specialized criminal courts and every state has at least one
such court. See, e.g., RESOLUTION 22: IN SUPPORT OF PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT PRINCIPLES AND METHODS
(Conference of Chief Justices & Conference of State Court Adm’rs, adopted July 29, 2004), http://
ccj.ncsc.dni.us/CourtAdmin Resolutions/ProblemSolvingCourtPrinciplesAndMethods.pdf; see also GREG
BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE 9–10 (2005); Judith
S. Kaye, Delivering Justice Today: A Problem-Solving Approach, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 125, 130
(2004) (“[T]hese courts have developed a new architecture—including new technology, new staffing,
and new linkages—to improve the effectiveness of court sanctions, particularly intermediate sanc-
tions . . . .”). Criminal court specialization has also influenced criminal law administration abroad. See
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prison-based sentencing in favor of problem-oriented alternatives.8 The courts
also empower judges to adopt neo-realist problem-oriented roles, embrace less
adversarial criminal procedures, and aspire to more effectively protect public
safety and prevent crime.9
It is uncertain, though, what specialized criminal courts actually portend. Are
these courts configured in a manner that is likely to facilitate the intended goals
of reduced or more efficacious criminal supervision and reduced incarceration?
Or, as some critics charge, do specialized criminal courts improve judges’
experience in the courts by emphasizing anti-formalist, problem-oriented proceed-
ings without tending to resolve the legal systemic and social problems the
courts purport to address?10
This Article offers an account of how specialized criminal courts may enable
substantially reduced reliance on incarceration as well as more general transfor-
mative criminal law reform by embracing a criminal law reformist framework,
which I term a decarceration model. However, this Article will argue that, in
their currently predominant institutional forms, specialized criminal courts
threaten to produce a range of unintended and undesirable outcomes: unnecessar-
ily expanding criminal surveillance, diminishing procedural protections, and
potentially even increasing incarceration.
The existing scholarship on specialized criminal courts treats particular sub-
stantively specialized criminal courts—drug courts, for example—as a largely
undifferentiated category, either celebrating or proposing the abandonment of
specialized criminal law administration across the board. On the one hand, some
commentators commend specialized criminal courts for facilitating “a quiet
revolution among American criminal courts”11 and the emergence of a new
“criminal justice paradigm.”12 Also among the courts’ supporters are those who
JAMES L. NOLAN JR., LEGAL ACCENTS, LEGAL BORROWING: THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT
MOVEMENT (2009).
8. See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 6 (“[P]roblem-solving courts seek to reduce the
criminal justice system’s reliance on incarceration . . . .”); John A. Bozza, Benevolent Behavior Modifi-
cation: Understanding the Nature and Limitations of Problem-Solving Courts, 17 WIDENER L.J. 97, 98
(2007).
9. See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 5–10.
10. See, e.g., JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT
(2001).
11. See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 3; NOLAN, supra note 10, at 185 (“What we are doing
here is no less than a complete revolution in jurisprudence.” (quoting Judge Peggy Hora)).
12. See Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System’s Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in
America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 463–64 (1999) (describing how drug courts work to “shift the
paradigm” of legal processing of drug cases); see also DRUG STRATEGIES, DRUG COURTS: A REVOLUTION IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2, 5 (1999) (“[T]his entirely new approach has revolutionized traditional attitudes
toward criminal justice.”). A separate body of empirical analyses focuses on how specialized criminal
courts reduce costs and recidivism, though it is not always clear whether these studies adequately
control for potential selection and attrition biases. See, e.g., SHANNON M. CAREY & MARK S. WALLER,
NPC RESEARCH, OREGON DRUG COURT COST STUDY: STATEWIDE COSTS AND PROMISING PRACTICES (2011)
(finding that Oregon drug courts have produced cost savings, and are projected to save taxpayers even
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herald specialized criminal courts as “experimentalist governance” mechanisms
enabling much-needed social and legal change not achievable through more
conventional judicial or legislative intervention.13 On the other hand, the courts’
detractors—criminal law scholars and criminal defense lawyers alike—have
called for the abandonment or marked scaling back of specialized criminal
courts as “contraindicated” and anathema to the reformist goals the courts’
architects hoped to achieve, largely on account of procedural rights concerns.14
Both of these sharply divided responses approach each type of substantively
specialized criminal court as internally homogeneous and either entirely praise-
worthy or entirely dangerous. Accordingly, there has been insufficient attention
both to the remarkable variation between specialized criminal courts and to the
different consequences potentially associated with the courts’ divergent ap-
proaches.
This Article demonstrates, instead, that specialized criminal courts have
become the locus of an ongoing contest between four primary competing
models of reformist criminal law administration. These models are character-
ized by dissimilar legal institutional features and distinct ideological and theoreti-
cal commitments. And these divergent approaches push in quite different
directions in terms of their likely effects on incarceration practices, levels of
criminal supervision, and other desired criminal law reforms.
Consider this motley assortment of specialized criminal courts and the vari-
ous criminal offenses, sentences, ideologies, and possible outcomes associated
with each. First, the Veterans Court of Okemos, Michigan and the case of Staff
Sergeant Brad Eifert, a veteran of the Iraq War. Armed with a .45-caliber pistol,
more in the future); Scott W.M. Burrus et al., Show Me the Money: Child Welfare Cost Savings of a
Family Drug Court, JUV. & FAM. CT. J., Summer 2011, at 1, 10–11 & tbl.2 (finding that family drug
court in Baltimore, Maryland reduced foster care-related expenditures); see also SHELLI B. ROSSMAN ET
AL., URBAN INST., THE MULTI-SITE ADULT DRUG COURT EVALUATION: THE IMPACT OF DRUG COURTS 246–47
(2011) (concluding that “drug courts—while effective at reducing costly criminal offending—are also
expensive enough to offset those costs”).
13. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimen-
talist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 883 (2000) (“The very existence of treatment courts is
remarkable, their rapid diffusion, provisional successes, and continual experimentalist self-examination
doubly so. . . . Surely there is hope for the renewal of our public institutions in this surprising
success.”). Proponents of specialized criminal courts generally contend that conventional U.S. criminal
law administration is deeply compromised, and specialized criminal courts may better address indi-
vidual cases and improve criminal justice results overall. See, e.g., Brenda Bratton Blom et al.,
Community Voice and Justice: An Essay on Problem-Solving Courts as a Proxy for Change, 10 U. MD.
L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 25, 36–37 (2010).
14. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783, 786, 830–35
(2008) (critically examining adverse consequences of drug courts and proposing instead that such
courts be transformed into voluntary rehabilitation programs) (“Put concretely, drug courts are ‘contrain-
dicated’ for genuine addicts . . . . The consequent adverse effects may be atypically long prison sen-
tences for the very defendants that drug courts were supposed to keep out of prison and off of drugs.”
(footnote omitted)); Mae C. Quinn, The Modern Problem-Solving Court Movement: Domination of
Discourse and Untold Stories of Criminal Justice Reform, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 57, 80–82 (2009);
see also NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, AMERICA’S PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: THE CRIMINAL
COSTS OF TREATMENT AND THE CASE FOR REFORM (2009).
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Eifert initiated a shoot-out with police in the woods adjacent to his home:
The police were out there somewhere and, one way or the other, [Eifert] was
ready to die. He raised the gun to his head and then lowered it. Then he fired
nine rounds.
. . . .
Leaving his weapon, he ran into the driveway, shouting, “Shoot me! Shoot
me! Shoot me!” The police officers subdued him with a Taser and arrested
him. A few hours later, he sat in a cell at the Ingham County Jail, charged with
five counts of assault with intent to murder the officers, each carrying a
potential life sentence.
. . . .
. . . Eifert, having pleaded guilty to a single charge of carrying a weapon with
unlawful intent, a felony, will officially enter the veterans court pro-
gram. . . . [In t]welve to 18 months[,] . . . if he adheres to the strict regimen of
treatment through the Veterans Affairs hospital in Battle Creek and supervi-
sion set by the court, the charge could be dismissed or reduced to a misde-
meanor.15
Compare Eifert’s case and the Okemos Veterans Court to Florida’s Broward
County Mental Health Court. In the words of Broward County’s Judge Ginger
Lerner-Wren:
[T]he Mental Health Court [is] a “strategy” to bring fairness to the administra-
tion of justice for persons being arrested on minor offenses who suffer from
major mental disability. . . . Persons with major psychiatric disorders and/or
mental disabilities can live and thrive in the community with individualized
care, treatment and community support.16
Whereas Eifert’s case involved a more serious weapons charge carrying a
potentially lengthy prison sentence, Judge Lerner-Wren’s Mental Health Court
concentrates on individuals accused of minor crimes. Yet, both the Broward
County Mental Health Court and the Okemos Veterans Court rely on alternative
sanctions that entail treatment primarily outside the specialized criminal court.
Other specialized criminal courts rely heavily on judicial monitoring as part
and parcel of alternative sentencing, rather than primarily on referral to social
services outside the criminal court, effectively tasking the judge with the work
of a probation or parole officer. For example, the Syracuse, New York Drug
Treatment Court significantly expands judicial surveillance of minor drug offend-
ers and uses arrest and incarceration as routine sanctions for noncompliance
with court mandates. As sociologist James Nolan explains, in one instance:
15. See Erica Goode, Coming Together To Fight for a Troubled Veteran, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/18/us/18vets.html.
16. DEREK DENCKLA & GREG BERMAN, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, RETHINKING THE REVOLVING DOOR:
A LOOK AT MENTAL ILLNESS IN THE COURTS 17 (2001) (emphasis added).
2012] 1593DECARCERATION COURTS
A participant in Judge McKinney’s Syracuse, New York drug court lost his
job. McKinney called the employer and learned that the client was regarded
as a “damn good employee” and that the boss would “hire him back in a
heartbeat” if the judge could guarantee that he was drug free and that he
wouldn’t miss any work. So the judge made a deal with the employer. He said
to him: “Okay, I’ll make a deal with you, you take him back and I’ll add
another weapon to your arsenal. If he doesn’t come to work when he is
supposed to, doesn’t come to work on time . . . I’ll put him in jail, on your say
so.” [The judge relayed the arrangement to the defendant,] telling him: “I’ll
get your job back for you, but you’ve got to promise you’ll be at work when
you are supposed to . . . . Your employer is now on the team of people who
are reporting to me. When he calls up and tells me that you are late, or that
you’re not there, I’m going to send the cops out to arrest you.”17
This approach may extend criminal supervision into new domains such as the
employment context and in so doing may increase levels of at least short-term
incarceration. Quite distinctly, the mental health and veterans courts’ ap-
proaches just related are characterized by a combination of diversionary treat-
ment strategies that do not necessarily rely heavily on judicial surveillance or
other forms of direct criminal supervision by the court.
These examples illustrate some of the considerable diversity in the institu-
tional configurations and conceptual orientations of specialized criminal courts.
These courts may focus on more minor offenses or more serious ones. They
may rely primarily on referrals to social service organizations or on direct
judicial oversight. The court proceedings themselves may aim to facilitate
behavioral modification, or social service intervention may occur entirely out-
side the court context. And diversion may take place pre-plea, post-plea, or as a
post-conviction sentencing alternative.
To begin to make sense of this diverse landscape, this Article introduces a
typology and critical theoretical account of four criminal law reformist models
at work in specialized criminal courts:
(1) a therapeutic jurisprudence model;
(2) a judicial monitoring model;
(3) an order maintenance model; and
(4) a decarceration model.18
The first three of these models, I argue, possess characteristics that pose a
considerable risk of deepening and extending existing pathologies in criminal
law administration, exacerbating overcriminalization and potentially expanding
17. See James L. Nolan, Jr., Therapeutic Adjudication, 39 SOCIETY 29, 32 (2002).
18. See infra Part II.
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incarceration. But the fourth model—a decarceration model—promises to begin
to reduce levels of criminalization and incarceration and to develop experimen-
talist and sociologically informed alternatives to criminal law intervention.
These four models consist of generally interconnected institutional features
and ideological commitments on which the courts draw. Although numerous
courts reflect some characteristics of more than one model, the models are
prototypes to which existing courts roughly adhere. In identifying these basic
contrasting approaches, this typology serves to illuminate some of the underap-
preciated variation between and among different specialized criminal courts,
thereby distinguishing the specific risks associated with distinct bundles of legal
institutional and ideological features, facilitating more informed empirical analy-
sis and clarifying the contours of various possible reform agendas being tested
in the specialized courts context.
Before delving in greater depth into the four models and their associated
aspirations, risks, and limitations, a brief overview of each model will help to
set the stage for the analysis to follow. Courts operating on a therapeutic
jurisprudence model adopt a neo-rehabilitative approach, convening courts to
therapeutically treat offenders (and in some instances victims).19 On a therapeu-
tic jurisprudence model, the judge personally attempts to facilitate a therapeutic
process in court through routine proceedings, intermediate sanctions, and in
some instances jail- or prison-based sentencing. Substantial efforts are devoted
to making court proceedings themselves part of ongoing psychotherapeutic
interventions aimed at behavioral modification.
The second model relies upon intensive judicial monitoring, focusing on
deterrence, defendant accountability, and expanded judicial surveillance as an
alternative or adjunct to incarceration.20 A court operating solely in conformity
with a judicial monitoring model eschews the court-centered rehabilitative
psychotherapeutic ambitions that are central to the therapeutic jurisprudence
model and instead emphasizes deterrent judicially administered surveillance.
A third model, emphasizing order maintenance, operates largely in commu-
nity courts, which address relatively minor public order violations through
locally administered intermediate sanctions such as community service.21 Courts
reflecting an order maintenance model are characterized primarily by their focus
on low-level quality-of-life offenses inspired by a “broken windows” theory of
policing and do not necessarily embrace either therapeutic or judicially surveil-
lant features.
Then, there is the fourth, less common model, the theoretical orientation and
reformist potential of which this Article will elaborate: a decarceration model.
Specialized criminal courts adopting a decarceration model are experimental
diversionary programs that assign otherwise likely jail- or prison-bound defen-
19. See infra section II.A.
20. See infra section II.B.
21. See infra section II.C.
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dants mental health and drug treatment, job and housing placement, along with
other services in lieu of incarceration.22 On a decarceration model, integration
within social institutions outside the criminal court substitutes for the surveil-
ling function of criminal supervision and incarceration.23 The significant reform-
ist possibility in a decarceration model arises principally from its directly
diversionary orientation coupled with rigorous ongoing empirical monitoring of
court experimentation to establish whether and, if so, how non-carceral sentenc-
ing may be applied in particular contexts without undue risk to public safety.24
The models are distinct from, though often overlapping with, the self-
definitions and names of the courts. In other words, the models are composed of
bundles of legal institutional and ideological features identified through my
research in preparation of this Article—through site visits, analysis of archived
interviews, and a review of quantitative and qualitative empirical studies—not
exclusively, or even primarily, in reference to the self-descriptions of the
various courts. So while a drug court might conform to an order maintenance
model or a therapeutic jurisprudence model, in either instance the court may
still be called simply a drug court. Likewise, a mental health court might reflect
features of a judicial monitoring model but be referred to plainly as a mental
health court. Courts adopting a diversionary decarceration approach are simi-
larly not called decarceration courts but are identified as drug courts or mental
health courts—and for reasons of political expedience, avoiding the decarcera-
tion terminology may be prudent. Other courts with characteristics correspond-
ing to a therapeutic jurisprudence model may tailor the courts’ names to reflect
their therapeutic orientation, as in a therapeutic drug court or drug treatment
court. Even though multiple institutional models may coexist in one court, one
or another model generally predominates in any given specialized criminal
court.
22. A decarceration model is potentially applicable to any specialized criminal court—a mental
health court, veterans court, drug court, or reentry court—which is organized in significant part to
decrease reliance on incarceration and to devise more effective and humane sentencing alternatives. See
infra sections II.D–IV.
23. See infra section II.D.
24. A notable feature of many specialized criminal courts, and one common to courts adopting a
decarceration model, is the incorporation of resident or external researchers within the courts’ institu-
tional design. Internal and external empirical monitoring entities generate extensive information
regarding the courts’ operations. See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 13, at 833 (“What makes the drug
courts distinctive and innovative . . . is the novel form of monitoring, and governance more generally,
upon which they rely.”). But see David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimental-
ism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2008) (critically analyzing democratic
experimentalism for mistakenly assuming consensus, reliable metrics for measuring success, and
costless deliberation, among other problems). A decarceration model of specialized criminal law
administration aims to take on board some of Super’s critiques of democratic experimentalism and, at
the same time, to embrace institutional flexibility and ongoing empirically informed self-evaluation,
with attention to building consensus on the substantive ends of reducing reliance on incarceration
through alternative forms of social integration.
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The following table illustrates the defining characteristics and theoretical
bases of each of the four models.
This Article’s core argument is that the therapeutic jurisprudence, judicial
monitoring, and order maintenance models may fall short in reducing criminal
supervision and incarceration and threaten to produce otherwise harmful out-
comes; a decarceration model, however, stands to facilitate broader transforma-
tive criminal law reform, setting in motion change processes that could over
time reduce reliance on criminal prosecution and incarceration as a way of
regulating an array of complex social problems. The risks attributed by critics to
any one particular type of specialized criminal court—drug courts, for instance—
are thus better understood as potential problems with particular models (bundles
of legal institutional and ideological features) of reformist criminal law adminis-
tration, certain of which may even tend to extend surveillance, diminish proce-
dural protections, and expand incarceration.25
Due to this variation, coming to terms with the shifts in criminal law manifest
in specialized criminal courts will not be achieved either by simply embracing
25. Cf. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 14; Bowers, supra note 14.
Model Defining Characteristics Theory
Therapeutic
Jurisprudence
Judge seeks to fulfill therapeutic
function, personally addressing
psychosocial motivation to offend
through therapeutically attuned
court proceedings
Neo-rehabilitative,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Judicial
Monitoring
Judge fulfills surveillant role akin to
probation or parole officer
Deterrence through Judicial
Surveillance
Order
Maintenance
Court provides forum for
prosecuting quality-of-life offenses
that would otherwise receive little
attention in conventional criminal
courts
“Broken Windows” Order-
Maintenance Hypothesis:
Reducing low level quality-
of-life offending will improve
respect for law and decrease
crime overall, thereby
reducing incarceration
Decarceration Court aims primarily to reduce
reliance on carceral sentencing by
referring defendants to mental
health, public health, job training,
and other sectors that serve
substitute surveilling function, and
outcomes are monitored to
demonstrate possibility of
expanding non-carceral approach
Structural/Systemic Origins
of Overcriminalization &
Overincarceration: Social
integration fulfills informally
surveillant function, a
preferable substitute for
incarceration in wide range
of cases
2012] 1597DECARCERATION COURTS
or by rejecting the turn to criminal court specialization. Rather, the effects of
specialized criminal courts will depend on an ongoing competition over the
shape and ambition of these courts. And a decarceration-focused criminal law
reform agenda—emerging in specialized criminal courts that attempt to navi-
gate the perils and harness the possibilities identified in the pages to follow—
holds the promise of enabling a form of criminal law administration more
narrowly tailored to address that conduct for which criminal law intervention is
most suited, allocating to other sectors the management of a range of social
concerns from addiction to mental illness.
Importantly then, the impact of these reformist models reaches beyond the
context of specialized criminal courts. At this moment of increasing bipartisan
interest in criminal law reform aimed at reducing incarceration, the models at
work in specialized criminal courts are likely to take on wider significance,
informing more general criminal law reform strategies. For this reason, atten-
tion to these contrasting reformist approaches at work in specialized criminal
courts merits the sustained attention of criminal law scholars and others con-
cerned about the steep costs—economic and human—of the status quo in U.S.
criminal law administration and about the harms endemic in our carceral
institutions.
This Article consists of four parts. Part I situates the contemporary explosion
of specialized criminal courts within a range of ongoing criminal law reforms
implemented to reduce levels of criminal supervision and incarceration. Part I
proposes that, as states and the federal government aim to decrease reliance on
incarceration, specialized criminal courts contribute an array of criminal law
reformist frameworks that may inform the wide-ranging, largely ad hoc changes
occurring more generally in U.S. criminal law.
Part II provides a typology and critical analysis of four criminal law reformist
models reflected in the rapidly multiplying assortment of specialized criminal
courts. Part II considers not only whether these models are likely to fulfill their
stated purposes but also some of their possible broader effects. An implication
of the analysis in Part II is that the study of specialized criminal courts ought to
proceed in a different way than it has to date, by attending carefully to the legal
institutional and conceptual differences between the various criminal law reform-
ist models that the typology introduced here identifies. Part II contends that, in
certain legal institutional configurations, specialized criminal courts may well
thwart the courts’ overarching shared ambition of countering overcriminaliza-
tion and overincarceration, and that they may cause other underappreciated
harms. Yet, if differently configured, the courts contain considerable broader
reaching reformist possibilities.
Part III explores three strategies that may enable a decarceration model to
realize its reformist potential to reduce reliance on conventional criminal super-
vision and incarceration as well as to facilitate other transformative shifts in
U.S. criminal law. Part III proposes that, though it is unlikely and possibly
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undesirable that specialized criminal courts would be brought to scale,26 even in
relatively small numbers a decarceration model may effect farther reaching
reform by facilitating cognitive reframing of particular categories of crime and
punishment, engaging in institutional reinvention, and enabling systemic change.
Finally, Part IV considers the perils of a specialized criminal courts law reform
approach more generally and begins to respond to anticipated objections.
The analysis in Parts I through IV is informed by observation of proceedings
in an array of specialized criminal courts; archived interviews with specialized
court judges, court administrators, and court participants; a review of hundreds
of the courts’ promotional materials; additional primary source material concern-
ing a national range of specialized criminal courts; the legal academic and
sociological literature on the courts; and previously unexamined studies of the
courts conducted by government agencies and independent research entities.27
I. A SHIFTING CRIMINAL LAW
Dissatisfaction with the status quo in U.S. criminal law administration has led
to a range of attempts to establish alternatives. The precise contours of what
such alternatives should entail are uncertain. This Part will first take stock of the
broad shifts ongoing in U.S. criminal law. Although these shifts lack an
orienting conceptual framework, specialized criminal courts have become grounds
for elaborating different criminal law reformist models, four of the most signifi-
cant of which are explored in Part II.
Preliminarily, what does the status quo in conventional U.S. criminal law
administration entail? A powerful body of criminal law and social theoretical
scholarship bears witness to the tremendous expansion and deepening harshness
of U.S. criminal law administration during the latter decades of the twentieth
and beginning of the twenty-first centuries: to the harms and economic burdens
caused by both overcriminalization and overincarceration;28 to the “culture of
control” these practices engendered;29 and to the United States’ “harsh justice”
regime,30 under which “the poor” and “urban outcasts” suffer most,31 and
26. See, e.g., PORTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 8 (“The potential for bringing the [specialized criminal]
problem-solving court model to scale . . . remains largely unrealized . . . .”).
27. See infra Parts I–IV.
28. See, e.g., BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006); see also John C.
Coffee, Jr., Hush!: The Criminal Status of Confidential Information After McNally and Carpenter and
the Enduring Problem of Overcriminalization, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121 (1988); Sanford H. Kadish,
The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 157 (1967); Erik Luna, The
Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703 (2005).
29. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
(2001).
30. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN
AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003).
31. LOI¨C WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY (2009);
LOI¨C WACQUANT, URBAN OUTCASTS: A COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY OF ADVANCED MARGINALITY (2008);
WESTERN, supra note 28.
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through which we all are “governed through crime.”32 As substantive criminal
law expanded dramatically, prosecutorial power mushroomed and so did case
load pressures and reliance on plea-bargaining.33 During the 1980s and 1990s, a
range of causal forces pushed toward a form of governance in the United States
that relied heavily on conventional criminal law administration to maintain
social order, in large part through policing, arrest, prosecution, probation, and
often lengthy prison sentences.34 The results have been disastrous, exceedingly
expensive, and inhumane: racial and class disproportion in U.S. criminal courts,
jails, and prisons is staggering, with African-American men incarcerated at a
rate six times greater than that of white men and nearly one in three young
African-American men without a high school education living behind bars.35
Prison and jail overcrowding is a persistent crisis.36 Sexual assaults in detention
settings are daily occurrences.37 Even for those not subject to violent physical
or sexual abuse, what Charles Dickens wrote of American jails and prisons well
over a century ago remains true today: “[T]his slow and daily tampering with
the mysteries of the brain . . . [visits] ghastly signs and tokens . . . not so
palpable to the eye and sense of touch as scars upon the flesh . . . .”38 “[T]hese
frustrations,” in the words of sociologist Gresham Sykes in his path-breaking
study, The Society of Captives, “carry a . . . profound hurt . . . directed against
the very foundations of the prisoner’s being. The individual’s picture of himself
as a person of value—as a morally acceptable, adult . . . who can present some
claim to merit in his material achievements and his inner strength—begins to
waver and grow dim.”39
32. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007).
33. See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2548, 2550 (2004) (“The greater the territory substantive criminal law covers, the smaller the role
that law plays in allocating criminal punishment.”).
34. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 32; LOI¨C WACQUANT, PRISONS OF POVERTY 5 (2009).
35. See HEATHER C. WEST, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2009—
STATISTICAL TABLES 2 (2010) (“Black non-Hispanic males . . . were incarcerated at a rate more than 6
times higher than white non-Hispanic males . . . .”); Bruce Western et al., Crime, Punishment, and
American Inequality 7 (June 2003) (unpublished working paper), available at http://inequality.prince
ton.edu/papers/western-crime.pdf (“Incredibly, 29 percent of black male dropouts under age 40 were
behind bars on an average day in 2000.”); see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS
IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); WESTERN, supra note 28; Becky Pettit & Bruce
Western, Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and Class Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69
AM. SOC. REV. 151 (2004).
36. See, e.g., JOHN J. GIBBONS & NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH, CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT: A REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS 23, 26–27 (2006).
37. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS, at v, 63 (2001); see also
Sharon Dolovich, Strategic Segregation in the Modern Prison, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (“[I]t
is well recognized that people who are gay or transgender face heightened vulnerability to sexual
victimization behind bars.” (footnotes omitted)).
38. CHARLES DICKENS, 1 AMERICAN NOTES FOR GENERAL CIRCULATION 239 (Chapman & Hall 2d ed.
1842).
39. GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON 79 (1958).
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Of the approximately 13.5 million people who spend time in U.S. prisons or
jails over the course of a year, ninety-five percent return to communities
outside. They bring with them the psychic toll of living amidst violence and
despair and the heightened risk of having acquired contagious diseases, impact-
ing the public health and public safety of communities around the country.40
Further, costs to maintain high levels of incarceration—with one in thirty-one
adults in the United States under some type of correctional control41—have
become exorbitant and particularly politically unpopular during a period of
significant fiscal constraints.42
As these costs of managing a range of social ills through criminal law and
punishment have become increasingly apparent, the hold of these practices is
slowly loosening.43 This poses anew a long-standing question of how to attempt
differently to achieve some measure of social order, whether through reformed
criminal law administration, the market economy, and/or reconfigured social
welfare policies.44
Even absent widely shared alternative conceptual frameworks to address this
question, legislatures and courts, cognizant of the problems posed by expansive
criminalization and incarceration, have begun to intervene to scale back the
reach of criminal law, at least with regard to certain categories of offenses and
offenders. Crime rates have remained relatively low, including violent crime
rates, generating greater openness to less punitive, less prison-focused ap-
proaches.45 The following sections briefly review the range of contemporary
criminal law reform efforts, first in the arenas of legislation, law enforcement,
and litigation, and then in the context of specialized criminal courts, which will
be the focus of the remainder of this Article.
40. See, e.g., GIBBONS & KATZENBACH, supra note 36, at 11.
41. See PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 1, at 1 (also noting that among certain demographics
correctional supervision rates are even starker—for example, one in eleven African-Americans are
under correctional control).
42. See, e.g., JOHN SCHMITT ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF
INCARCERATION 2, 10 (2010).
43. See, e.g., Mary Bosworth, Penal Moderation in the United States?: Yes We Can, 10 CRIMINOLOGY
& PUB. POL’Y 335, 335–36 (2011).
44. See Shelley Johnson Listwan et al., Cracks in the Penal Harm Movement: Evidence from the
Field, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 423, 450 (2008).
45. See, e.g., Vanessa Barker, Explaining the Great American Crime Decline: A Review of Blumstein
and Wallman, Goldberger and Rosenfeld, and Zimring, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 489 (2010); Allison
Klein, Drop in Violent Crime in D.C. Area and Some Other Major Cities Puzzles Experts, WASH. POST,
July 20, 2009, http://www.washington post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/19/AR2009071902154.
html; Evan Perez, Violent Crime Falls Sharply, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB100014240527487041135045752644324634 69618.html; see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT
AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 57–98 (2007) (critically analyzing the tendency to attribute crime decline to
any single explicit policy change); Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four
Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 170–83 (2004)
(explaining the decline in crime in terms of legalized abortion, increased police presence, more
incarceration, and decrease in crack cocaine use).
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A. REFIGURING HARSH JUSTICE: LEGISLATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT, LITIGATION
There is an increasing openness on the part of legislatures, courts, and the
public to experiment with criminal law administrative alternatives, but across
the numerous contexts of ongoing reform there is no common conception of
how an alternative social-order-maintenance regime may operate without exten-
sive reliance on conventional criminal law enforcement. Importantly as well,
the ad hoc shifts in criminal law administration are occurring in the absence of
an account of how current shifts will be sustained in the event that one
egregious crime causes popular punitive sentiment to rise again.
Generally, recent legislation has shortened prison terms,46 recharacterized
some of what were previously felonies to misdemeanors,47 and reduced sen-
tences for nonviolent offenses.48 Additional measures divert people charged
with lower-level drug offenses from carceral sentences, apply graduated sanc-
tions to those who violate the rules on probation or parole, and focus resources
on reentry so as to avoid reincarceration.49
At the state level, along with other criminal law reforms, mandatory mini-
mums have been eliminated in multiple jurisdictions. Michigan, for example,
has done away with mandatory minimum sentences for the vast majority of
drug offenses.50 Kansas revised its sentencing guidelines to mandate treatment
rather than prison for persons convicted of drug possession.51 In 2009, New
York repealed the Rockefeller drug laws, which mandated sentences of at least
46. See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. L. §§ 270–273 (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2012) (providing authority to
counties and the city of New York to convene “local conditional release commissions” to consider
candidates for early release); 61 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 4503–4506 (West 2010) (permitting a
reduction of up to twenty-five percent of non-violent offender’s sentence to encourage offender to
engage in rehabilitative programming); see also Kirk Mitchell, First 10 Felons Set Free Under
Colorado Early-Release Initiative, DENVER POST, Oct. 15, 2009, http://www.denverpost.com/
ci_13564285; Riley Yates, Release Plan for Convicts Starts Slow, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 26,
2010, at A14. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has estimated that its Recidivism Risk Reduction
Incentive (RRRI) program—created by the statutory provisions cited above—saves the state nearly
$10,000 per RRRI inmate, for a total savings of more than $11 million over the first two years of the
program’s existence. BRET BUCKLEN & JACQUELINE YOUNG, PA. DEP’T OF CORR., RECIDIVISM RISK
REDUCTION INCENTIVE 2010 REPORT 1 (2011).
47. See, e.g., Jessica Fender, More Rehab, Less Jail in Drug-Reform Measure, DENVER POST, Feb. 24,
2010, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_14459351 (reporting on Colorado legislation reducing offense of
possession of between eight and twelve ounces of marijuana from a felony punishable by up to six
years in prison to a misdemeanor); see also Debi Brazzale, HB10-1352: Lawmakers Unite Behind New
Approach to Drug Offenders, STATE BILL NEWS (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.statebillnews.com/2010/02/
hb10-1352-lawmakers-unite-behind-new-approach-to-drug-offenders/ (reporting on the same Colorado
legislation).
48. See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90
N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (working paper draft at 2), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_ id1804539.
49. GREENE & MAUER, supra note 3, at 1.
50. Id. at 3.
51. Id. Subsequently, Michigan achieved a twelve percent reduction in its prison population and
Kansas a five percent reduction. See id. at 2.
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fifteen years for possession of as little as four ounces of a narcotic drug.52
California Senate Bill X3 18, passed in 2009, introduced numerous changes to
reduce reliance on imprisonment, including authorizing nonrevocable parole,
increasing the minimum dollar quantity for some felony-level property crimes,
and raising the number of “good-time credits” prisoners are eligible to earn
through educational programs, treatment participation, or firefighting work.53
At the federal level, the Second Chance Act of 2007 provides federal funding
to the states for new criminal justice initiatives aimed at reducing recidivism
and reincarceration.54 The legislation supports appropriations for state and
federal programs providing employment assistance, substance abuse treatment,
and housing along with other services for individuals with criminal convic-
tions.55 And, in 2010, Congress passed a bill to reduce the disparity in crack and
powder cocaine sentencing from 100:1 to 18:1.56
Accompanying these legislative changes, police departments are increasingly
participating in diversionary programs at the preindictment stage, seeking to
reduce reliance on arrests, prosecution, and prison- and jail-based punishment.57
Some police departments have transitioned to a “problem-oriented” or “predic-
tive policing” model, which focuses police energies on particular areas where
certain crimes are believed to be likely to occur.58 The focus is on understand-
ing crime patterns in neighborhoods where a car theft or burglary has taken
place and allocating resources to prevent similar future acts in significant
52. See, e.g., JUDITH GREENE, JUSTICE STRATEGIES, POSITIVE TRENDS AND BEST PRACTICES IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE REFORM: A NATIONAL OVERVIEW 12–15 (2009); Casey Seiler, Paterson Signs Drug Law Reform,
CAPITOL CONFIDENTIAL (Apr. 24, 2009, 11:22 AM), http://blog.timesunion.com/capitol/archives/13869/
paterson-signs-drug-law-reform/ (quoting release from the governor’s office regarding repeal of the
Rockefeller Drug Laws and relating “three significant pieces of the new laws,” including first that “they
create a drug treatment program to be administered by drug court judges”). From 1999 to 2009, New
York reduced its prison population by twenty percent. GREENE & MAUER, supra note 3, at 5.
53. See Rosemary Gartner et al., The Past as Prologue?: Decarceration in California Then and
Now, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 291, 296, 319 (2011); see also CAL. CITIES GANG PREVENTION
NETWORK, 18TH BULLETIN (2010), available at http://www.ccgpn.org/Publications/CA%20Cities
%20Bulletin%2018.pdf (discussing SB X3 18). Interestingly, the California Correctional and Peace
Officers Association did not publicly work against SB X3 18, though this may be due to the
legislation’s limited anticipated effects on prison reliance. See Gartner et al., supra, at 319.
54. Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and
42 U.S.C.). Like other legislative reforms enabling alternatives to incarceration, Second Chance Act
programs must establish that they are “evidence-based,” requiring an evaluation using “evidenced-
based methodology and outcome measures.” Id. § 101(d)(3); see also id. §§ 3(a)(3), 113, 201(c)(2)(D),
231(d)(3)(B), 241(b)(6).
55. Id. §§ 111, 112.
56. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372; see also Jim Abrams,
Congress Passes Bill To Reduce Disparity in Crack, Powder Cocaine Sentencing, WASH. POST, July 29,
2010, http://www.washington post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/28/AR2010072802969.html.
57. See, e.g., DAVID M. KENNEDY, DON’T SHOOT: ONE MAN, A STREET FELLOWSHIP, AND THE END OF
VIOLENCE IN INNER-CITY AMERICA (2011) (documenting Professor Kennedy’s implementation of his
“Operation Ceasefire” program in cities throughout the United States, with the cooperation of local
police departments).
58. See, e.g., Erica Goode, Sending the Police Before There’s a Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/us/16police.html.
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measure through design interventions such as improved lighting and visibility,
or more frequent patrols.59
Shifts are also reflected in Supreme Court case law. Rehabilitation—for
decades largely rejected as a theory of punishment—was invoked by the Court
in its 2010 opinion in Graham v. Florida, which extended proportionality
review in the noncapital context to restrain penal severity.60 The Court categori-
cally invalidated the sentence of life imprisonment without parole for juveniles
for nonhomicide offenses on the grounds that the sentence rejected “altogether
the rehabilitative ideal,” providing “no chance for reconciliation with society,
no hope” for one who committed a crime while still “a child in the eyes of the
law.”61 And in Brown v. Plata, a majority of Supreme Court justices joined an
opinion upholding a specially convened three-judge district court’s prison popu-
lation reduction order and decrying the inhumane conditions for mentally ill and
infirm inmates in California’s prisons.62
These developments are in line with recommendations to reduce dependence
on incarceration and criminal supervision urged by liberal criminal law scholars
and criminologists since at least the mid-1990s.63 Many of these reforms have
more recently been embraced by political conservatives as well.64
Although these changing approaches and attitudes have affected every level
of criminal law administration from policing to parole and probation, there is
nonetheless a more general, persistent uncertainty about how better to adminis-
ter criminal law so as to depart significantly from current practices—and
perhaps more critically, how to expand and sustain support for alternatives to
incarceration and conventional criminal supervision. Part of what is lacking is
what criminologist Mary Bosworth describes as a “coordinated conceptual
framework to help shift not only penal institutions and practices but also those
more subtle structures of feeling and belief that have proven so effective in
ratcheting up punitive practice.”65
Specialized criminal courts are engaged in the work of shaping coordinated
59. See, e.g., RONALD V. CLARKE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SHOPLIFTING 20 (2002), available at
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/e10011345.pdf; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime
Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039, 1041–42 (2002); Cecelia Klingele et al., Essay, Reimagining Criminal
Justice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 953, 975–76.
60. 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028–33 (2010).
61. Id. Subsequently, in its 2011 opinion in Tapia v. United States, the Court rejected rehabilitation
as a ground on which to impose a lengthier federal prison sentence. 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2393 (2011)
(holding that “a court may not impose or lengthen a prison sentence . . . to promote rehabilitation”).
62. 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1944–47 (2011).
63. See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 23–40 (2009) (citing
studies exploring harms associated with high levels of incarceration); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social
and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271,
1281–97 (2004) (citing and discussing scholarship focused on incarceration-related harms).
64. Perhaps most prominently, the right-wing criminal law reform campaign, “Right on Crime,” is
committed to markedly reducing reliance on incarceration. See, e.g., Savage, supra note 2.
65. See Bosworth, supra note 43, at 336; see also ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 21
(2003) (“The most difficult and urgent challenge today is that of creatively exploring new terrains of
justice, where the prison no longer serves as our major anchor.”).
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conceptual and institutional frameworks to inform criminal law reform pro-
cesses, and there are at least four distinct reformist approaches represented in
existing specialized criminal courts. The following section explores the emer-
gence of contemporary specialized criminal courts—their heterogeneous and
common ambitions, histories, and ambits—before turning in the following Part
to a typology and critical analysis of four reformist models at work in these
courts.
B. CRIMINAL COURT REFORM: SPECIALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS
The contemporary specialized criminal courts movement was spearheaded by
state court judges dismayed with the miscarriages of justice they witnessed
daily in their courts. Although the progenitors of specialized criminal courts
sought initially only to devise different solutions for their respective local
jurisdictions, the specialized courts approach took off and the courts’ influence
expanded nationally. As specialized criminal courts spread across the United
States, the courts came to reflect considerable institutional diversity.
Of the approximately 3,000 specialized criminal courts in the United States,
the original and most numerous are drug courts. Beginning in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, judges dissatisfied with their role in processing drug cases began to
convene drug courts to reduce reliance on incarceration in favor of treatment
and other monitoring processes for drug-related offenses. Among the first
contemporary adult specialized criminal courts, the Miami-Dade Drug Court
was established in 1989 to reduce reliance on jail and prison in dealing with
low-level drug offenders.66 To promote these initiatives, state court judges
collaborated with prosecutors, public defense counsel, and ultimately state
legislatures and the federal government. Former Attorney General Janet Reno,
when she was a local prosecutor in Florida, was instrumental in establishing the
Miami-Dade Drug Court; and then, when Reno became Attorney General of the
United States, she used her control over federal criminal justice spending to
urge other states to adopt similar initiatives.67 Subsequently drug courts have
received overwhelming bipartisan support.68
66. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 9; see also NOLAN, supra note 10, at 134. Although
addiction itself cannot be criminalized, coerced treatment may serve as a response to conviction for
possession of narcotics in lieu of a jail or prison sentence. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
667 (1962) (holding unconstitutional a California statute criminalizing narcotics addiction as cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). But see Powell v. Texas,
392 U.S. 514, 532–33 (1968) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Texas statute rendering public
intoxication criminal did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment). The Nixon Administration’s
Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC) program, a predecessor to the drug court movement,
also provided for diversion from adjudication to drug treatment. But TASC differed in that it diverted
cases from the courts for treatment, whereas drug courts generally supervise the treatment process
itself. See NOLAN, supra note 10, at 36.
67. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 203 n.3.
68. See ROBERT V. WOLF, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, ‘A NEW WAY OF DOING BUSINESS’: A CONVERSA-
TION ABOUT THE STATEWIDE COORDINATION OF PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS 12 (2009) [hereinafter WOLF, A
NEW WAY] (“[P]ositive evaluations have generated bipartisan support, allowing [Maryland’s] statewide
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At the National Drug Court Conference in 1998, Judge Jeffrey Tauber,
Oakland, California’s first drug court judge and then-President of the National
Association of Drug Court Professionals, addressed his audience of more than
2,500 drug court professionals, predicting the growing influence that drug
courts would wield in coming years: “[W]e have clearly proven through the
work that we’ve done, through our numbers, through the effectiveness of our
courts, that this field, this movement, this organization is ready to take center
stage, is ready to move its own agenda forward on . . . the local, state, and
national levels.”69
Indeed, in the years to follow drug courts sprung up around the country. As
the number of drug courts increased, their institutional configurations came to
vary substantially. Like the first Miami-Dade Drug Court program, drug courts
generally aim to help narcotics-involved offenders to stay off drugs by offering
the opportunity to enter drug rehabilitation rather than incarceration, but many
drug courts increasingly address a range of other crimes presumably associated
with drug use, such as shoplifting, prostitution, and burglary.70 Some drug
courts admit defendants with lengthy and serious felony records, while others
limit eligibility to those with nonviolent minor charges.71
Shortly after the advent of the drug court movement, mental health courts,
community courts, domestic violence courts, and, later, veterans courts, sex
offense courts, and reentry courts emerged in jurisdictions around the United
States. Each of these categories of specialized criminal courts represents a
largely judicially innovated attempt to work around perceived inadequacies in
the conventional criminal law administrative approach in the area in question—
whether arrests and prosecutions of mentally ill individuals, veterans, persons
accused of domestic violence, alleged sex offenders, or parolees.
Criminal law administration within specialized criminal courts generally
adopts a neo-realist jurisprudence, which its proponents call problem-solving
justice or, to my mind more accurately, problem-oriented justice.72 This has led
problem-solving committee to influence public policy . . . .” (paraphrasing Judge Jamey Hueston of the
Maryland Problem-Solving Courts Commission)); ROBERT V. WOLF, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, NEIGH-
BORHOOD KNOWLEDGE: COMMUNITY PROSECUTION IN WASHINGTON D.C. 3–4 (2001) (noting that, during the
Clinton administration, Eric Holder, then deputy attorney general, championed community prosecu-
tion); Anthony C. Thompson, Courting Disorder: Some Thoughts on Community Courts, 10 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 63, 84–85 (2002) (noting that Republican New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani introduced
certain problem-solving courts as part of a broader order-maintenance crime control policy); see also
America’s Oldest War: The Efficacy of United States Drug Policy, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 401, 411
(2003) (“But we should have new ideas and support things that work, such as drug courts that have
treatment with accountability for those with addiction problems . . . .” (statement of Asa Hutchinson,
former Republican legislator and then-Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration)); Adri-
aan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 359, 369 (2005).
69. See NOLAN, supra note 10, at 43–44.
70. See id. at 143.
71. See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 8.
72. Although many commentators refer to the problem-oriented approach of specialized criminal
courts as “problem-solving justice,” I prefer the term “problem-oriented justice” because most of the
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some commentators to label all specialized criminal courts interchangeably,
“problem-solving courts,”73 a term that connotes an aim on the part of the
courts to address problems both in the legal system and in the lives of defen-
dants appearing before the courts.74
It is noteworthy that judges themselves have been the primary driving force
behind the specialized-criminal-courts movement, working cooperatively with
prosecutors, defense counsel, and other interested elected officials to convene
specialized criminal courts. As criminal law enforcement expanded during the
latter decades of the twentieth century and many more cases entered the
criminal courts, dockets swelled.75 More cases meant more pressure on judges
to resolve cases quickly, leading to reduced judicial morale.76 In response to
their deep dissatisfaction with their own role in criminal law administration,
judges sought to devise an alternative legal institutional framework for at least
some categories of criminal cases, obtaining initially the support of locally
elected prosecutors and, subsequently, as the specialized-criminal-court initia-
tives expanded, broader legislative support.77 In promoting specialized court
programs as a criminal law reform standard, judges and other court advocates
increasingly have collaborated with specialized court consultants, such as the
relevant “problems” are unlikely to be “solved” by the courts and because the conceptual origins of this
approach lie in problem-oriented policing. See Greg Berman & Aubrey Fox, The Future of Problem-
Solving Justice: An International Perspective, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 1
(2010) (exploring the emergence of the rubric of problem-solving justice and the nature of some of the
profound problems the courts aim to address).
73. See, e.g., PAMELA M. CASEY & DAVID B. ROTTMAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, PROBLEM-
SOLVING COURTS: MODELS AND TRENDS (2003); JUSTICE POLICY INST., ADDICTED TO COURTS: HOW A
GROWING DEPENDENCE ON DRUG COURTS IMPACTS PEOPLE AND COMMUNITIES 2 (2011).
74. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 5 (“[A] case is a problem to be solved, not just a matter to
be adju[di]cated.”); GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, PROBLEM-SOLVING
COURTS: A BRIEF PRIMER 3 (2001) (“Problem-solving courts use their authority to forge new responses to
chronic social, human and legal problems—including problems like family dysfunction, addiction,
delinquency and domestic violence—that have proven resistant to conventional solutions.”); NOLAN,
supra note 10, at 141 (“[T]he issue of guilt/innocence is not of concern.” (quoting Judge McKinney));
Kay L. Levine, The New Prosecution, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1125, 1127 (2005) (“Problem-oriented
approaches challenge law enforcement personnel to abandon their traditional reactive orientations in
favor of proactive efforts to solve social problems . . . .”). Public defenders have also proposed more
problem-oriented advocacy, focusing on “holistic” client-centered defense rather than on victory in a
particular case. See, e.g., Robin Steinberg & David Feige, Cultural Revolution: Transforming the
Public Defender’s Office, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 123, 124 (2004).
75. See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 23–24.
76. Criminal law reformers convened specialized criminal courts as thousands of new cases entered
the system. The greatest increase in case filings was in the area of domestic relations where, between
1984 and 1998, cases increased by seventy-five percent. These increases were caused in part by
expanding criminal law enforcement, which resulted in more police officers and more cases went
forward due to expanded prosecutorial funding and “‘no-drop’ prosecution policies.” See id. at 23–26.
77. See Eric Lane, Due Process and Problem-Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 955, 955–56
(2003) (quoting Justice Kathleen A. Blatz of Minnesota’s Supreme Court and citing BERMAN &
FEINBLATT, supra note 74). The Honorable Jonathan Lippman, Chief Judge of the New York Court of
Appeals, has likewise described New York’s specialized criminal courts as “a judicially-created,
statewide architecture.” Jonathan Lippman, How One State Reduced Both Crime and Incarceration, 38
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1045, 1053 (2010).
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Center for Court Innovation, a New York City-based organization, and with
legal academics.78
State legislatures and the U.S. Congress have endorsed the specialized courts
approach by incorporating diversionary specialized court sentencing into statu-
tory provisions and by authorizing state and federal funding for specialized
criminal courts. In this regard, the specialized courts movement may be under-
stood as a widely endorsed work-around of political process defects: whereas
“tough on crime” norms make decriminalization or other downscaling of punish-
ment less available, specialized criminal courts allow officials to appear “smart”
rather than “soft” on crime. For example, in 2000 Congress enacted America’s
Law Enforcement and Mental Health Project, which authorized federal funds
for states and counties to develop mental health courts and diversion programs
rather than more directly tackling the overincarceration of mentally ill per-
sons.79 Financed with a combination of state and federal funding, mental health
courts aim to address the disproportionate number of persons with mental
illness under criminal supervision and to reduce reliance on incarceration in
responding to the conduct of mentally ill individuals. Although the first genera-
tion of mental health courts largely excluded persons charged with violent
offenses, some mental health courts now accept individuals facing violent
felony charges.80 Also in 2000, the Office of Justice Programs’ Reentry Court
Initiative funded reentry courts to facilitate ex-convicts’ returns from prison to
their respective communities of residence.81 Reentry courts convene team-based
efforts that typically involve a judge, a social worker, and a mental health
professional, who design a diversionary social service supervisory regimen for
parolees and help to facilitate access to employment and housing.82
Veterans courts, convened beginning in the mid-2000s, are specialized courts
established to address socially disruptive behavior on the part of veterans, many
of whom are suffering mental health problems arising from combat-related
post-traumatic stress disorder.83 Those accused of violent crimes are in some
instances able to participate in veterans courts, which rely on alternative sen-
tences involving predominately mental health and medical treatment along with
78. See, e.g., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, www.courtinnovation.org.
79. Pub. L. No. 106-515, 114 Stat. 2399 (2000).
80. See Henry J. Steadman et al., From Referral to Disposition: Case Processing in Seven Mental
Health Courts, 23 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215, 220 (2005); Shauhin Talesh, Mental Health Court Judges as
Dynamic Risk Managers: A New Conceptualization of the Role of Judges, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 93, 112
(2007).
81. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 73, at 18.
82. See ROBERT V. WOLF, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, REENTRY COURTS: LOOKING AHEAD 11–12
(2011); Reentry Courts: An Emerging Trend, REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL (Sept. 20, 2005), http://
reentrypolicy.org/announcements/ reentry_courts_emerging_trend.
83. See Michael Daly Hawkins, Coming Home: Accommodating the Special Needs of Military
Veterans to the Criminal Justice System, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 563, 563–70 (2010); William H.
McMichael, The Battle on the Home Front: Special Courts Turn to Those Who Served To Help
Troubled Vets Regain Discipline, Camaraderie, ABA J., Nov. 2011, at 42–48.
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other services.84
In contrast to drug courts, mental health courts, and veterans courts, domestic
violence courts and sex offense courts generally operate with less reference to
rehabilitative goals. Instead, domestic violence and sex offense courts, for the
most part, seek to provide individually tailored monitoring of defendants charged
and/or convicted in domestic violence or sex offense cases and, in some
instances, more meaningful service provision for complainants. But some domes-
tic violence and sex offense courts also seek to reduce reliance on incarceration.
Domestic violence and sex offense courts with an incarceration-reduction mis-
sion intend for monitoring and services to serve as an alternative to jail- or
prison-based sentencing and to work to break preexisting cycles of violence and
abuse so as to limit levels of reincarceration. As Brooklyn’s Felony Domestic
Violence Court Judge John Leventhal explained:
I saw people going to jail for two years for not paying child support, which is
a condition of their order of protection . . . [and] I was . . . surprised to see
such a large violation and probation calendar. I wanted to cut that down. How
do we cut that down? We bring them back while they’re on probation, before
they’re really violating in a bad way, to keep them on the right track.
. . . For the first four years or five years that we were doing it, we had half the
violation rate of the general probation population—which is incredible consid-
ering that you have targeted victims and people who know each other. Since
then I think our violation rate has gone down even further.85
So in domestic violence courts, such as Judge Leventhal’s, judicial monitoring
aims to reduce carceral sentencing, reoffending, and reincarceration, even though
these goals were not the explicit initial motivations for convening most domes-
tic violence courts.
Likewise, sex offense courts have been promoted to more effectively monitor
persons accused or convicted of sex offenses.86 Yet, some of these courts
simultaneously seek to shift criminal law administration in sex offense cases to
84. See, e.g., Megan McCloskey, Veterans Court Takes a Chance on Violent Offenders, STARS &
STRIPES (Sept. 14, 2010), http://www.stripes.com/veterans-court-takes-a-chance-on-violent-offenders-
1.118182; see also Kathleen Kreller, Idaho Court Would Assist Veterans Who Land in the Legal System
in Getting Help—Instead of Hard Time, IDAHO STATESMAN (Apr. 17, 2011), http://www.idahostatesman.
com/2011/04/17/1612614/idaho-considers-veterans-court.html.
85. Interview by Carolyn Turgeon with Judge John Leventhal, Brooklyn Felony Domestic Violence
Court (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/research/judge-john-leventhal-brooklyn-
felony-domestic-violence-court.
86. When asked what he thought the future of the sex offense courts would be, Judge James
McCarthy of the Oswego County Sex Offense Court replied: “I think you will find a sex offender court
in every county in New York and every state in this country. Sex offender courts are going to expand
because the public wants to see compliance and monitoring by the criminal justice system of sex
offenders that are in the community.” Interview by the Center for Court Innovation with Judge James
McCarthy, Oswego County Sex Offense Court, available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/research/
james-mccarthy-judge-oswego-county.
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make the criminal supervisory regime more reasonable and less likely to result
in reincarceration for technical violations. Contrary to public perception, most
convicted sex offenders receive little prison time in their initial sentence and are
subject primarily to terms of probation or a short carceral sentence followed by
parole.87 Still, in many jurisdictions the vast majority of convicted sex offend-
ers—even those charged only with an offense stemming from public exposure
or sex with a person just a few years younger than the accused—are subject to
sex offender registration and residential restrictions that make life extremely
difficult and may encourage criminal behavior by socially isolating sex offend-
ers.88 Sex offense courts permit modifications of certain of these restrictions
where doing so is thought to be reasonable, so that the response to persons
charged and convicted of sex offenses may unfold with greater moderation and
rationality.89 As Judge James McCarthy, the first presiding judge of the Oswego
County Sex Offense Court in New York has explained, the ambition of his court
in offering a more individualized monitoring regime for convicted sex offenders
is in part to make it such that “the sex offender can live somewhere and work
somewhere, without being demonized, while still being closely supervised.”90
The sex offense courts may also be conceptualized in some instances, then, as
an attempt to work around existing criminal law regimes that appear to judges
and other interested persons to be irrational or excessively harsh, where more
thoroughgoing legislative modification is unavailable. The courts aim to devise
an alternative regime to mitigate the perceived ill effects of the conventional
processes and to develop a different approach that may have as an important
side effect reduced reliance on incarceration in response to technical viola-
tions.91
There are, as of this writing, in jurisdictions across the United States,
approximately 300 mental health courts,92 200 domestic violence courts, and
thirty community courts, more than 2,000 drug courts, and in excess of 500
87. See, e.g., REBECCA THOMFORDE-HAUSER & JULI ANA GRANT, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, SEX
OFFENSE COURTS: SUPPORTING VICTIM AND COMMUNITY SAFETY THROUGH COLLABORATION 1–2 (2010); see
also LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS
OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT (1997).
88. See, e.g., Sarah E. Agudo, Comment, Irregular Passion: The Unconstitutionality and Inefficacy
of Sex Offender Residency Laws, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 307, 308–11 (2008); see also Fourth Amended
Complaint, Whitaker v. Perdue, No. 4:06-cv-140-CC (N.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 2008), available at http://
www.schr.org/files/post/FILED%20FAC.pdf (challenging Georgia’s sex offender registry on behalf of a
class of convicted sex offenders, the named plaintiff of which is twenty eight-year-old Wendy Whitaker,
who is on the registry because at the age of seventeen she engaged in a single consensual act of oral sex
with a fifteen-year-old boy).
89. See, e.g., THOMFORDE-HAUSER & GRANT, supra note 87, at 5–6.
90. See Interview by the Center for Court Innovation with Judge James McCarthy, supra note 86.
91. A technical violation is a probation or parole rule infraction—such as a missed curfew, missed
probation counseling appointment, or dirty urine analysis—which does not rise to the level of a
criminal offense.
92. See, e.g., PAUL HIGGINS & MITCHELL B. MACKINEM, PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? at ix (2009).
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other specialized criminal courts including sex offense and veterans courts.93
Those states with numerous specialized criminal courts span the country, includ-
ing jurisdictions as diverse as Alaska, California, Indiana, and New York.94
There is no single foundational document to which all specialized criminal
courts refer, and no unified theory that captures their complicated interrelation-
ships and diverse projects. But although the initial impetuses for convening
specialized criminal courts differed, most of their founders share in common the
hope of devising better substantially non-carceral approaches to criminal law
administration, at least for certain categories of offenders.95
Specialized criminal courts have now reached some measure of maturity and
there are at least four legal institutional and conceptual reformist models to
which the existing courts roughly correspond. In fact, what may make special-
ized criminal courts politically palatable is also what makes their eventual
outcome uncertain: their form is sufficiently open so as to incorporate any or
several of these four often quite divergent reformist approaches.96 As a result,
what specialized criminal courts ultimately portend for U.S. criminal law
remains ambiguous, a matter over which there should be much more rigorous
and reasoned debate than has occurred to date.
II. FOUR REFORMIST MODELS AT WORK IN SPECIALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS
This Part introduces a typology and critical theoretical analysis of four
criminal law reformist models at work in specialized criminal courts—(a) a
therapeutic jurisprudence model; (b) a judicial monitoring model; (c) an order
maintenance model; and (d) a decarceration model—with particular emphasis
on the models’ respective aspirations, potential unintended harms, and reformist
possibilities. This Part argues that, whereas the first three more predominant
models possess characteristics that threaten a range of unintended and harmful
consequences, the fourth model—a decarceration model—holds considerable
promise to facilitate broader transformative criminal law reform.97 The follow-
ing Part, Part III, explores in greater detail three criminal law reform strategies
that a decarceration model may set in motion.
93. See, e.g., PORTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 1.
94. See id.
95. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 6.
96. See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 145–48 (2007)
(arguing that law and policy innovations that contain multiple meanings, or are “expressively overdeter-
mined,” are most likely to be taken up).
97. In contrast to the typology introduced here, political scientist Lawrence Baum identifies three
types of specialized criminal courts: those courts convened to administer criminal law with (1) more
harshness; (2) more lenity and/or treatment; or (3) both. See BAUM, supra note 6, at 96–97. My analysis
permits closer understanding of the mechanisms that may drive particular outcomes across different
specialized criminal courts.
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A. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL
Specialized criminal courts adopting a therapeutic jurisprudence model are at
work in every state in the country and increasingly in a wide range of foreign
jurisdictions.98 This model draws heavily on a theoretical framework developed
by law professors David Wexler and Bruce Winick.99 Wexler and Winick’s
fundamental premise is that law may operate in ways that are therapeutic or
anti-therapeutic so as to improve or undermine people’s psychological well-
being.100 According to Wexler and Winick, all other things being equal, legal
actors should seek to promote therapeutic outcomes over anti-therapeutic ones.
In urging attention to the therapeutic consequences of legal arrangements,
Wexler and Winick recommend: “[W]e should . . . see if the law could be
reshaped to make it into more of a healing force, a therapeutic force.”101
In a certain respect, in the criminal law context a therapeutic jurisprudence
model is a repackaging of a rehabilitative theory of sentencing that also borrows
from restorative justice approaches, but therapeutic jurisprudence is farther
reaching.102 The judge in a therapeutic specialized criminal court does not
simply assign a sentence that aims to rehabilitate or serve a therapeutic or
restorative function. Instead, the court proceedings themselves—whether through
the judge’s warm encouragement or “tough love”—are intended to promote
therapeutic outcomes. The entire legal process—in fact, the entire institutional
operation of the court as such—is to be reconceived on the therapeutic model.
Although Wexler and Winick make clear that therapeutic concerns ought not
necessarily take precedence over other considerations, they do not provide any
concrete manner to evaluate or rank therapeutic priorities relative to other
matters, leading their adherents in therapeutic criminal courts to prioritize
therapeutic concerns over others in at least certain contexts when conflicts
between contending values emerge.103 Accordingly, to the extent earlier cri-
tiques leveled against rehabilitative punishment and indeterminate sentencing
may apply to a therapeutic jurisprudence model, they apply with even greater
force because, on a therapeutic jurisprudence model, the rehabilitative or thera-
peutic ambition stretches beyond sentencing and punishment to nearly every
98. See, e.g., NOLAN, supra note 7; see also NOLAN, supra note 10.
99. See, e.g., Hora et al., supra note 12, at 439; Peggy Fulton Hora & William G. Schma,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 82 JUDICATURE 8 (1998); David Rottman & Pamela Casey, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Emergence of Problem-Solving Courts, NAT’L INST. JUST. J., July 1999, at 12,
14–15.
100. See Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC
KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 645, 648 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds.,
1996).
101. Bruce J. Winick, Panel Remarks, The Changing Face of Justice: The Evolution of Problem
Solving, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1809, 1809 (2002).
102. See JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., THE THERAPEUTIC STATE: JUSTIFYING GOVERNMENT AT CENTURY’S END
80–83 (1998).
103. See, e.g., E. Lea Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2012).
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aspect of the court proceedings.104
Once a defendant opts into a specialized therapeutic criminal court, “all of the
major players in the courtroom—judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney—
explicitly acknowledge that the goal is to change [the defendant’s] behavior,
moving [the defendant] from addiction to sobriety and from a life of crime to
law-abiding behavior.”105 In contrast to the traditional adversarial model of the
disengaged, dispassionate judge whose primary task is to decide cases fairly and
impartially,106 therapeutic judges are active and engaged, invested in acquiring
expertise regarding the problems they address. On a therapeutic model, the
specialized criminal court judge—whether in a drug court, mental health court,
therapeutic sex offense court,107 or another type of specialized therapeutic
criminal court—engages in a direct, emotional, and frequently effusive manner
with defendants, who are often referred to as the courts’ “clients.”
In Washington, D.C.’s Mental Health Diversion Court, for example, Judge
Linda Kay Davis greets defendants by warmly asking them how they are doing
and how they are feeling.108 She encourages them in their accomplishments
and, for a sustained period of good behavior—clean drug tests and regular
attendance of psychotherapy—she gives them a rose, a certificate, and a coin.
The D.C. Mental Health Diversion Court is part of the Criminal Division and
exercises jurisdiction over defendants who have been diagnosed with mental
illness and who may qualify for deferred prosecution while undergoing mental
health treatment. Many defendants in the D.C. Mental Health Diversion Court
also suffer from co-occurring drug addiction.
In demonstrating her heartfelt concern for the defendants/clients in her court,
Judge Davis descends from the bench to deliver her gifts to those who success-
fully complete her prescribed treatment program. She explains that the coin is to
remind them of their hard work, though it carries no monetary value. In the
spirit of therapeutic jurisprudence, Judge Davis asks defendants who fail drug
104. The rehabilitative model “fell into disfavor” because “it produced serious disparities in the
sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants” and because many came to believe “that the
system’s attempt to achieve rehabilitation of offenders had failed.” See Tapia v. United States, 131 S.
Ct. 2382, 2387 (2011) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 365–66 (1989)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
105. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 9; see also id. at 34–35.
106. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376 (1982) (“[J]udges are not
supposed to have an involvement or interest in the controversies they adjudicate. Disengagement and
dispassion supposedly enable judges to decide cases fairly and impartially.”).
107. Christopher Bruell, Sex Offender Courts: Implications for the Future (paper presented at the
annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology (ASC), Los Angeles Convention Center, Los
Angeles, California, Nov. 1, 2006) (summary available at http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/
p127257_index.html?PHPSESSIDe4d700de960ebe2892f7e9570253eca9) (“[I]t seems reasonable to
believe that we should create and utilize specialized sex offender courts, which can address sex
offenders’ underlying addictions through treatment and graduated levels of community supervision.
These specialized sex offender courts should be based upon the therapeutic jurisprudence approach
used in drug courts and other problem-solving courts.”).
108. Author’s Notes, observation of D.C. Mental Health Diversion Court, July 6, 2011 (afternoon
session) (on file with author).
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tests or other court requirements “what the court can do to help” and extends
and intensifies their period of court supervision.109
The actual therapeutic or other effects of this engagement remain uncertain.
Judge Davis, for instance, who was once a public defender at D.C.’s Public
Defender Service, conducts her court in a therapeutic manner that appears
eminently humane, though she has no formal psychotherapeutic expertise.
Illustrating the bizarre quality and uncertain psychotherapeutic impact of merg-
ing judicial and therapeutic roles, one afternoon in mental health court, Judge
Davis greeted a defendant/client with smiles and congratulations, telling the
mentally ill defendant/client how “proud” she was of her, and how the defendant/
client was “really doing well,” about which the judge relayed “delight.” But the
clerk interrupted the exchange to point out to the judge that the day prior the
defendant/client had tested positive for cocaine. Judge Davis then desisted in
her praise, extended the defendant/client’s term in the criminal supervisory
program, issued a stern warning about noncompliance, and ordered the defendant/
client to talk to the assigned therapist about the relapse. The mentally ill
defendant/client looked visibly pleased at the judge’s initial encouraging ap-
proval and then visibly distraught by the abrupt turn of events. The defendant/
client reported to the judge directly (not through counsel) having difficulty
finding an available individual therapist to comply with the court’s orders as
none were available, and she related that she was hanging out with drug users,
which made it hard for her to resist using drugs. It appeared unclear whether the
defendant/client understood that the role of the judge was distinct from that of a
mental health care provider or other counselor. The judge listened in front of the
full courtroom and then called the next defendant/client.
Whatever uncertainties attend Judge Davis’s therapeutic courtroom methodol-
ogy—and indeed she appears compassionate and well-intentioned in her deal-
ings with the defendants/clients who appear before her—an additional potential
problem posed by the therapeutic jurisprudence model is that, in promoting
itself as a useful treatment approach, it may cause other criminal justice system
actors—particularly police and prosecutors—to likewise view the court as a
treatment outlet. This may lead relatively minor cases to go forward, offenses
that perhaps ought not to be prosecuted in the first instance. But these cases
come to the court for extended court proceedings rather than just being dropped,
or the defendants simply referred for treatment because the court itself, rather
than the social service organization conducting therapeutic treatment, is under-
stood to be a central part of the therapeutic process.
This potential “net widening”110 effect of a therapeutic model of specialized
109. See id.
110. See, e.g., STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL: CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND CLASSIFICATION
(1985) (exploring, in one of the first studies of its kind, how development of criminal law administra-
tive alternatives may produce a widening “net” of penal control); see also Joel Gross, Note, The Effects
of Net-Widening on Minority and Indigent Drug Offenders: A Critique of Drug Courts, 10 U. MD. L.J.
RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 161, 162 (2010).
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criminal law administration underscores that criminal courts are part of a
working institutional and social system, not simply sites for interpersonal
conduct modification.111 As criminal law scholar Guyora Binder has persua-
sively argued: “Punishment is not a behavior, but an institution. It is part of a
system that involves conduct norms, an authoritative procedure for generating
these norms, an authoritative procedure for decisions to impose sanctions, and
some measure of practical power over persons or resources.”112 When special-
ized criminal courts operate on a therapeutic model they exert system-wide
institutional effects, likely shaping what cases are brought to criminal court, and
to which agencies’ treatment resources are allocated. And all the while, therapeu-
tic judges exercise substantial power over defendants/clients.
Given the authoritative force of therapeutic judges’ determinations, a further
set of problems may arise if judges administering criminal law on a therapeutic
model believe themselves to be acting in the therapeutic interests of the
defendants/clients before them but are not as humane as Judge Davis. Accounts
of the Glynn County, Georgia Drug Court suggest that the former presiding
judge there wielded her therapeutic judicial authority with an iron fist.113 For
infractions as minor as a first offense of forging two checks totaling 100 dollars,
one young woman was sentenced to ten and a half years under criminal
supervision: five and one half years in the Glynn County Drug Court, including
fourteen months behind bars, and then an additional six months locked up,
followed by four and one half years on probation.114
This young woman, Lindsay Dills, forged two of her father’s checks, entered
the Glynn County Drug Court, missed a curfew, and failed a drug screen. As a
consequence, without further ado, she spent seven days in jail. Dills reported
that Drug Court Judge Amanda Williams “would flip out every time [Dills]
went before her. . . . [S]he was just . . . screaming . . . in court. . . . [S]he’s stand-
ing behind the bench, with a microphone and screaming . . . .”115 For subse-
quent technical violations, such as a missed curfew or dirty urine tests, Dills
111. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 6 (1993).
112. See Guyora Binder, Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 321, 321
(2002).
113. See Ira Glass, Very Tough Love, THIS AM. LIFE (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/
radio-archives/episode/430/transcript.
114. See id. Judge Amanda Williams has challenged this characterization of her court on a number of
different grounds. See, e.g., Press Release, Georgia Judge Rebuts Public Radio Story on Drug Court,
(Apr. 14, 2011), available at http://www.atlawblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Williams-Rebuts-
Glass-Press-Release-April-14-2011.pdf. In response, attorneys for “This American Life” maintain the
basic accuracy of the program’s account of the Glynn County, Georgia Drug Court, and Judge Williams
has subsequently retired after facing state disciplinary charges. See Letter from Michael M. Conway,
Foley & Lardner LLP, to Prof. David G. Oedel, Mercer Univ. Law Sch. (Apr. 15, 2011), available at
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/sites/default/files/Foley_response_ to_Oedel_April_15_2011.pdf; Mar-
tha Neil, Longtime Ga. Judge Facing Disciplinary Case After ‘This American Life’ Broadcast Will
Retire, ABA JOURNAL (Dec. 20, 2011, 5:28 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/article/longtime_
ga._judge_facing_disciplinary_case_following_this_american_li/.
115. See Glass, supra note 113.
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reported spending 51 days, 90 days, and 104 days incarcerated, until Judge
Williams sent Dills away on an “indefinite sentence.”116 In Dills’ own words:
So I get to the jail house and I call my dad immediately . . . from the pay
phone that’s in the booking area. And I hear the phone ring . . . where the
booking area is. And they answer it and I heard them say, “Dills.” . . . So I’m
on the phone and they said, “Dills hang that phone up.” And I’m like, “OK.”
[S]o I turn around and the[y] tell me that Judge Williams has now called and
ordered me to have no further contact: no phone, no visitation and no mail.
And that I’d be put in their isolation cell. And I’m like, “How long?”
[T]hey’re like, “We don’t know.” And I’m like, “Well for the whole 28 days
that I’m here?” And they said, “Well your order is now indefinite.”
. . . .
. . . I cried a lot . . . . I was like, “How is this happening? How is this ethi-
cal? . . . Have I killed someone that I don’t know about?” . . . But there’s
nothing I can do about it. Because I can’t even use the phone. I can’t even
send a letter.117
Dills reportedly came to the attention of the jail authorities when she attempted
suicide after weeks in isolation by cutting open her wrists.118
Judge Williams’s interest in starting a drug court was personal: she had
addiction in her own family and believed in “tough love.”119 Although the
National Association of Drug Court Professionals discourages such a punitive
approach, the malleability of therapeutic jurisprudence when administered by
lay-therapist judges makes it all too likely that judges will confuse therapy with
punishment and that their unchecked retributive impulses will be brought to
bear under the guise of therapeutic jurisprudence.120
Such potential miscarriages of therapeutic jurisprudence expose another sig-
nificant overlooked feature of specialized criminal courts operating on a therapeu-
tic model. Therapeutic courts attempt to rid themselves of the various traditional
approaches to criminal law administration and punishment—retribution, deter-
rence, incapacitation121—in favor of a therapeutic approach. While conven-
tional criminal courts generally (at least in principle) administer criminal law
with self-conscious reference to a compound of retributive, deterrent, and other
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. Even if portions of the widely-reported account of Judge Williams’ drug court are particularly
egregious and unusual, the question the report raises remains: that is, whether a court configured on a
non-adversarial, anti-formalist, psychotherapeutic model with largely unconstrained judicial discretion
poses the inherent risk of the sorts of outcomes attributed to the Glynn County, Georgia Drug Court.
This Article does not purport to identify any definite outcomes that will necessarily follow from courts
adopting a therapeutic jurisprudence model but rather aims to develop a critical theoretical framework
within which to think about the possibilities and perils of variously configured specialized criminal
courts.
121. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 30–48 (5th ed. 2009).
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punishment approaches, specialized criminal courts adopting a therapeutic cast
seek to purify the administration of criminal law to one putatively rehabilitative
“therapeutic” variant.122 The risk of this attempted purification is that it is
difficult to disentangle deterrent, therapeutic, and retributive impulses in crimi-
nal punishment,123 and so cordoning off certain courts as purely involved in
therapeutic interventions may both misstate what is actually occurring in those
courts and undermine judicial self-consciousness about whether the punitive
effects of particular decisions are proportional to the offending conduct and no
greater than necessary to deter offending behavior.124 Indeed, some judges
administering specialized criminal courts on a therapeutic model label their
courts’ sanctions “smart punishment” but propose that “[s]mart punishment is
not really punishment at all, but a therapeutic response.”125
Although the problem of disproportionate punitiveness might in principle be
resolved by having all specialized criminal courts adopt sentencing ceilings for
technical violations, courts operating on a therapeutic model embrace an anti-
formalist, problem-oriented, discretionary approach that rejects such externally
imposed, pre-fixed constraints. This model, when it comes to predominate over
other approaches to criminal law administration, thus threatens to place judges
with extraordinary power in a position where they act in what they perceive to
be defendants’/clients’ therapeutic interests but with unchecked, potentially
punitive effects, unimpeded by principles of proportionality characteristic of a
retributive theory of punishment. This is all the more troubling because these
judges may lack formal psychotherapeutic expertise and many are likely ex-
hausted by the undoubtedly difficult work of dealing with criminally accused
addicted or mentally ill individuals, often in under-resourced environments. The
relaxation of procedural safeguards as part of an anti-formalist, team-based,
122. Compare the purely therapeutic judicial orientation to the composite sentencing approach
provided for under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 2, according to which a
federal sentencing judge is required to:
[C]onsider . . . (2) the need for the sentence imposed (A) to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to
afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes
of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Tapia v. United States: “These
four considerations—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—are the four purposes
of sentencing generally, and a court must fashion a sentence to achieve these purposes . . . .” 131 S. Ct.
2382, 2387 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the
Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 346–48 (1984) (examining how, in order to deter, criminal
sanctions must also communicate moral blame, necessarily intertwining utilitarian and retributive
approaches to punishment).
124. See Richard C. Boldt, The “Tomahawk” and the “Healing Balm”: Drug Treatment Courts in
Theory and Practice, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 45, 65 (2010) (noting that
“[under] treatment/punishment hybrids . . . therapeutic impulses tend to collapse into punitive prac-
tices”).
125. See Hora et al., supra note 12, at 469–70.
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therapeutic approach only stands to exacerbate these problems if judges are not
particularly conscientious.
A further limitation of the therapeutic jurisprudence model has to do with the
difficulty of bringing a therapeutic court-based approach to scale, even were
that to be a desirable outcome—a matter on which the preceding analysis
should cast some doubt. Although the reformist potential of a therapeutic model
rests on being able to administer therapy to individual defendants through the
courts, these courts only address a small fraction of drug cases or other relevant
categories of cases in the system. As of 2005, the number of individuals in drug
court programs was 70,000, as compared to a population on probation of about
four million individuals, many of whom are drug-involved offenders.126 To
reach even ten percent of individuals serving a probationary sentence, the
number of therapeutic drug courts would need to increase enormously.127 The
Akron Mental Health Court as of 2004 handled at one time approximately 120
clients, only a small fraction of the many thousands of mentally ill individuals
likely to be caught up in Ohio’s criminal justice system.128 The Louisiana
Mental Health Court as of 2009 had eighty-five participants and operated one
day per week.129 Administering therapeutic jurisprudence through convening
separate specialized criminal courts is also relatively costly, further decreasing
the likelihood that it will be possible to bring this model to scale even were this
to be a sought-after result.
In any event, there is considerable cause to question whether specialized
criminal courts adopting a therapeutic jurisprudence model ought to be brought
to scale given that proceedings in these courts appear to possess certain inherent
features that may tend to exacerbate some of the most troubling problems
associated with the adjudication of criminal cases in conventional courts,
including unnecessary terms of incarceration for minor or technical violations
and prevalent procedural irregularities. On a therapeutic model, any judicial
tendencies in these directions are more likely to be unchecked.
Worse still, on a therapeutic jurisprudence model, procedural shortcutting or
unnecessary incarceration may be defended as therapeutic, rendering it less
susceptible to critical engagement.130 For instance, when California drug court
126. See Bozza, supra note 8, at 141–42.
127. National research indicates that approximately three out of every four arrestees in large cities
test positive for drugs at the point of arrest. See John Feinblatt et al., Judicial Innovation at the
Crossroads: The Future of Problem-Solving Courts, CT. MANAGER, Summer 2000, at 28, 29.
128. See Lisa Shoaf, A Case Study of the Akron Mental Health Court, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 975, 995
(2004).
129. See John E. Cummings, Comment, The Cost of Crazy: How Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
Mental Health Courts Lower Incarceration Costs, Reduce Recidivism, and Improve Public Safety, 56
LOY. L. REV. 279, 281 (2010) (citing telephone interview with Hon. Arthur L. Hunter, Jr., Chief Judge,
Orleans Parish Criminal District Court and Presiding Judge of the Louisiana Mental Health Court (Mar.
31, 2009)).
130. Foreshadowing this concern, C.S. Lewis, an early liberal critic of rehabilitative sentencing,
cautioned against a system of criminal punishment in which
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judges wished to amend the California penal code to reduce the privacy rights
of drug court defendants/clients, one judge defended the practice as follows: “I
support a search clause for drug treatment court clients because I think a search
clause is therapeutic . . . . I don’t see a search clause as a sanction so much as an
additional therapeutic intervention that will help them succeed.”131 The poten-
tially problematic effects of this curtailment of privacy are obscured by a
therapeutic justificatory approach that is difficult for non-experts to critically
confront on its own terms. And even if, on balance, relinquishing some privacy
protections may be socially desirable because it serves to reduce recidivism,
casting the argument for this approach in vague psychotherapeutic terms ob-
scures, rather than illuminates, the relevant considerations at stake.
A therapeutic jurisprudence model thus does little by itself to reduce reliance
on criminal supervision and incarceration unless administered by a judge al-
ready inclined to reduce carceral sentencing and enable other positive interven-
tions; and in fact, in the wrong judge’s hands, a therapeutic approach may cause
significant harm. Reliance on jail sentences as a sanction for noncompliance
with treatment or other technical requirements can actually result in substantial
carceral penalties.132 Potential net widening effects associated with placing
criminal courts in the role of administering therapeutic interventions also threat-
ens to increase criminal case filings and, hence, overall levels of criminal
supervision and quite possibly incarceration.133 Although a therapeutic jurispru-
dence model nonetheless appeals to many because it repackages (and resurrects)
a rehabilitative sentencing approach, it does so with considerable risk of engen-
dering a variety of unintended and undesirable consequences, both for rule of
only the psychotherapist can tell us what is likely to cure. It will be in vain for the rest of us,
speaking simply as men, to say, “but this punishment is hideously unjust, hideously dispropor-
tionate to the criminal’s deserts.” The experts with perfect logic will reply, “but nobody was
talking about deserts. No one was talking about punishment in your archaic vindictive sense of
the word. Here are the statistics proving that this treatment deters. Here are the statistics
proving that this other treatment cures. What is your trouble?”
C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, reprinted in 6 RES JUDICATAE 224, 226 (1953); see
also Candace McCoy, Commentary, The Politics of Problem-Solving: An Overview of the Origins and
Development of Therapeutic Courts, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1513, 1513–17 (2003) (discussing the
tension and potential conflict between the rehabilitative and coercive elements present in juvenile
justice administration).
131. See James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the Meaning of
Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1562 (2003) (quoting an unidentified judge).
132. See, e.g., DONALD J. FAROLE, JR. & AMANDA B. CISSNER, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, SEEING EYE
TO EYE?: PARTICIPANT AND STAFF PERSPECTIVES ON DRUG COURTS 1 (2005) (“[D]rug courts have been
somewhat less successful in reducing incarceration time. Although those who complete the program
spend substantially less time in prison than traditionally prosecuted cases, the relatively lengthy
sentences for those who do not complete, combined with programs’ use of short-term incarceration as a
sanction for noncompliant participant behavior, render the overall time incarcerated only slightly lower
than that of comparable non-drug court defendants.” (citation omitted)). But see DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE
& WILLIAM G. MEYER, NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., THE DRUG COURT JUDICIAL BENCHBOOK 36–37 (2011)
(recommending that incarceration should only be used as a last-resort sanction).
133. See FAROLE & CISSNER, supra note 132.
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law principles and for the persons it is intended to benefit.
The answer to these problems is to disentangle reformist criminal law
administration from a particular set of predefined therapeutic jurisprudential
commitments and instead to experiment with jurisprudential content so as to
reduce reliance on incarceration and to divert cases to other sectors that may
more meaningfully address social goals. The appropriate reconceptualization for
the courts is as a strategy to enable decarceration, their unifying feature being
that they are experimenting with criminal law administration to reduce carceral
sentencing in favor of preferable approaches rather than adapting a therapeutic
methodology for criminal law. But before turning to a decarceration model, it
remains in the following sections to explore the other predominant reformist
models at work in specialized criminal courts.
B. JUDICIAL MONITORING MODEL
The defining characteristic of specialized criminal courts operating on a
judicial monitoring model is that they rely primarily on judges to engage in
monitoring of defendants or participants who may be asked to submit to urine
tests and curfews and to attend court appointments as often as several times per
week.134 The theoretical basis of the judicial monitoring model is that intensi-
fied judicially administered criminal surveillance will reduce future misconduct,
at lesser cost than incarceration, and with greater efficacy than conventional
probation or parole. As distinct from the therapeutic jurisprudence model,
specialized criminal courts operating exclusively on a judicial monitoring model
do not aim to generate therapeutic outcomes through courtroom proceedings.
Instead, the judge is empowered to closely monitor defendants’ compliance with
court mandates in a manner akin to a probation or parole officer. On the judicial
monitoring model, the court retains jurisdiction to monitor the defendant/
participant during pretrial proceedings. And when the court assigns a non-
carceral sentence, the judge mandates reporting back to the court on a regular
basis.
The impetus for judicial monitoring courts arose largely due to an acute sense
of the limits of conventional probation and other non-carceral forms of criminal
supervision. Although probation is by far the most common criminal sanction in
the United States,135 with caseloads of up to 1,000 probationers per officer, the
degree of supervision is frequently minimal.136 Judicial monitoring aims to
improve supervision by transferring authority to judges to monitor defendants.
This transfer, it is hoped, will reduce recidivism and thereby reduce incarcera-
tion.
134. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 9.
135. See, e.g., Key Facts at a Glance: Correctional Populations, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
http://bjs.ojp. usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/corr2tab.cfm (reflecting the disproportionately large num-
ber of individuals sentenced to probation, as compared to prison or jail, in the United States from 1980
to 2009) (last revised Feb. 12, 2012).
136. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 21.
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Two examples of specialized criminal courts operating primarily on the
judicial monitoring model are domestic violence courts and sex offense courts,
though certain drug courts and other specialized criminal courts also function
primarily as judicial monitoring bodies. Intensive monitoring of defendants in
domestic violence cases aims to encourage greater compliance with protective
orders and attendance of anger management trainings.137 Judicial monitoring
sex offense courts likewise supervise defendants’ compliance with court man-
dates and mandatory treatment.138 A judicial monitoring model as applied to
drug courts extends judicial supervision over drug offenders. In some jurisdic-
tions’ drug courts, judicial monitoring is coupled with a therapeutic jurispruden-
tial approach. In other jurisdictions it is not.139
Although judicial monitoring relies in part on technological devices to facili-
tate monitoring, the judicial role shifts in these courts in ways that pose
considerable risks of judicial overreaching, expanded surveillance, and in-
creased incarceration for technical violations. Due to the large numbers of
criminal cases disposed of with probationary sentences—and the tremendous
capacity of the defense, computer, and electronic industries—there is an exten-
sive market for electronic monitoring, voice verification systems, and inexpen-
sive on-site drug testing on which monitoring may rely.140 But the central
feature of judicial monitoring, as opposed to probation or parole, is that the
judge plays an active role in overseeing surveillance of defendants. And once a
judge becomes the monitor of defendants’ compliance with court orders, the
judge’s role changes from one of, at least in principle, adjudicative neutrality to
more active investigative supervision on behalf of the state. Simultaneously, a
judicial monitoring model threatens to expand, rather than reduce, levels of
criminal supervision and at least short-term incarceration because more inten-
sive supervision increases the likelihood of identifying technical violations,
which increases the likelihood of short-term incarceration. This increased likeli-
hood is true particularly because, in many judicial monitoring courts, incarcera-
tion is the default penalty for technical violations that do not even rise to the
level of criminally chargeable misconduct.141
One particularly striking example of the judicial role transformation and
expanded criminal surveillance associated with the judicial monitoring model
can be found in the ethnographic work of sociologist James Nolan, who
undertook several multi-year studies of drug courts and other specialized crimi-
nal courts. As related in this Article’s introduction, in Judge McKinney’s
Syracuse, New York drug court, Nolan found that judicial monitoring empow-
137. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 73, at 19.
138. See Interview by Center for Court Innovation with Judge James McCarthy, supra note 86.
139. See, e.g., Glass, supra note 113.
140. Joan Petersilia, A Decade of Experimenting With Intermediate Sanctions What Have We
Learned?, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1998, at 3, 5.
141. See, e.g., ZACHARY HAMILTON, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, DO REENTRY COURTS REDUCE RECIDI-
VISM?: RESULTS FROM THE HARLEM PAROLE REENTRY COURT 4 (2010).
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ered the judge to delegate reporting authority to the defendant’s employer, to
whom Judge McKinney promised a deal: “[Y]ou take [the defendant] back and
I’ll add another weapon to your arsenal. If he doesn’t come to work when he is
supposed to, doesn’t come to work on time . . . I’ll put him in jail, on your say
so.”142 Invasive judicial monitoring of this sort may result in part from the
court’s understanding of itself as engaged purely in deterrent conduct-shaping
monitoring rather than punishment. As on the therapeutic jurisprudence model,
which is (ostensibly) solely rehabilitative in its focus, on the judicial monitoring
model specialized criminal courts seek to purify their approach to a solely
deterrence-based framework. But as with the neo-rehabilitative approach of the
therapeutic jurisprudence model, the judicial monitoring model is unconstrained
by concerns of proportionality and operates without self-consciousness of its
potentially punitive and overreaching, rather than purely deterrent, effects. Also,
because the judicial monitoring model treats the unconstrained authority of the
judge to solve problems as central to its mission, it is no solution simply to
constrain sanctions for technical violations to those that would have been
available had the defendant gone through the conventional process or to those
that would otherwise be proportional to particular sorts of violations.
Further, because a judicial monitoring model is frequently dominant in
specialized courts where retributive responses are likely to be triggered—such
as domestic violence and sex offense courts—the threat of punitive judicial
overreaching in carrying out purportedly purely deterrent monitoring is of
special concern.143 In other words, whereas the therapeutic approach tends to
dominate in courts addressing more sympathetic cases—those involving drug
addicts, veterans, or the mentally ill—the punitive excesses of judicial monitor-
ing threaten to surface with particular force given that the model plays a central
role in courts with less conventionally sympathetically received defendants.
There is even a risk that the monitoring courts will become partially insulated
from conventional adversarial advocacy because they are specialized anti-
formalist, team-oriented courts, and judicial monitoring will serve as a vehicle
for enhanced punitiveness for unpopular classes of defendants: those charged
with domestic violence or sex offenses, for example.
In addition to the liberty-infringing risks posed by courts operating on a
judicial monitoring model, there remain fundamental questions about the ability
of such courts to reduce recidivism and achieve other desired ends.144 Part of
the motivation for court specialization is that judges in a specialized judicial
monitoring court may become experts with regard to the particular offense at
142. See Nolan, supra note 17, at 32.
143. See, e.g., supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text.
144. To the extent reduced cost is a concern, judicial monitoring is more resource intensive than
probation or parole supervision as it relies on relatively higher paid judges supervising relatively
smaller case loads.
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issue.145 But problems arise when judges believe they possess special expertise
about a single best approach to monitoring an issue when in fact there is
profound uncertainty as to how best to handle such matters. For example, there
is preliminary empirical evidence that a judicial monitoring approach is less
effective than might be anticipated in reducing recidivism in domestic violence
cases. A study of the Bronx Misdemeanor Domestic Violence Court tracked
randomly assigned groups of offenders who received varying combinations of
judicial monitoring and batterer’s intervention.146 The differential rates of recidi-
vism of violent conduct among the groups (including those who received no
judicial monitoring or other intervention) were not statistically significant.147
This result suggests that the routine judicial monitoring interventions of the
domestic violence court—batterer’s intervention and court monitoring—may
have limited success in reducing the incidence of domestic violence.148 So
while in at least one jurisdiction domestic violence recidivism remained un-
changed, substantial resources were devoted to a judicial monitoring regime that
threatens to significantly transform the role of the judge with other uncertain
and potentially undesirable effects.149
What is more, in the reentry context at least, a judicial monitoring model has
been associated with substantial increases in reincarceration for technical viola-
tions. A study of the Harlem Parole Reentry Court’s initial judicial monitoring
program found that “[t]echnical revocations occurred more frequently for Reen-
try Court participants than comparison parolees” for all three years of the
study—an effect the Court’s researchers ascribe to a “supervision effect”150
(that is, increased discovery of punishable violations produced by increased
supervision). Thus, the Harlem Parole Reentry Court study reflects that a
judicial monitoring approach threatens to increase incarceration for technical
145. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 103 (“By handling all felony cases from the borough in a
single courtroom, the court was designed to develop a focused expertise in domestic violence.”).
146. See MELISSA LABRIOLA ET AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, TESTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
BATTERER PROGRAMS AND JUDICIAL MONITORING 15–21 (2005) (describing research methodology).
147. Id. at 41–42; see also id. at 62 (“We anticipated that monitoring would suppress recidivism, at
least during the monitoring period itself. But judicial monitoring had no more impact on re-offending
than did batterer programs: When we compared the offenders in our randomized trial—all of whom
were monitored—to a matched group of offenders who pled to violations and were sentenced to a
conditional discharge without monitoring, we found no differences in nearly all re-arrest measures.”).
148. See id. But see Catherine Shaffer, Therapeutic Domestic Violence Courts: An Efficient Ap-
proach to Adjudication?, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 981, 995–96 (2004) (reporting other studies of
domestic violence batterer treatment programs that demonstrated evidence of reduced recidivism).
149. Similar concerns about the soundness of court monitoring and intervention applies in the drug
court context: some evaluations of drug courts show that drug court monitoring and treatment achieve
outcomes no better than traditional in-community treatment, and other evaluations claim reduced
recidivism but suffer from significant methodological problems. See, e.g., Candace McCoy, Do Drug
Courts Work? For What, Compared to What? Qualitative Results from a Natural Experiment, 5 VICTIMS
& OFFENDERS 64 (2010) (exploring methodological problems with drug court studies and analyzing
natural experiment suggesting that drug courts achieve outcomes equivalent to traditional in-
community treatment).
150. See HAMILTON, supra note 141, at 29.
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violations, such as missed curfews or other failures to conform with the court’s
monitoring orders.151
These findings are consistent with the best available evidence regarding
“intensive supervision programs” (ISP) during an earlier period of experimenta-
tion with intensive criminal surveillance. Monitoring aimed at deterrence, when
uncoupled from a substantial rehabilitative component, tends strongly to expand
incarceration with little in the way of countervailing benefits. According to
Stanford criminologist Joan Petersilia, who is among the country’s leading
experts on intermediate sanctions, the:
[E]mpirical evidence regarding intermediate sanctions is decisive: Without a
rehabilitation component, reductions in recidivism are elusive. In sum . . .
programs were seldom used for prison diversion but rather to increase account-
ability and supervision of serious offenders on probation. In addition, pro-
grams did not reduce new crimes, but instead increased the discovery of
technical violations and ultimately increased incarceration rates and system
costs.152
The ineffectiveness of judicial monitoring may be further aggravated if
judicial monitoring negatively influences defendants’ perceptions of legitimacy
of the courts. Diminished perceptions of procedural fairness on the part of
defendants in judicial monitoring courts may actually undermine compliance
with court orders by fostering resentment and exacerbating recidivism.153
So as with the therapeutic jurisprudence model, on the judicial monitoring
model the role of the judge expands, potentially dramatically beyond its tradi-
tional bounds. Surveillance increases. Procedural protections are curtailed to
enable judicial monitoring. And there is no overriding commitment to avoid
incarceration in the instance of discovery of technical violations. As a conse-
quence, increased periods of at least short-term incarceration threaten to follow,
even if only as a product of technical violations, and the reach of the criminal
151. See id.
152. Petersilia, supra note 140, at 6; see also Joan Petersilia & Susan Turner, Intensive Probation
and Parole, 17 CRIME & JUST. 281, 311 (1993) (finding that, in a study of ISP participants, “an average
of 65 percent of the ISP clients experience[d] a technical violation compared with 38 percent of the
controls”).
153. In judicial monitoring courts, even before adjudication, defendants are routinely subject to
intensive supervision and mandatory treatment with the only alternative being incarceration. This
arrangement raises double jeopardy concerns, among other problems: insofar as the preadjudication
monitoring is punitive in purpose, it effectively may lead to imposition of double punishment, once
preadjudication and subsequently postadjudication. See generally Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice:
Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843 (2002) (explaining
how social psychological findings regarding perceptions of legitimacy and legal compliance indicate
that procedural justice may be important to reducing the incidence of domestic violence recidivism and,
hence, domestic violence court monitoring should attend to this variable in determining court interven-
tions).
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law threatens to radically expand.154 Monitoring that is not merely extending
surveillance for its own sake must attend to what forms of surveillance actually
promote socially desirable outcomes by eliminating crime and reducing incarcera-
tion. This is, in significant part, the ambition of a decarceration model, to which
we will turn after exploring the order maintenance model—the final criminal
law reformist model commonly at work in specialized criminal courts.
C. ORDER MAINTENANCE MODEL
The third widely occurring criminal law reformist model operative in special-
ized criminal courts seeks to advance order maintenance by convening local
tribunals devoted to prosecutions of relatively minor quality-of-life crimes.
Although the general goal of specialized criminal courts was to address the
impacted and poor quality of conventional criminal law administration by
shifting cases out of conventional courts into specialized courts, in the view of
some advocates, “in many cases, the current system works just fine” such as in
handling “murders, rapes, and robberies;” they believed that alternatives for
prosecution of more serious offenses would be inappropriate.155 Consequently,
efforts focused on minor crimes—“prostitution, low-level drug possession, and
disorderly conduct”—that conventional criminal courts were otherwise inclined
to ignore.156
The theoretical framework underlying the order maintenance model is largely
derived from the broken windows approach to policing. The broken windows,
or order maintenance, hypothesis maintains that minor physical and social
disorder—turnstile jumping, marijuana use, public drinking—if not addressed,
contributes to more serious crime.157 A specialized order maintenance criminal
court responds to public order violations by initially assigning intermediate
154. See Loı¨c Wacquant, Prisoner Reentry as Myth and Ceremony, 34 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY
605, 616 (2010) (explaining how monitoring, along with other community supervision programs, may
extend the scope of criminal supervision without offering any means to counteract the pressures toward
technical noncompliance and criminal offending that abound in under-resourced neighborhoods). But
see ANGELA HAWKEN & MARK KLEIMAN, MANAGING DRUG INVOLVED PROBATIONERS WITH SWIFT AND
CERTAIN SANCTIONS: EVALUATING HAWAII’S HOPE (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/
229023.pdf (evaluating favorably probation monitoring and flash incarceration intensive supervision
program for drug offenders in Hawaii for its reduction of reliance on prison sentencing for high-risk
drug offenders relative to less intensively surveillant conventional supervision). It is worth noting that
Project HOPE is a probation supervision, as distinct from a specialized courts, regime, and, while
Hawken and Kleiman’s study suggests HOPE probation may be preferable to the dysfunctional status
quo in conventional drug probation and parole, it is still heavily reliant on incarceration and intensive
criminal surveillance. See id.
155. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 4.
156. See id.
157. Professor Bernard Harcourt powerfully criticizes this hypothesis, refuting the oft-cited bases of
empirical support for the theory and raising foundational theoretical and empirical questions regarding
broken windows policing. As Harcourt explains in summary:
First, the quality-of-life initiative may create the category of the disorderly. Second, the
category of the disorderly may facilitate a policy of aggressive arrests, with the possibility of
attendant brutality, even though such a policy is unlikely to have the slightest effect on crime
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sanctions such as community service. It is hoped that imposition of these
sanctions, in turn, will improve perceptions of the law’s legitimacy and hence
social order. The theory, as applied to specialized criminal courts, holds that, as
a consequence of prosecuting public order offenses, crime overall will decline
and, with it, more general reliance on criminal arrests and incarceration.158
Along these lines, community courts, the quintessential order maintenance
courts, aim to improve social order by providing a venue for the prosecution of
relatively minor quality-of-life offenses occurring in a delimited geographic
area.159 Incarceration is imposed only if a defendant is noncompliant with
intermediate sanctions or if his offense is relatively serious. Generally, misde-
meanor defendants are able to opt in to courts operating on an order mainte-
nance model rather than being mandatorily assigned.160
In addition to community courts, other specialized criminal courts may also
operate on an order maintenance model. For example, drug courts operating on
an order maintenance approach provide a local forum for prosecuting lower-
level drug offenses that would otherwise receive minimal attention in conven-
tional criminal courts.
There are three supposed advantages to an order maintenance model of
specialized criminal court administration, all of which fail to withstand close
scrutiny. First, proponents suggest that these courts will increase potential
offenders’ perceptions of the criminal law’s legitimacy and, hence, will increase
law-abiding behavior overall.161 This is thought to be the case because the
courts assign presumably more meaningful non-carceral sanctions.162 But order
maintenance courts are often perceived as harsher and less legitimate than
conventional courts in their response to public order violations. Community
courts are less inclined to dismiss cases with “time served” sentences, and
where jail time is imposed, it is for longer periods.163 Further, community
service sentences will not necessarily be perceived as more legitimate than jail
rates. Third, the interplay of the norm of orderliness (discipline) and the ideals of justice (law)
may succeed in blinding us to the disorder that accompanies the quality-of-life initiative.
Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of
Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 291, 368 (1998); see also BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF
BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2001).
158. But see Harcourt, supra note 157, at 292–94.
159. See, e.g., Victoria Malkin, Community Courts and the Process of Accountability: Consensus
and Conflict at the Red Hook Community Justice Center, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573, 1574 (2003)
(“[T]he unifying feature of these community courts is their preoccupation with the ‘quality of life’ in
local neighborhoods.”).
160. See, e.g., BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 62.
161. See generally MICHELE SVIRIDOFF ET AL., DISPENSING JUSTICE LOCALLY: THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
EFFECTS OF THE MIDTOWN COMMUNITY COURT (2000).
162. See id.
163. See id. at 129 (“[A]ll else being equal, petit larceny cases at Midtown receive[d] jail sentences
that [were] 31 days longer than similar cases Downtown [at the main criminal courthouse], and . . .
jail sentences for prostitution cases tended to be longer at Midtown than Downtown.”).
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sentences. One sex worker sentenced at the Midtown Community Court ex-
plained: “Community service is all day—cleaning toilets and stuffing enve-
lopes . . . .”164 Rather than improving perceptions of legitimacy, routine reliance
on community service of this sort as a sanction may reduce opportunities for
paid work in a jurisdiction and cause further economic hardship for defendants.
The onerous requirements of unpaid community service work coupled with
associated fines may even increase pressures to participate in criminalized
markets.
A second purported advantage of an order maintenance model is that it will
reduce reliance on conventional carceral sentencing, instead introducing more
effective and beneficial intermediate sanctions, like community service. But
when defendants fail to comply with intermediate sanctions, they are often
punished with at least short-term incarceration. Indeed, empirical analyses
establish that increased short-term incarceration is the unintended outcome of at
least some courts operating on an order maintenance model.165
Additionally, in a manner distinct from that of therapeutic courts, order
maintenance courts widen the net of infractions addressed by criminal courts
because they focus primarily on low-level misdemeanor offenses, which other-
wise would receive less attention: disorderly conduct prosecutions are common-
place in order maintenance courts for pedicab drivers’ obstruction of cross-
walks or unlicensed vending of t-shirts or otherwise licit goods.166 This net
widening tendency is consistent with the findings of Professors Michael Tonry
and Norval Morris, who demonstrated in their famous study of intermediate
sanctions that “[w]hen an intermediate choice is offered it will tend to be filled
more by those previously treated more leniently than by those previously treated
164. Robert Victor Wolf, New Strategies for an Old Profession: A Court and a Community Combat a
Streetwalking Epidemic, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 347, 355 (2001).
165. See SVIRIDOFF ET AL., supra note 161, at 129. As an aside, to the extent that more vigorous
enforcement of particular quality-of-life offenses, such as prostitution, in one discrete area aims to
eliminate that conduct (whether by improving offenders’ perceptions of legitimacy or otherwise), it is
equally likely that the undesired conduct will just be pushed to a different (not necessarily distant)
location. Further, all too often courts administering specialized criminal law recognize the broader web
of the problem at stake—whether prostitution or shoplifting—but focus exclusively on an individual’s
addiction or other personal issues that may be impossible to meaningfully address without attending to
background conditions that inform the personal problems. See generally Jeffrey Fagan & Victoria
Malkin, Theorizing Community Justice Through Community Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 897,
948–49 (2003) (“Although originally designed to provide a creative and rich mix of social and
rehabilitative services to citizens with a variety of legal entanglements and social problems living in a
disadvantaged neighborhood the Red Hook Community Justice Center relies heavily on drug treatment
to address residents’ complex personal problems that do not easily fall into a simplified medical
treatment paradigm. Despite its notable achievements . . . the Justice Center remains focused on milling
the neighborhood’s ‘disorderly’—the loiterers, the publicly intoxicated—into drug treatment of uncer-
tain effectiveness.”).
166. See Author’s Site Visit Notes, Midtown Community Court, September 2011 (on file with
author).
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more severely.”167 This is not to suggest that intermediate sanctions are never
appropriate but rather that there is a risk of net widening where such sanctions
are made available and order maintenance courts stand to considerably expand
the class of offenses subject to criminal prosecution by emphasizing offenses
that would otherwise be unlikely targets for prosecution. As a result of this net
widening tendency, an order maintenance model threatens to expand criminal
supervision and increase short-term incarceration when individuals are unable
to comply with intermediate sanctions.
Whether other beneficial effects on local neighborhoods follow from this net
widening criminal law enforcement remains uncertain. According to Portland’s
district attorney Mike Schrunk, a proponent of Portland’s order maintenance
specialized criminal court, as a prosecutor “[y]ou tend to blow off” turnstile
jumping or petty shoplifting because they are “not as important as rape and
robbery.”168 Yet, Schrunk justifies emphasis on these minor offenses in order
maintenance courts on the grounds that “what really drives people out of a
neighborhood or makes a neighborhood rot from the inner core is the small,
petty stuff.”169 But it is not entirely clear why turnstile jumping, unless abso-
lutely pervasive and reckless, would undermine the quality of life in a particular
neighborhood. Although petty shoplifting is perhaps more harmful to local
businesses, it is not apparent why such offenses must be prosecutorial priorities
in order to obtain a satisfactory level of respect for private property in targeted
neighborhoods. For instance, local business organizations could instead encour-
age store owners to adopt store policies that render goods less readily subject to
theft. In fact, the available evidence indicates that police arrest less than one
percent of all shoplifters.170 Shoplifters are most likely to steal products, such as
clothing, CDs, and DVDs, which are “concealable, removable, available, valu-
able, enjoyable, and disposable.”171 Placing unremovable security tags on these
products and/or storing them in locked shelving units, along with other store
design and stock control measures, substantially reduce the opportunity to
shoplift.172 For these reasons, store owners and the public at large would likely
be better served by adopting environmental and business practices that reduce
the incidence of shoplifting rather than investing large sums of public resources
in prosecuting some small percentage of these offenses (that are so minor as to
otherwise command little prosecutorial attention) in specialized order mainte-
nance courts. Of course, this alternative approach transfers the costs of address-
ing petty crime in part from tax payers to business owners, but the business
costs of merchandising and related policies are not prohibitive and there is
167. NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS
IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 225 (1990).
168. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 72.
169. See id.
170. CLARKE, supra note 59, at 1–2.
171. See id. at 6.
172. See id. at 8–9; see also Klingele et al., supra note 59, at 975–76.
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strong reason to believe they would prove both more effective and less costly
overall.173
What’s more, although there may be positive effects associated with devoting
attention to disruptive conduct that residents of affected areas care about—for
instance, the prevalence of street prostitution may cause more sexual harass-
ment of all women and girls—there are also significant potential negative,
systemic consequences generated by bringing more people under criminal
supervision than would otherwise occur. In particular, net widening may cause
criminal courts’ dockets to become further impacted. In Denver, Colorado, for
example, the number of drug cases filed in the Denver District Court grew
radically after the introduction of a drug court program dedicated to prosecuting
low-level drug offenses—effectively an order maintenance drug court mod-
el—as police and prosecutors perceived the courts to be capable of handling the
sort of minor offenses that would previously not have been pursued. During
1993, the last full year before the Denver Drug Court convened, 1,047 drug
cases were filed, but during the second year of the Court’s existence, in 1996,
there were 3,017 filings. Judge Morris Hoffman of the Denver criminal court
reported that the Denver Drug Court “caused police to make arrests in, and
prosecutors to file, the kinds of ten- and twenty- dollar hand-to-hand drug cases
that the system simply would not have bothered with before.”174 Ultimately, in
large measure for this reason, Denver abandoned its Drug Court in 2003 and did
away with order maintenance drug law administration.175
Expanding the range of individuals subject to criminal prosecution in order
maintenance courts is not simply a matter of burdening court dockets. Net
widening produces other broader, systemic pressures: when offenders do not
comply with intermediate sanctions administered by order maintenance courts,
they are subject to short-term incarceration. Subsequently, even those offenders
who receive only thirty-day jail sentences often cycle back through the criminal
173. Likewise, much auto theft may be prevented through straightforward changes by auto manufac-
turers. See Ronald V. Clarke & Patricia M. Harris, Auto Theft and Its Prevention, 16 CRIME & JUST. 1,
37 (1992). To provide another related example of this approach, in Portland, Oregon, residents
concerned about open-air drug dealing in a local park turned on the park’s sprinklers periodically
throughout the day, and it worked to disperse the drug dealing. As one prosecutor related: “No
expenditure of police or prosecutor resources, the problem is solved, and all we did was water the
lawn.” See Klingele, et al., supra note 59, at 966 (citing AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., UNWELCOME
GUESTS: A COMMUNITY PROSECUTION APPROACH TO STREET LEVEL DRUG DEALING AND PROSTITUTION 1
(2004) (quoting Multnomah County Deputy District Attorney Wayne Pearson)). Drug transactions in
Portland surely did not cease, but they shifted location and that may be all that can be expected of crime
control interventions of any kind. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 2385, 2392–97 (1997) (exploring how criminal law’s deterrent effect may often lead to substitu-
tion of one offense for another or displacement of crime rather than its elimination).
174. See Morris B. Hoffman, Commentary, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1502
(2000).
175. See Morris B. Hoffman, Commentary, A Neo-Retributionist Concurs with Professor Nolan, 40
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1567, 1567 (2003). But see Sue Lindsay, City Resurrects Drug Court: Supporters
Tout New Strategies To Avoid System’s Past Failures, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 15, 2007, http://www.
highbeam.com/ doc/1G1-157582096.html.
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courts, trapped in a never-ending series of criminal supervisory sentences, such
that these minor law breakers end up “doing life in prison, thirty days at a
time.”176 This pattern imposes tremendous costs on the public and often irrepara-
bly disrupts the lives of accused minor law breakers and their families.
A final benefit noted by supporters of an order maintenance model, and of
community courts in particular, involves the courts’ revival of local democratic
participation in criminal law administration. While democracy is not an unquali-
fied good for criminal law—indeed, democratic processes have often resulted in
later-regretted criminal law and policy outcomes—democratic excesses could in
principle be restrained by confining community participation to discrete locali-
ties in which the members would themselves internalize the costs of favored
policies.177 The local democratic potential of community courts is thought to
derive from the involvement of community members in setting the courts’
priorities, the local access to community court judges, and more general in-
creased accessibility and transparency of the courts. Yet, the actual democratic
potential of order maintenance community courts is unclear given that, as
multiple studies indicate, only a small number of often relatively wealthy or
unusually vocal individuals participate actively in community court pro-
grams.178 In fact, there is some evidence that these courts may serve to advance
the interests of a moneyed minority interest group in furthering gentrification to
improve property values.179 And while gentrification may be a positive force in
these neighborhoods—engendering improved neighborhood quality of life and
increasing property values—it is nonetheless questionable whether associated
court reform desirably reconstitutes local democratic practices in criminal law
administration. Control of a local criminal law enforcement agenda by a few
relatively powerful outspoken community members hardly represents a robust
form of local democratization of criminal law, whatever may or may not be the
176. Alex Calabrese, Presiding Judge, Red Hook Community Justice Center, Speech delivered at
London, England (July 7, 2003) (quoted in BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 16).
177. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword, The Coming Crisis of Criminal
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1173–77 (1998); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms
of) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 832 (1998) (“When inner-city residents can
choose for themselves the law enforcement policies that will work for them, crime is reduced through
community empowerment.”); William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1974 (2008).
178. See Fagan & Malkin, supra note 165, at 943–47; Lanni, supra note 68, at 381; Malkin, supra
note 159, at 1585–86.
179. As one supporter of the Portland Community Court remarked, “Now people are buying
property, and when you own property, you care about it. . . . Now we feel like we can really invest in a
home here.” BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 82 & 207 nn. 16–17 (citing Voice from the
Neighborhood, Community Court Reporter, Portland Oregon Community Court, June 2001 (quoting
Susan Cox, resident of Southeast Portland)). The most vocal supporters of the Midtown Community
Court in Manhattan are likewise those local residents whose real estate assets benefitted considerably
from the gentrification enabled by order maintenance policing. See, e.g., Midtown Community Court
Video, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, http://www.courtinnovation.org/research/midtown-community-court-
video (last visited Mar. 9, 2012); see also Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Danger of
“Community,” 2003 UTAH L. REV. 343 (examining some of the potential threats of the invocation of the
term “community”).
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other advantages of gentrification.180
In summary, the criminal law reformist benefits ascribed to an order mainte-
nance model are uncertain, and this approach poses a significant risk of generat-
ing otherwise harmful consequences.
D. DECARCERATION MODEL
A decarceration model is committed foremost to reducing reliance on incarcera-
tion and to a sociologically and empirically informed framework that links court
participants to local social services and other institutions, shifting the manage-
ment of socially disruptive conduct in part from criminal courts to other sectors.
The ultimate aim of a decarceration model, as applied to specialized criminal
courts, is to isolate those crimes for which conventional criminal law administra-
tion may be most fitting, contributing gradually to the de facto decriminalization
of certain categories of conduct and enabling alternative non-carceral regulatory
approaches to a range of social ills where criminalization remains appropriate.
The basic premise underlying a decarceration model in the specialized courts
context is that overcriminalization and overincarceration are in part structural
problems, which specialized criminal courts may begin to address.
Because a decarceration model aims to reduce reliance on incarceration while
achieving other social goals, the model endeavors to respond to the forces that
led incarceration rates to rise so precipitously in the first instance and that cause
them to remain so high. The explanations for large-scale incarceration are
various, but there is general agreement that criminal law and policy contributed
significantly to the growth in incarceration.181 Expanded sentences for drug
convictions perpetuated a significant portion of the increase in state prisoners
beginning in the late 1980s, and, subsequently, much of that growth has been
attributable to increased penalties for violent crimes, predominantly robbery and
assaults, and “public order” offenses.182 As a result, criminal law and policy
changes stand to contribute substantially to decarceration, but one single policy
intervention will be insufficient to bring about any extensive decrease in
imprisonment. Instead, the scholarly consensus suggests that prison commit-
ments must be reduced and prison release increased and return to prison after
parole failure decreased.183 Obstacles to achieving these ends, which I will
touch upon only briefly because they are thoroughly explored elsewhere, in-
clude: the difficulty of legislatively retreating from the “pathological politics” of
180. It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the complicated relationship between order
maintenance, social welfare, and gentrification. My more limited suggestion here is that, regardless of
one’s views on these matters, there is considerable reason to doubt that order maintenance specialized
criminal law administration revitalizes local democratic criminal law decision making, as these
processes appear to be controlled by a small but vocal and economically influential minority.
181. See Gartner et al., supra note 53, at 293–94.
182. JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., JFA INST., UNLOCKING AMERICA: WHY AND HOW TO REDUCE AMERICA’S
PRISON POPULATION 7 (2007).
183. See, e.g., Gartner et al., supra note 53, at 313.
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overcriminalization and overincarceration;184 the organizational cultures of po-
lice and prosecutors’ offices that encourage vigorous enforcement of existing
criminal laws;185 fiscal constraints that limit available funds for social service
alternatives to incarceration; reduced judicial authority under determinant sen-
tencing laws; resistance of interest group lobbies, such as victims’ rights groups
and prison guards unions; a limited role for less politicized expert input in
criminal law and policy-making; and belief in the efficacy or at least unavoidabil-
ity of criminalization and incarceration.186 A decarceration model may function
to circumvent and begin to reshape some of these barriers.
Courts operating predominately on a decarceration model circumvent some
of the legislative impediments to changing substantive criminal law by working
cooperatively with prosecutors, police, defense counsel, and elected officials at
the local level to shift cases out of the conventional criminal courts. Without
requiring legislative repeal of particular criminal statutes, these courts provide a
venue for suspending or dropping criminal charges in drug cases, a range of
misdemeanor cases, and, in some instances, even in cases involving more
serious felony charges as well as in a range of matters involving mentally ill
offenders and veterans. A decarceration approach seeks to locate alternative fora
for responding to these matters, and then when the courts have obtained a
certain measure of broad-based support, legislators are able to enact statutes that
legitimize and institutionalize the decarceration regime. This method has proven
to be more politically viable than seeking directly to decriminalize particular
conduct, and alternative diversionary court approaches have garnered consider-
able public support.187
In their day-to-day operations on a decarceration model, courts act as diversion-
ary clearinghouses for social service resources, ensuring the assignment of
individual defendants to those resources. Careful empirical monitoring tracks on
an ongoing basis court outcomes to ensure that incarceration is actually reduced
184. See, e.g., Luna, supra note 28, at 719 (“As a rule, lawmakers have a strong incentive to add
new offenses and enhanced penalties, which offer ready-made publicity stunts, but face no countervail-
ing political pressure to scale back the criminal justice system.”); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T.
Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the States from Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169,
169–73 (2003) (critically examining the expansion of criminal codes and the difficulty of retreating
from this pattern through legislative repeals); Stuntz, supra note 2, at 510, 515; see also WILLIAM J.
STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011).
185. See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 453, 519 (2004) (discussing how police organizations, not unlike other bureaucracies, are
inclined to assess success quantitatively by arrest and citation numbers rather than by qualitative
assessments); Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory Videotaping of
Interrogations Is the Solution to Illinois’ Problem of False Confessions, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 337,
347–48 n.46 (2001) (noting that conviction percentages influence election and promotion in state
prosecutors’ offices).
186. See Gartner et al., supra note 53, at 313–19.
187. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE NCSC SENTENCING ATTITUDES SURVEY: A REPORT ON
THE FINDINGS 5 (2006) (reporting that over eighty percent of persons surveyed in representative national
telephone survey supported alternative non-carceral sentencing “often” or “sometimes” for nonviolent
cases).
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and to ascertain the effect of various alternative sanctions and services on
participants and other relevant variables.188
At least in some jurisdictions, courts adopting a decarceration model assume
jurisdiction over those charged with, or convicted of, more serious felony
offenses.189 This is critical to reducing reliance on incarceration and avoiding
net widening because many nonviolent misdemeanor offenses are already dealt
with through non-carceral sentences in the conventional courts.190 To the extent
courts adopting a decarceration approach address accused offenders who might
otherwise receive probationary sentences, the diversionary programming orders
issued may make it less, rather than more, likely that defendants will be subject
to incarceration in the future by facilitating opportunities for law-abiding liveli-
hoods.
The theoretical framework that informs the decarceration model focuses on
deploying social structures separate from criminal law administrative compo-
nents—such as local neighborhood networks, business organizations, and men-
tal health, public health, job training, and other social services—to reduce
criminal offending and to foster socially constructive citizenship behaviors. The
foundational idea is that social institutions outside the criminal law context are
critical to the maintenance of social order and to organizing informal surveil-
lance. Correspondingly, a shift away from current carceral practices will be
enabled by bolstering opportunities for social integration and institutional involve-
ment, particularly for those persons with otherwise limited access to such
conventional social institutions.191
There is wide-ranging empirical and theoretical support for this structural
188. See, e.g., ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 1–10, 165, 169, 262–65 (examining, in multi-site
study of drug courts, certain features of courts that correspond to a decarceration model, including
organization of specialized courts as clearinghouses for social service resources and empirical monitor-
ing).
189. See, e.g., Interview by Carolyn Turgeon with Judge Matthew J. D’Emic, Brooklyn Mental
Health Court (June 2004), available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/research/matthew-j-demic-
brooklyn-mental-health-court?mode 889&urlresearch%2F889%2Finterview (“Initially we were set
up to handle exclusively non-violent felonies, but that changed and we do take some violent fel-
ons . . . .”).
190. Although only approximately seventeen percent of the crimes for which individuals are arrested
are either violent or property crimes, roughly seventy-one percent of people incarcerated in state
prisons have been convicted of violent or property crimes. Compare Uniform Crime Reports, Crime in
the United States 2010: Arrests, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/
crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/persons-arrested (last visited Mar. 20, 2012), with HEATHER
C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 2009, at 7 tbl.7
(2010).
191. See ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD
EFFECT 22 (2012) (“[N]eighborhoods are not merely settings in which individuals act out the dramas
produced by autonomous and preset scripts . . . but are important determinants of the quantity and
quality of human behavior in their own right.”); id. at 423 (“[E]ven the worst-off communities
command human assets and organizational potential that have not been fully harnessed. In fact . . .
disadvantaged communities sometimes have rather high levels of other-regarding behavior and latent
collective efficacy that are otherwise suppressed by the cumulative disadvantages built up after repeated
everyday challenges.”). In a study comparing the lives of former juvenile offenders (discussed in
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approach. One interesting early contribution comes from the work of Sheldon
and Eleanor Glueck, married co-authors employed at Harvard Law School from
the late 1920s to the 1950s, who conducted a seminal study of the lives of 500
Boston juvenile delinquents.192 The Gluecks found that although most of the
cohort ceased committing crime after turning twenty-five, a small minority
persisted in criminal involvement. Decades later Harvard sociologist Robert
Sampson and criminologist John Laub reexamined the Gluecks’ data to deter-
mine if there were any criteria distinguishable from the early lives and criminal
offending of those men who went on to become persistently criminally involved
over the course of their lives.193 Sampson and Laub could not identify any
factors present during childhood or adolescence that differentiated those young
men who would pose a continuing menace and those who would desist from
criminal activity following adolescence.194 There were, however, “turning points”
in the men’s lives—obtaining and maintaining employment and establishing
contacts with conventional institutions and groups—that distinguished those
who continued to commit crime from those that did not.195 Further, men who
had been incarcerated in prison were substantially more likely to continue to
further detail infra notes 192–97 and accompanying text), sociologist Robert Sampson and criminolo-
gist John Laub found that:
The majority of men we interviewed desisted from crime largely because they were able to
capitalize on key structural and situational circumstances. They often selected these structural
and situational circumstances (for example, they decided to get married, get that job, hang out
with those friends), but those institutions and relations in turn influenced the men as
well. . . . Men who desisted from crime were embedded in structured routines, socially bonded
to . . . others . . . and were virtually and directly supervised and monitored. In other words,
structures, situations, and persons offered nurturing and informal social control that facilitated
the process of desistance from crime. . . .
. . . .
. . . Generally, the persistent offenders we interviewed experienced residential instability . . .
job instability . . . and relatively long periods of incarceration. Except when in prison or jail,
they were ‘social nomads,’ to use Foucault’s term.
JOHN H. LAUB & ROBERT J. SAMPSON, SHARED BEGINNINGS, DIVERGENT LIVES: DELINQUENT BOYS TO AGE
70, at 279–80 (2003) (citations omitted). A distinct theoretical approach, which Professor Mary D. Fan
has called “rehabilitation pragmatism,” shares some significant features in common with a decarcera-
tion approach. The difference between rehabilitation pragmatism and conventional rehabilitation is that
the rehabilitative intervention is not undertaken for the benefit of the individual defendant but instead in
the public interest to improve safety and reduce costs, with reliance on empirical data in selecting
defendants who are more likely to succeed. See Fan, supra note 48, at 45–56; see also Jessica S. Henry,
The Second Chance Act of 2007, CRIM. L. BULL., Summer 2009, at art. 3 (“Rehabilitation, with an eye
to reentry, has been repackaged, not as way to improve the individual offender for his or her own sake,
but rather as a way to improve public safety for all of society.”); Joan Petersilia, California’s
Correctional Paradox of Excess and Deprivation, 37 CRIME & JUST. 207, 212 (2008) (“Well-run,
well-targeted educational and vocational programs, substance abuse treatment, cognitive behavioral
therapies, and reentry partnerships can reduce recidivism by 5–30 percent.”).
192. See SHELDON GLUECK & ELEANOR T. GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELIQUENCY (1950).
193. See LAUB & SAMPSON, supra note 191.
194. See id. at 113.
195. Id. at 114–49.
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offend than men who served only local jail time or probation.196 These factors—
rather than personality characteristics, early offense characteristics, childhood
experiences, or other factors—appeared to differentiate the perpetual offenders
from those that went on to lead relatively law-abiding lives.197
Additional support for the hypothesis that social engagement and institutional
involvement, or group-level effects, cause reduced criminal offending derives
from a significant body of further studies linking structural context and the
prevalence of effective social organizations with decreased interpersonal vio-
lence and neighborhood disorder.198 As important, this theory accords with
known social facts about the world: social institutions—employers, community
organizations, families—convey social expectations and informally surveil those
who participate in them. In a neighborhood where these institutions are function-
ing effectively, people tend to be discouraged and inhibited from engaging in
criminalized pursuits, and they will tend to have access to social supports in the
event they find themselves struggling with addiction or other personal chal-
lenges.199
Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that social institutional engage-
ment will not serve to dissuade all persons from criminal conduct, and some
conventional social institutions may even be criminogenic.200 Indeed, employed
persons operating in firmly established institutional contexts perpetrate fraud,
embezzle funds, and harm others.201 But conventional institutional engagement
provides some significant constraint on particular sorts of criminal offending
196. See id. at 188–90.
197. It is possible, of course, that the law-abiding men were otherwise disposed to obtain employ-
ment and to establish conventional institutional ties, and that their social engagements were not the
cause of their law-abiding turn. Instead, their turning points might have been the product of some
unidentified additional factor—moral fortitude or personal perseverance. In other words, it might be
that some other variable besides social institutional involvement is the critical differentiating characteris-
tic between offenders and nonoffenders, even if Sampson and Laub were unable to identify such a
variable from the Gluecks’ data.
198. See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson et al., Does Marriage Reduce Crime? A Counterfactual Approach
to Within-Individual Causal Effects, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 465, 465 (2006) (analyzing data that “support[]
the inference that states of marriage causally inhibit crime over the life course”); Robert J. Sampson et
al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918, 923
(1997) (finding that a “combined measure of informal social control and cohesion and trust [was] a
robust predictor of lower rates of violence”); Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a
Theory of Race, Crime, and Urban Inequality, in CRIME AND INEQUALITY 37 (John Hagan & Ruth D.
Peterson eds., 1995).
199. It is widely recognized that reasonable educational opportunities, access to employment, and
informal institutional social controls are associated with improved public safety. See ARNOLD S. LINKSY
& MURRAY A. STRAUS, SOCIAL STRESS IN THE UNITED STATES: LINKS TO REGIONAL PATTERNS IN CRIME AND
ILLNESS (1986). While incarceration drains resources from these areas, decarceration would make
available resources for these social sectors. But funds devoted to resource-intensive judicial monitoring,
order-maintenance, and therapeutic court processes are unavailable for educational programs, job
training, healthcare, affordable housing, or other services.
200. See, e.g., David Friedrichs, Enron et al.: Paradigmatic White Collar Crime Cases for the New
Century, 12 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 113, 119–21 (2004) (examining the criminal organizational culture
of Enron as well as those of other large corporations, accounting firms, and law firms).
201. See id. at 114–16.
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and lacks the criminogenic and other harmful characteristics associated with
prison or jail.
On a decarceration model, then, given the severe harms associated with
large-scale incarceration and the compelling evidence that social institutional
engagement may address certain commonly criminally prosecuted forms of
socially disruptive conduct more effectively than incarceration, non-carceral
sentencing is preferred. The only circumstances under which a carceral sentence
would be imposed in a specialized criminal court adopting a pure decarceration
model would be where there is substantial reason to believe incarceration is
necessary to protect public safety or is otherwise necessary in the interests of
justice. And to the extent there is doubt as to this determination, on a pure
decarceration model that doubt would be resolved in favor of non-carceral
sentencing unless and until incarceration becomes necessary.202 In such in-
stances—for example, in cases of serious violent crime where the defendant is
adjudged mentally well and that individual’s prior record and most recent
criminal conduct suggests a serious ongoing risk to public safety—it is unlikely
a defendant would be referred to a specialized diversionary court in the first
place. Were that to occur, however, the case would be referred back to the
conventional court. Though these determinations are inevitably complicated and
involve assessment of uncertain risks, serious violent and dangerous defendants
who would continue to pose a grave threat—even if subject to an alternative
socially integrative sentencing regime of mental health treatment, job place-
ment, and social service reporting—are a substantially smaller demographic
than that of the current population incarcerated in the United States.203
A decarceration model of specialized criminal law administration operates
with reference to this framework, seeking to facilitate greater non-carceral
social institutional integration of persons accused of an array of criminal
offenses. But apart from this commitment to attempting to reduce criminal
involvement by improving access to other social institutions, a decarceration
model is untethered from any highly specified jurisprudential or institutional
content. Its sole unifying feature is that of closely empirically monitored
202. More generally, a decarceration model would aim to restrict incarceration over time only to
those cases where persons are guilty of crimes so appalling the public’s sense of justice requires it, such
as for serial killers; to matters where the convicted offender’s prior criminal history is so extensive and
serious that the risk of release would be too grave to manage; and to those who, once subject to
diversionary sentencing, revealed themselves through subsequent offending to pose an ongoing threat
to others.
203. See Key Facts at a Glance: State Prison Population by Offense Type, 1980–2006, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/corrtyp.cfm (last revised Mar. 9, 2012) (report-
ing that state prison populations as of 2006 consisted of approximately 100,000 persons convicted of
public order offenses, over 200,000 persons convicted of drug offenses, and over 200,000 persons
convicted of property offenses); see also GLAZE, supra note 1, at 1 fig.1; Homicide Trends in the U.S.:
Homicide Victimization 1950–2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
homicide/tables/totalstab.cfm (last revised Mar. 9, 2012); Key Facts at a Glance: Percent of Total
Crime Reported to Police, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/
reportingtypetab.cfm (last revised Mar. 9, 2012).
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experimentation with criminal law administrative alternatives so as to reduce
reliance on incarceration consistent with maintenance of public safety and to forge a
more sociologically and empirically oriented criminal justice framework.
Courts adopting a pure decarceration approach would reject the court-based
therapeutic methods of certain specialized criminal courts and the commitment
to judicial monitoring as a scalable manner of deterring criminal conduct. A
focus on order maintenance is abandoned too on a decarceration model, along
with the associated commitment to broken windows policing. The purpose of a
decarceration approach—more conducive to adoption by conventional courts
than reformist approaches that entail providing therapy in a courtroom context
or transforming judges into probation officers, though certainly not typical of
traditionally conceived courts—is to oversee the adequate provision of services
to the class of defendants referred to those services and appearing before the
diversionary courts, predominately by monitoring the service providers. This is
a role somewhat familiar to courts from the structural reform litigation context.204
Critically, courts adopting a decarceration model are experimentalist institu-
tions that are open to revision in light of ongoing empirical feedback—they are
unfinished, self-correcting, reformist organizations. The aspiration of a decarcera-
tion model of specialized criminal law administration is to bring about criminal
law reform incrementally, revising policies in response to input from defen-
dants, judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and empirical monitoring enti-
ties.205 In this sense, a decarceration model is decidedly unfinished, promising
gradual reform rather than a bold new program fully specified in advance.206
A further advantage of a decarceration model is that it works to reduce
reliance on incarceration while closely attending to the particular needs and
204. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1284 (1976).
205. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL 209–10 (1983)
(describing the “problem-oriented approach” as one that calls for “making incremental and unexciting
adjustments in the administration of existing [programs]”). A decarceration model may be understood
in this regard as adapting an approach elaborated by Scandanavian criminologist and political theorist
Thomas Mathiesen, who developed a theory of the unique promise of unfinished reforms. See THOMAS
MATHIESEN, THE POLITICS OF ABOLITION 13–28 (1974). For Mathiesen, the unfinished alternative emerges
when we refuse “to remain silent concerning that which we cannot [yet] talk about”; in our grasping
attempts to fashion a competing, contradictory, and in that sense new state of affairs, we “express the
unfinished.” See id. at 16. A decarceration model adopts precisely this approach, borrowing the now
familiar institutional home of the specialized criminal court to attempt to direct criminal law administra-
tion in different directions, incrementally, experimentally, with sensitivity to empirical feedback, and
with the overall goal of facilitating a form of social order that is less reliant on conventional criminal
law frameworks and incarceration.
206. See FEELEY, supra note 205. Dorf and Sabel also underscore that experimentalist institutions are
in an important sense always “unfinished.” See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 13, at 860; see also Michael
C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 940 (2003) (referring to
problem-oriented courts as “always a work in progress,” and stating that “the very conditions upon
which problem-solving courts insist in the actors they evaluate—openness and revisability in light of
experience—apply as well to problem-solving courts themselves”). But see Super, supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
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risks associated with specific populations of defendants. The hope is that this
will free up resources currently allocated to criminal law administration and
make them available for other sectors better suited to addressing the relevant
underlying problems. This may help to negotiate (if not to entirely avoid) the
decarceration trap that Professors Robert Weisberg and Joan Petersilia have
cautioned against: the “grave risk of backfire if advocates attempt to reduce
mass incarceration simply for the sake of reduction rather than coupling advo-
cacy with a full consideration of the causes of recidivism.”207 Because, as
Weisberg and Petersilia warn, “even if small increases in crime by released
prisoners . . . are not statistically meaningful, they may reignite the political
demagoguery that contributed to mass incarceration in the first place.”208 A
decarceration model functions in an incrementalist fashion to reduce reliance on
incarceration by experimenting with alternatives closely tailored to the needs of
populations currently subject to criminal supervision while attending to the
causes of recidivism and creating a record of demonstrated positive results.
A decarceration model also promises to attend to the risk of “transinstitution-
alization,” which Professor Bernard Harcourt has identified with regard to
mentally ill incarcerated persons.209 Transinstitutionalization refers to the disas-
trous experience encountered during the earlier attempt to deinstitutionalize
persons living in mental hospitals without accounting in any meaningful way
for their integration elsewhere. Following the deinstitutionalization of hospitals
for the mentally ill in the 1960s and 1970s, many persons released from mental
institutions either became homeless or were later reinstitutionalized in prisons
and jails.210 A decarceration model works to avoid this outcome of transferring
persons from one total carceral institution (prison or jail) to another total
institution (for example, a psychiatric hospital) by collaborating closely with,
monitoring, and shifting resources to a continuum of networked though indepen-
dent and mostly nonresidential service providers that address housing, mental
health, medical, and employment needs of low-income persons in a given
delimited geographic area.211
It is imperative to underscore, though, that in diverting certain categories of
cases and defendants to sectors outside the criminal law administrative context,
a decarceration approach should be understood as a partial strategy for decarcera-
tion, not necessarily as a permanent criminal law administrative fixture nor as a
comprehensive solution to the problems of overcriminalization and overincarcera-
207. See Weisberg & Petersilia, supra note 5, at 126.
208. Id.
209. Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the Deinstitutionalization of
Mental Hospitals in the 1960s, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 53, 87–88 (2011).
210. See id. at 53–54, 87–88.
211. Cf. Weisberg, supra note 179, at 363–69 (examining how deinstitutionalization of the mentally
ill in the 1970s was a catastrophe motivated in part by widely shared but unexamined notions of how
gravely disabled people could be treated “in the community,” with little thought devoted to how such
care would actually be administered).
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tion. Rather, the decarceration model’s more modest goal is to shift the manage-
ment of social disorder, where possible, from criminal courts, probation or
parole offices, jails, and prisons to a range of other institutions. Invariably,
violent and otherwise criminal conduct will continue to intrude upon people’s
lives, and conventional criminal law administration will play a role, however
imperfect, in responding to that conduct. A decarceration model promises to
minimize such conduct, focus conventional criminal law resources where they
seem most plainly called for, and begin to respond to the problems of overcrimi-
nalization and overincarceration by enlisting other social institutions more fully
in managing social disorder. Documented successful diversion of some cases
may form the basis for subsequent decriminalization of certain conduct (for
instance of particular drug offenses), while other offenses may entail harm that
warrants a retained norm of criminalization (particularly where theft or violence
is involved) even as successful diversion may support substantially reduced
reliance on incarceration for that category of offense or offender.
The remainder of this section will explore how different existing specialized
criminal courts are functioning or could and should function on a decarceration
model. The criminal law reformist possibilities of a decarceration model are
further explored in Part III. Objections to a specialized criminal law reform
strategy more generally are considered in Part IV.
Although many mental health courts adopt some combination of a therapeutic
jurisprudence and judicial monitoring approach, mental health courts may also
embrace a decarceration model, shifting resources for mentally ill persons from
the criminal courts, jails, and prisons to other sectors. Mental health courts
operating on a decarceration model seek to remove mentally ill individuals from
conventional criminal processing to a forum where the focus is on addressing
holistically relevant needs so as to prevent subsequent criminal offending.
There is tremendous potential to accomplish significant decarceration by
addressing mentally ill individuals’ socially disruptive conduct outside the
context of conventional criminal law administration. Roughly 500,000 mentally
ill people are incarcerated in prisons and jails in the United States.212 Among
the most common mental illnesses U.S. prisoners suffer are schizophrenia and
bipolar disorder, both of which are amenable in many cases to effective
psychiatric intervention.213
212. See, e.g., The New Asylums, PUB. BROAD. SERV., http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
asylums/view/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). Reports suggest that between one fifth to one half of
prisoners in the United States suffer from a serious mental illness. In 2005, a Bureau of Justice
Statistics study found that more than half of the inmate population had a mental illness. See DORIS J.
JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF
PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006). Other sources suggest that between sixteen to twenty percent of
prisoners in the United States are seriously mentally ill. See, e.g., Merrill Balassone, Jails, Prisons
Increasingly Taking Care of Mentally Ill, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/jails-prisons-increasingly-taking-care-of-mentally-ill/2011/01/21/ABo3WRJ_story.html.
213. See, e.g., Stephen Allen, Mental Health Treatment and the Criminal Justice System, 4 J. HEALTH
& BIOMED. L. 153, 161–65 (2008).
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For the mentally ill, incarceration is frequently brutal and devastating and
conditions of confinement routinely worsen rather than improve the relevant
mental illnesses and associated disorderly conduct.214 As the U.S. Supreme
Court explained in Brown v. Plata: In California, “[b]ecause of a shortage of
treatment beds, suicidal inmates may be held for prolonged periods in telephone-
booth sized cages without toilets.”215 The Court included this image of the
holding cages used for mentally ill individuals in California prisons216:
214. Gary Fields, No Way Out: Trapped by Rules, the Mentally Ill Languish in Prison, WALL ST. J.,
May 3, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114662497280042311.html.
215. 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1924 (2011).
216. Id. at 1950 app. A.
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The majority opinion in Plata continued:
A psychiatric expert reported observing an inmate who had been held in such
a cage for nearly 24 hours, standing in a pool of his own urine, unresponsive
and nearly catatonic. Prison officials explained they had “no place to put
him.”217
The brutality of these conditions entailed by incarcerating large numbers of
mentally ill individuals, often in response to relatively minor offending criminal
conduct, is sufficiently apparent as to require little further explication.
By contrast, on a decarceration model, mental health court teams—composed
of a judge, prosecutor, defense counsel, social worker, and psychologist—work
to identify mentally ill individuals who may be removed from conventional
criminal carceral sentencing to alternative programming without excessive risk
to public safety, leading Professor Shauhin Talesh to refer to mental health
courts generally as “dynamic risk managers.”218 Then, mental health court
teams work to locate sustainable psychiatric treatment, sustainable housing
arrangements, and meaningful activity of some sort for participants to under-
take.219 Mental health courts operating on a decarceration model monitor
provision of mental health treatment and other services to defendants.220 The
service providers themselves have an informal surveiling function, and the
courts only need to intervene to conduct a revocation hearing or to increase
service levels or monitoring if a defendant reveals himself or herself to pose a
substantial danger to others.221 The courts use outside referrals to apply a
combination of risk assessment tools to develop programmatic interventions,
including actuarial models to identify risk factors and more individualized
217. Id.; see also id. at 1926 (“Mentally ill inmates languished for months, or even years, without
access to necessary care. They suffer from severe hallucinations, and they decompensate into catatonic
states.” (alteration omitted) (quoting Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1316 (E.D. Cal. 1995)
(internal quotations marks omitted)).
218. Talesh, supra note 80, at 119–24.
219. According to Mental Health Court Judge Patrick Morris:
A substantial number of these folks are so low functioning that you have to reduce your level
of expectations. Many are illiterate, and when you say, “Go to school,” you may mean simply
“Go [to] the county library and be engaged in a literacy program.” What you want to do is
essentially find a way to occupy them constructively . . . . Re-engage them with their family if
at all possible . . . so that they have a support group out there and a daily activity to go to
that’s meaningful and constructive. And it may be as simple as a volunteer position at a
homeless shelter . . . but you look for a variety of ways to simply help them reconstruct a life
that has some meaning to it, and that’s about all you can do with some of these clients.
Id. at 122 n.191 (citing Interview with Judge Patrick Morris, Satellite Broadcast of Mental Health
Courts, Ctr. for Court Innovation (Nov. 14, 2002)).
220. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 73, at 19.
221. See, e.g., Matthew J. D’Emic, The Promise of Mental Health Courts: Brooklyn Criminal Justice
System Experiments with Treatment as an Alternative to Prison, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2007, at 24, 26–27.
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clinical assessment.222 Perfect compliance with treatment and other orders is not
expected, and incarceration is used only as a last resort when all other lenient
policies relating to noncompliance have failed.223 There is evidence that diver-
sionary mental health courts may reduce reliance on incarceration in managing
mentally ill persons, reduce reliance on in-patient psychiatric treatment, and
improve access to housing for program participants.224
Veterans courts operating on a decarceration model would similarly obtain
local cooperation to manage the cases of referred veterans through non-carceral
sentencing, such as through referral to Veterans Affairs programs as in the case
of Eifert recounted in this Article’s introduction.225 If community courts are to
function on a decarceration model, they would need to limit their jurisdiction to
matters in which defendants would otherwise likely be subject to incarcera-
tion.226
Drug courts may function on a decarceration model, accomplishing some
measure of de facto decriminalization by sentencing drug-involved defendants
to treatment and non-revocable or revocation-limited probation. When state
legislatures pass drug court acts or related legislation authorizing this non-
carceral drug court approach, the effect is to bypass political barriers to more
explicit decriminalization and to lend democratic legitimacy to drug courts’
222. See, e.g., Talesh, supra note 80, at 113–15 (“Mental health courts have a unique, clinically-
based risk management model that is routinely updated and altered and relies on dynamic assess-
ment.”).
223. See, e.g., Shoaf, supra note 128, at 991 (“Jail time is used only when deemed absolutely
necessary, and is usually for a short period of time such as three, five, or ten days. If the client is
eventually terminated from the program, any jail time served is put towards the remaining time the
client may have on his or her original sentence.”); Talesh, supra note 80, at 119 & n.174; see also Mark
A.R. Kleiman, The Outpatient Prison, AM. INT., Spring 2010, at 45 (reporting reduced incarceration and
recidivism in Hawaii program that applied short and certain carceral sanctions to high-risk group of
drug addicted ex-offenders).
224. See, e.g., Richard D. Schneider, Mental Health Courts, 21 CURRENT OPINION IN PSYCHIATRY 510,
510–11 (2008) (reporting range of positive outcomes associated with mental health courts); see also
Teresa W. Carns et al., Therapeutic Justice in Alaska’s Courts, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2002)
(reporting that evaluation of Alaska’s mental health court reflected that participants experienced
reduced mental hospital admissions, reduced criminal justice involvement, and improved housing
placement). But see Christine M. Sarteschi et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of Mental Health Courts:
A Quantitative Review, 39 J. CRIM. JUST. 12 (2011) (reporting findings that suggest mental health courts
are an effective intervention with respect to both recidivism and clinical outcomes but noting findings
are limited by methodological weaknesses of existing studies); see also Richard J. Bonnie & John
Monahan, From Coercion to Contract: Reframing the Debate on Mandated Community Treatment for
People with Mental Disorders, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 485, 485 (2005) (analyzing the types and
features of mandated community treatment that are tied to “some form of ‘leverage’ in which
deprivations such as jail or hospitalization have been avoided, or rewards such as money or housing
have been obtained [by persons with mental disorders], contingent on treatment adherence”).
225. See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, A Separate Peace: Specialized Courts for War Veterans Work
Wonders. But Why Stop at Veterans?, SLATE (Feb. 11, 2010, 1:33 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/ 2010/02/a_separate_peace.html.
226. See Marsha Weissman, Aspiring to the Impracticable: Alternatives to Incarceration in the Era
of Mass Incarceration, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 235, 239–40 (2009) (discussing the need to
avoid the dangers of net widening in implementing alternatives to incarceration programs).
1642 [Vol. 100:1587THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
efforts.227
Reentry courts may also operate on a decarceration model. Parole or proba-
tion violators constitute approximately 50–65% of people admitted to state
prison, and about half of these individuals are re-incarcerated for technical
violations.228 Reentry courts may facilitate access to social services and employ-
ment and rely on those referral sources for notification of extremely concerning
noncompliance but otherwise sharply limit reincarceration for technical viola-
tions.229
Although most domestic violence courts function on a judicial monitoring
model of limited effectiveness and with substantial associated rights-eviscerat-
ing risks, domestic violence courts could shift to a decarceration model for
certain cases arising from relatively less serious and less violent incidents.
Alternative sentences could still be onerous and require, among other condi-
tions, considerable financial support of and physical separation from the com-
plainant. These provisions might better serve the interests of the complainant
spouse than incarceration for short periods of a spouse who is the primary
source of financial support for the family.230 Courts could also work to facilitate
services for complainants—as do many domestic violence courts currently—
particularly because the availability of alternative living arrangements, employ-
ment opportunities, or vocational or educational training may empower survivors
of domestic violence to leave or transform abusive relationships and, hence, in
the long-run reduce reoffending, re-arrests, and reincarceration. Sex offense
courts are generally conceptualized primarily on a judicial monitoring model
but could also shift to a decarceration model by identifying those individuals
whose convictions are such that carceral sentencing seems unnecessary (for
instance, individuals convicted on the basis of public urination, certain other
forms of indecent exposure, or consensual sex with a person not significantly
younger than the accused).231
227. See, e.g., Daniel T. Eismann, Three Branches of Government Working Together Effectively
Have Made Idaho a Leader, THE ADVOCATE: OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR, Sept. 2008,
at 12, 12 (“In 2001, the legislature enacted the Idaho Drug Court Act to provide a statutory framework
for implementing drug courts throughout the state.”).
228. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 182, at 23. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, parole
violators returned to prison serve eighteen months on average before being released again. Id. In
Louisiana, technical violators serve an average of twenty months before being re-released. See id.
229. After the Harlem Parole Reentry Court learned judicial monitoring was associated with
increased reincarceration, it began to shift to something approaching a decarceration model, seeking to
reduce judicial surveillance and revocation to jail for technical violations. See HAMILTON, supra note
141, at 33 (“In New York State a policy shift occurred in 2006, resulting in parole officers making a
concerted effort not to revoke parolees based on technical violations.”); see also id. at 30 (“[I]n the days
ahead the Reentry Court might consider exploring alternative responses to technical infractions, such as
increased use of intermediate sanctions in lieu of revocation.”).
230. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 14, at 68 (“Women’s problems frequently are exacerbated rather
than solved by a lack of financial and other support from their incarcerated partners.”).
231. See, e.g., New Sex Offender Court Being Set Up in Pittsburgh, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 4, 2011,
http://www.buffalonews.com/wire-feeds/state/article412890.ece (describing the goals and design of
Pittsburgh’s sex offender court).
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In all of these separate specialized criminal court contexts, a decarceration
model does not purport to be capable of solving the underlying problems.
Instead, a decarceration model frees up resources that might be allocated to
sectors better able to address relevant problems, even if the problems ultimately
remain in some measure intractable, at least without further-reaching interven-
tion. A decarceration model is minimalist in its mission as compared to compet-
ing criminal law reformist models, at least with regard to the degree of
intervention taking place in the court itself. Empirical monitoring may establish
the basis for transferring this framework outside the specialized courts context,
facilitating farther-reaching transformative criminal law reform. Gradually, in
an incremental experimentalist fashion, a decarceration model may begin to
reform criminal law more broadly by working to address the compound prob-
lem of the criminal law’s relationship to social-order maintenance and the social
conditions associated with targeted conduct, moving the regulation of certain
matters outside criminal law administration to other sectors.
In summary, the upshot of the Article’s analysis to this point is that if
specialized criminal courts aim to begin to reduce harshness and brutality in
criminal law administration and to limit reliance on criminal supervision and
incarceration while addressing socially disruptive conduct, they should organize
themselves predominantly on a diversionary, minimalist, experimental, sociologi-
cally oriented decarceration model. The therapeutic, judicial monitoring, and
order maintenance models represent distinct criminal law reformist strategies
that threaten to exacerbate rather than unwind existing problems in criminal law
administration because they each possess inherent features that tend to increase
reliance on criminal supervision and that may even expand incarceration—
radically transforming the judicial role and diluting procedural protections more
significantly than on a decarceration model, without generating other demon-
strated desirable outcomes.
The following Part will explore in more detail three criminal law reform
strategies that courts adopting a decarceration model may set in motion. Part IV
will address anticipated objections.
III. POSSIBILITIES OF A DECARCERATION MODEL
Much of the reformist promise of a decarceration model lies in the associated
courts’ ability to begin to redirect criminal law administration more generally
through three primary strategies: (1) cognitive reframing; (2) institutional rein-
vention; and (3) systemic change. The following subsections attend to each of
these three strategies in turn.
A. COGNITIVE REFRAMING
Specialized criminal courts adopting a decarceration model hold the potential
to reframe shared understandings of criminalized conduct, developing alterna-
tive approaches to an array of matters currently managed in large part through
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criminal supervision and incarceration. Reframing common conceptions of
crime and punishment is a critical component of any decarceration strategy
because to shift the management of social order from criminal law administra-
tion to other institutions will require changed public understandings of when
incarceration is called for and what viable alternatives might entail.
Before turning to the mechanisms by which courts adopting a decarceration
model may reframe the criminal law’s response to various forms of criminally
charged conduct, a brief detour into the literature on framing is in order.
Framing is a process explored widely in psychological,232 political science,233
sociological,234 and legal scholarship,235 so I will only quickly define the
dimensions of framing relevant for present purposes.
In short, a “frame” is a mental structure through which we understand the
world and which serves to organize perception.236 Frames are generated through
interactive social processes237 and they shape how people construct meaning,
identify problems, and determine to resolve those problems, often operating
unconsciously to inform individual and collective decision making.238 How a
particular problem or choice is framed significantly influences the way in which
people proceed to address the situation.239 For example, a public-health framing
of the problem of drug use might suggest drug treatment as a preferred solution;
a moralistic framing of drug use as an unethical failure of will might suggest a
criminally punitive response. Likewise, a mental health framing of veterans’ or
mentally ill persons’ antisocial conduct might suggest a coordinated reaction of
clinical treatment and social service provision, whereas a framing of such
persons as dangerous and unmanageable criminals likely would suggest a
carceral response.
Despite the powerful influence exerted by existing frames, reframing occurs
routinely, contributing to shifting social understandings. In effect, reframing
reorganizes intuitions and understanding, generating different frames, often by
introducing alternative ways of speaking about and approaching (and regulat-
ing) the dimension of the world in question.240
232. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981).
233. See, e.g., DONALD A. SCHO¨N & MARTIN REIN, FRAME REFLECTION: TOWARD THE RESOLUTION OF
INTRACTABLE POLICY CONTROVERSIES (1994).
234. See, e.g., Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An
Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 611, 614 (2000).
235. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 813–18 (2008).
236. ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE 21 (1974).
237. See, e.g., Benford & Snow, supra note 234.
238. See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 232; see also GOFFMAN, supra note 236.
239. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 3–4 (2008).
240. Another related, though distinct, way to characterize the process of reframing is in terms of
changing or ambiguating social meaning. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social
Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1039–42 (1995). According to Lessig:
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Social psychologist John M. Darley explains one way in which intuitions
may change as abstract reasoning overrides less reflective judgment.241 Cogni-
tive psychologists refer to this as dual processing: “One process, produced
rapidly, takes place non-optionally . . . . The second set of processes involves
abstract reasoning areas of the brain, and is not always triggered into ac-
tion. . . . [W]hen this reasoning system is activated, it sometimes overrides
intuitions.”242 Over time, cognitive frames may shift through the contestation,
embrace, and repetition of competing frames in different social and cultural
contexts.
In the criminal law context, frames are routinely invoked in ways that shape
how people imagine particular forms of disfavored conduct ought to be man-
aged.243 In a provocative article on what he called “Interpretive Construction in
the Substantive Criminal Law,” Mark Kelman revealed how certain frames
shape whether the conduct of a criminally accused person is understood as
morally blameworthy, as an appropriate subject of criminal punishment, or as
excusable.244 Though Kelman did not himself rely on the conceptual apparatus
of cognitive framing, his analysis offered an account of how framing occurs in
the context of criminal law administration through the selection of time frames
(narrow or broad) and intentionalist versus determinist interpretations of behav-
ior, among other interpretive schemes.245 Narrow versus broad time framing
influences perceptions of the degree of culpability of a defendant, enabling or
undermining the view of that defendant as morally responsible (on an intention-
alist account) or as significantly constrained and, hence, less responsible in
some relevant respect (a determinist interpretation).246
A decarceration model of specialized criminal law administration offers an
alternative perspective on the necessity of incarceration; on structural, neighbor-
hood-level mechanisms that may inhibit crime; as well as on time-framing,
moral responsibility, and blaming practices in criminal law. And it asserts these
alternative frames in local, state, and national contexts. The process by which
[S]ocial meanings . . . are used by individuals, or groups, to advance individual or collective
ends; and . . . their force in part hangs upon their resting upon a certain uncontested, or
taken-for-granted, background of thought or expectation . . . .
. . . .
. . . [Change in social meanings] proceeds by remaking that which is taken for granted, and
which gives a particular text an unwanted meaning. It functions by switching on new
associations. This breaking up, or remaking, requires effort; it follows from a practice.
See id. at 951, 962.
241. See John Darley, Realism on Change in Moral Intuitions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1643, 1649 (2010).
242. Id.
243. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 111, at 10 (discussing the “teaching function” of U.S. criminal
law).
244. See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV.
591, 592–98 (1981).
245. See id. at 593–96.
246. See id.
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courts adopting a decarceration model reframe understandings of particular
categories of crime and offenders begins with a dialogue between architects of
specialized criminal courts, prosecutors, public defenders, and defendants.247
Collectively, these actors forge a different account of the causes and conse-
quences of certain criminal offenses. For example, veterans courts and mental
health courts have made considerable headway in advancing a regime of
treatment rather than incarceration in response to socially disruptive conduct on
the part of veterans and mentally ill persons; other specialized criminal courts
have introduced with substantial success a revised approach to drug offenses
involving treatment and irrevocable or rarely revocable probation. Over time,
this understanding is embraced, at least to some extent, by those who interact
with the specialized criminal court itself and by other relevant criminal law
administrative actors: police, prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges. These
alternative frames are diffused through the court to the various individuals that
come into contact with the court. Eventually, the reconfigured framework may
be taken up by actors outside the specialized court. The publication and
dissemination of empirical analyses of court outcomes may allow for broader
circulation of a proposed framework for reform.
Consider again the veterans courts program in Okemos, Michigan and the
case of Staff Sgt. Brad Eifert introduced in this Article’s introduction. Eifert
served in Iraq and lives in Okemos, which is one of the approximately eighty
jurisdictions in the United States with a veterans court. After returning from
Iraq, Eifert struggled with depression, alcohol, and his own anger until he took a
gun and initiated a confrontation with the police of a kind sometimes referred to
as “suicide by cop.”248 Although he faced charges carrying multiple potential
life sentences, he was ultimately permitted to participate in a diversionary court
program that may result in a dismissal of all charges.249
The procedures whereby Eifert came to be admitted to the diversionary
program reflect the reframing processes potentially introduced through a special-
ized criminal court adopting a decarceration approach. In the first instance, to
establish a veterans court, judges and other advocates introduce a different
framing of responsibility for the criminal conduct in question. In the veterans
court context, this entails reframing veterans’ socially disruptive acts as, to
some extent, a shared responsibility occasioned by the fact that these individu-
als have been sent by elected officials into harm’s way, resulting in their
inability to function in a socially acceptable manner. The offending behavior in
question is also reframed as something other than a deliberately criminal
transgression, warranting blame and carceral punishment. Instead, veterans’
socially disruptive conduct is recharacterized as a manifestation, in part, of what
Buffalo, New York’s Veterans Court Judge Robert T. Russell has called the
247. See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 13, at 832.
248. See Goode, supra note 15.
249. See id.
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“invisible wounds of war.”250 Judge Russell said of his Veterans Court in an
interview with the New York Times: “I don’t interpret it as excusing behavior,
but as addressing what the behavior is.”251 In galvanizing support to create
veterans court programs, the courts’ architects invoke repeatedly this set of
contending frames, differently characterizing the defendants and offending
conduct to be addressed by the court, both at the local level and also on a state
and national stage through media and other public engagements.
Then, when the court is operational, the process of moving particular defen-
dants into that court itself engages and reframes the way different key actors in
the local criminal process understand the problems at hand. For Eifert to be
admitted to the diversionary program, the judge, defense counsel, prosecutors,
and police all had to agree on the transfer. The judge had to consider whether
Eifert could be admitted given that his case involved the use of a firearm and
threat of injury to police officers. Defense counsel advocated for Eifert’s
admission and ultimately convinced the judge. Initially, though, the prosecutor’s
office “was not going to play at all,” according to Eifert’s counsel. But eventu-
ally, as Eifert’s lawyer introduced a differently framed interpretation of the
case—calling attention to the severity of Eifert’s post-traumatic stress disorder
and his decision not to harm the officers when, as a trained marksman, he could
have done so—the prosecution adjusted its position. Then, the assistant prosecu-
tor had to engage the police officers who had been in the woods that night when
Eifert was firing shots. The case had been debated in local news venues with
some arguing that Eifert should receive a life sentence and others urging a more
lenient response. In the end, the officers were persuaded to agree to Eifert’s
admission to the veterans court and in public comment, one officer, who stated
he feared for his life that night, concluded: “I don’t think any of us would not
want him to get treatment . . . . There’s a difference between somebody who’s a
criminal and someone who’s just in a perfect storm of things going wrong.”252
The line between those two figures—the criminal and the person “in a perfect
storm of things going wrong”—may not in fact be clear at all in the vast
majority of criminal cases, but veterans courts reintroduce a determinist frame,
a collectivist frame, and a broader time frame for a range of conduct in ways
that shift public understandings of a significant group of defendants, veterans,
and a variety of criminalized conduct. Ongoing media attention to specialized
criminal courts carries the reframed understandings in particular jurisdictions,
such as in Okemos, Michigan where Eifert’s case unfolded, to a broader
national audience.
Judges operating in specialized criminal courts understand that they are
engaged in a strategic undertaking focused in large part on shifting public
perceptions about the appropriate scope of criminal law and punishment. As
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See id.
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Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren of the Broward County Mental Health Court relayed
in comments excerpted in this Article’s introduction: “We view the Mental
Health Court as a ‘strategy’ to bring fairness to the administration of justice for
persons being arrested on minor offenses who suffer from major mental disabil-
ity.”253 This strategy of reframing particular defendants and criminalized behav-
iors as suited for alternative forms of social response apart from the criminal
law is a crucial part of the work of a veterans or mental health court and of a
decarceration approach more generally.
It is important to note, however, that this strategy is not without important
limits: the success of reframing and of admission to the programs depends on
the zealous advocacy of defense counsel and on the openness of the judge and
prosecutor. While measures could (and perhaps should) be taken to limit
prosecutorial discretion in the referral process, the cooperation of prosecutors
contributes to the reframing work in which the court is engaged.
In any case, despite its limits, through this strategy specialized criminal
courts have generated some significant reconceptualization of how to approach
particular categories of offenses and offenders. These changes generally begin
with judges and lawyers working within the courts. Chief Judge Jonathan
Lippman of the New York Court of Appeals, for instance, has suggested that:
“When it comes to non-violent crime, we have changed how judges and lawyers
measure success—no longer by the number of dispositions, convictions, or
acquittals but by whether we are able to break the cycle of addiction and crime
and improve public safety.”254 Judge Clinton Deveaux reports that, although his
judicial colleagues used to deride his specialized criminal court work as that of
a “social worker on the bench,” in due course other judges started to refer cases
to his court and reported adopting some similar approaches in their own
conventional courts, acknowledging that “this is the only way to deal with this
stuff if you’re going to actually stop the recidivism and actually solve some of
the problems that are bringing these people to the court.”255 Transfer of
reframed conceptions also is likely to occur through the transfer of judges from
the specialized criminal court back to the conventional court. When judges
move between a specialized criminal court and a conventional court, many
report that they continue to apply in part the approach developed in the
alternative court context to the extent allowable.256
253. DENCKLA & BERMAN, supra note 16, at 17 (emphasis added).
254. Lippman, supra note 77, at 1055.
255. NOLAN, supra note 7, at 21 (quoting Judge Deveaux, who presides over an Atlanta community
court).
256. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 196 (“There was general agreement among the judges
that taking ideas from problem-solving courts was not only possible but desirable. They highlighted
several things that they had learned from their time in problem-solving courts—including the value of a
problem-solving mindset, direct interaction with defendants, monitoring offenders’ performance in
treatment, and reaching out to social service providers—that were appropriate for mainstream use . . . .”);
see also JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS 87 (Bruce J. Winick
& David B. Wexler eds., 2003) (“[M]any former problem solving court judges, upon being transferred
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Beyond the level of reshaping the perspectives of individual court personnel,
judges and other institutional actors frequently adapt the courtroom to function
as public theatre and publicize through the media the aspirations of their
respective courts. As a consequence, large numbers of cases are not necessarily
required for the courts to shift understandings on a broader scale.257 This
addresses one challenge for specialized criminal courts: namely, that they
cannot reasonably be brought to scale. Active engagement of judges, lawyers,
and social scientists involved with diversionary courts in reframing certain of
the criminal law problems at stake in the courts allows the courts broader reach
than that provided by the relatively limited number of cases they are able to
process at any given time.
Additionally, through empirical monitoring of the courts, a decarceration
model helps determine whether incarceration is necessary or advisable for
certain kinds of crimes and defendants, balancing important concerns about
public safety and criminal law reform goals. Many administrators of specialized
criminal courts, often alongside external empirical monitoring entities, closely
track the outcomes regarding recidivism and other variables for participants in
non-carceral programming relative to similarly situated persons subject to
conventional criminal supervision and/or incarceration. If a decarceration ap-
proach is able to demonstrate that reliance on incarceration can be diminished
without imperiling public safety, this approach may reframe public attitudes
regarding incarceration more broadly—providing the basis for a large-scale
reasoned rethinking of prison- and jail-based social order maintenance.258
The process of disseminating empirical analyses is well underway with drug
courts. In a quasi-experimental study released in June 2011, a team of social
scientists working with the Urban Institute and funded by the U.S. Department
of Justice examined the outcomes regarding criminal recidivism and drug
relapse for participants in twenty-three drug courts and six comparison sites.259
Using a combination of statistical techniques to correct for potential selection
bias, attrition bias, and clustering of outcomes within sites, the study’s authors
found that drug courts significantly reduce criminal recidivism and drug use
after eighteen months as compared to the outcomes for similar individuals in the
comparison sites.260 In July 2011, the Senate Judiciary Committee convened
hearings regarding this and related studies to explore expanded funding for
specialized criminal courts relying on alternatives to incarceration, with specific
back to courts of general jurisdiction, have taken with them the tools and sensitivities they have
acquired in those newer courts.”).
257. See, e.g., D’Emic, supra note 221.
258. Cf. Sharon Dolovich, Foreword: Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 237,
258 (2009) (examining the link in popular imagination between safety and incarceration).
259. See ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 1.
260. See id. at 2–7.
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emphasis on drug courts and veterans courts.261 In time, empirical analyses of
this sort may facilitate alternative framings that would enable legislative re-
forms markedly scaling back sentence lengths across the board.
Though specialized criminal courts have generally started with jurisdiction
only over a very limited class of offenders or offenses, typically the courts’
authority expands and an increasing range of cases come before the courts. For
example, drug courts began by accepting drug possession cases but over time
have expanded to include individuals arrested for forgery, burglary, and other
crimes believed to be associated with drug addiction.262 This occurs in part due
to the cognitive reframing that the courts enable: drug crime is characterized to
include not only narcotics possession and sales offenses but also conduct
motivated by drug addiction.
Once diversionary specialized criminal courts have become an established
alternative means of addressing drug offenses and the socially disruptive con-
duct of veterans or the mentally ill, broader shifts in social understanding may
be set in motion. The diversionary alternatives introduce a new institutional
framework for managing the problems in question. The existence of these
programs normalizes the alternative responses. And the availability of a parallel
diversionary alternative for a significant class of cases makes available a set of
reasons why diversion may be preferable in other contexts—a potentially
transposable “reasoned override” to the automatic invocation of conventional
criminal law frameworks.263 The contagion of the diversionary approach is
confirmed by the experience of the past decade during which time diversionary
courts have rapidly multiplied in numerous areas and expanded to cover more
serious offenses.
The alternative framings of crime and punishment emerging through the
work of specialized criminal courts, particularly those adopting a diversionary
decarceration approach, hold the promise to shift considerably and broadly
public conceptions of various problems currently managed through criminal
prosecution and incarceration.
B. INSTITUTIONAL REINVENTION
Along with reframing social understandings of crime and punishment, a
decarceration model may also reshape criminal law administrative institutions
by introducing additional tasks for judges, defense counsel, and prosecutors.
Further, a decarceration model incorporates novel players into specialized
criminal courts’ work, in part by facilitating partnerships with local organiza-
tions and social service providers.264
261. See Drug and Veterans’ Treatment Courts: Seeking Cost-Effective Solutions for Protecting
Public Safety and Reducing Recidivism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Terrorism of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011).
262. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 241–42 and accompanying text.
264. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 13, at 865–68.
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The roles of the judge and the parties on a decarceration model are all in flux,
but, unlike on the therapeutic jurisprudence or judicial monitoring models, these
role shifts are relatively consistent with preservation of conventional values
respectively associated with these roles. The primary work of the judge on a
decarceration model is to convene the parties and service providers; to oversee
the negotiation of a diversion plan; to monitor performance of diversion pro-
grams; and then to be available to adjudicate motions for sanctions should
major noncompliance become an issue. The judge on a decarceration model
plays a far less active role than on a therapeutic, judicial monitoring, or order
maintenance model, requiring only one or two days of work per week in the
specialized court. The courts’ institutional design facilitates conscientiousness
about procedural protections, particularly in sanctions proceedings, and it aims
to make transparent the reasons behind court orders.265 On a decarceration
model, the judge also often serves as a spokesperson for a decarceration strategy
and for experimental, empirically informed criminal law administration.266
Defense counsel’s role shifts too, such that his or her most critical function
involves negotiating the terms on which a defendant opts into the diversionary
court. Because specialized criminal courts are configured differently with regard
to the consequences of failure in terms of sentence penalties, informed counsel
at this stage is extremely important. Defense counsel continues to play a role in
safeguarding a defendant’s procedural rights and other interests throughout the
process, especially when motions for sanctions arise. Defense counsel may play
a critical part as well in ensuring that the court actually reduces carceral
sentencing, as opposed to on a therapeutic approach where defense counsel may
acquiesce in a carceral sentence for its presumed therapeutic effect, or in
conventional courts where much defense work involves brokering plea deals
and rarely actively contesting evidence, let alone conducting trials.267
The role shift on a decarceration model is perhaps most dramatic for prosecu-
tors. Embracing a decarceration approach for prosecutors entails that their
offices operate not simply by seeking the toughest charges and sentences for
criminal defendants, but that they work also on strengthening public safety and
advancing justice in a broader context.268 Prosecutors on a decarceration model
265. See HAMILTON, supra note 141, at 9 (“[T]he judge is responsible for openly and publicly
discussing program requirements, sanctions and their purposes.”).
266. See, e.g., D’Emic, supra note 221.
267. See BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 87 (“Public defenders, who would normally object to
a client’s revealing any extraneous personal information, are apt to accept these conversations, knowing
that encouraging words from an authority figure like the judge can be extremely helpful to a client
struggling to achieve sobriety.”); Tamar M. Meekins, Risky Business: Criminal Specialty Courts and
the Ethical Obligations of the Zealous Criminal Defender, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 75 (2007).
268. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 74, at 1125 (“I think if you were to ask most prosecutors what
their goals are, they would say: ‘My job is to put bad guys away.’ That goal is endorsed by our
education and by our culture . . . . If you were to change the goal slightly . . . that completely changes
both the methods that you use, the partners you choose, and every single aspect of what you do.”
(quoting John Feinblatt & Derek Denckla, What Does It Mean To Be a Good Lawyer?: Prosecutors,
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focus their conventional prosecutorial resources on more serious violent or
property crimes where conventional criminal proceedings are most warranted
and refer to specialized courts or drop charges in those matters where non-
carceral sentencing is possible. Prosecutors committed to decarceration also
devote their resources in part to enabling alternatives to incarceration. Taking up
in some significant manner a decarceration agenda, the Brooklyn District
Attorney’s Office, for example, has pioneered several alternatives-to-incarcera-
tion programs. These initiatives emerged before the proliferation of specialized
criminal courts, suggesting that a decarceration approach may have broader
potential to restructure a prosecutorial agenda beyond specialized courts.269 In
1990, Brooklyn’s D.A. Charles “Joe” Hynes introduced a diversion program
that allowed nonviolent drug offenders to enter substance abuse treatment
instead of receiving a conventional criminal sentence. By the late 1990s, the
D.A.’s Office was organizing community group gatherings across Brooklyn to
link individuals on parole or probation to jobs, housing, and treatment pro-
grams.270 This work does not require prosecutors to cease prosecuting cases of
serious crime, but it suggests that prosecutors can play an important part in
decarceration strategies by augmenting the prosecutorial function and organiza-
tional mission.
Beyond reshaping the roles of existing players in criminal courts, a decarcera-
tion model introduces additional players. One notable new player is the re-
sources coordinator—a position increasingly institutionalized in criminal law
administrative systems more broadly.271 Resource coordinators work to link
defendants to services, treatment, and housing, and they work to address other
related cross-sector collaborative efforts of the courts.
Finally, specialized criminal courts operating on a decarceration model may
work to shift the institutional form and function of the courts themselves. As it
has begun to adopt to a greater extent a decarceration mission, the reentry court
in Harlem, for example, has appropriated the form of the parole revocation
court but has become less court-like, functioning simultaneously as a clearing-
house for job placement, mental health care, and legal advice, aiming to change
local opportunities for ex-offenders and to facilitate more general economic
development programs in East Harlem.272 Over time, as these courts become
resource clearinghouses rather than primarily sites for processing guilty pleas or
Defenders and Problem-Solving Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 206, 209 (2001) (quoting Elizabeth Glazer)
(second alteration in original))).
269. See, e.g., Bruce Western, Reentry: Reversing Mass Imprisonment, BOS. REV., July/Aug. 2008.
270. See id. at 9–10.
271. See, e.g., Interview by Carolyn Turgeon with Judge John Leventhal, supra note 85 (“Then we
got a grant for a resource coordinator, a position that has now been institutionalized in the system.”).
272. See HAMILTON, supra note 141, at 11. As a defendant in another specialized criminal court
reported: “It’s not over when you get out of this [graduate the program] . . . . If you needed help or
something, or . . . lost your job and you needed help doing a resume or you needed help finding
employment, you can come back here in this door here and they’re going to do anything they can to
help you out.” FAROLE & CISSNER, supra note 132, at 7 (alterations in original).
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parole revocations, this may work to transform diversionary courts from crimi-
nal courts into different institutions altogether, focusing conventional criminal
law resources on the most serious forms of violent and property crime and
lending support to a range of different local social and economic development
initiatives.
C. SYSTEMIC CHANGE
Through both reframed understandings and institutional reinvention, a decar-
ceration model may enable broader systemic change: altering conceptual ap-
proaches to prevalent social problems, freeing financial resources for other
initiatives, increasing the level of accountability of service providers in diversion-
ary collaborations, politicizing court actors regarding the limits of available
alternative programming, and transforming the manner in which criminal law is
administered more generally. First, by marshaling support for particular types of
social service interventions, a decarceration model directs attention and finan-
cial resources to public health, mental health, housing, and other services that
might not otherwise be available.273 Particularly during times of fiscal austerity,
as resources are cut for mental health and other public health programs, a
decarceration approach may free resources that could be allocated to treatment
initiatives.274 As prisons close, additional resources may be freed for other
initiatives.275 In this regard, specialized criminal courts function as a potential
vehicle for “justice reinvestment;” as the former Executive Director of the
National Association of Drug Court Professionals, Karen Freeman-Wilson,
explained, “the ultimate idea is to shift the resources from the departments of
correction and other places where that money could be put to better use.”276
These courts may also bring about systemic change by influencing how the
problems confronting criminal courts—for instance, mental illness—are man-
aged in other parallel institutions, such as in cities’ public health and publicly
subsidized housing systems. Monitoring the provision of services in diversion-
ary programs provides an additional layer of accountability for those sectors.277
Through this monitoring, the courts aim to encourage improved performance in
related fields as court administrators advocate, for example, to make sure “there
are enough treatment beds, treatment slots . . . in order to make these courts
273. See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 13, at 833 (“Unlike traditional courts of specialized
jurisdiction, drug courts are creating the framework for a pervasive reform of the service providers with
whom they collaborate in the very act of coordinating the services provided.”).
274. Cf. Nicole Santa Cruz & Ashley Powers, Mental Health in Arizona: A Case Study, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/19/nation/la-na-arizona-mental-health-20110120 (ex-
plaining how services for mentally ill persons have been reduced by $2 billion across the country,
eliminating 4,000 inpatient beds, and depriving numerous patients of desired treatment and medica-
tion).
275. See GREENE & MAUER, supra note 3 (examining the fiscal impacts of prison downscaling).
276. WOLF, A NEW WAY, supra note 68, at 6.
277. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 13, at 839.
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functional.”278
As specialized criminal court judges and advocates run up against the limits
of social service providers to accommodate the need for the relevant services,
the effect in many instances may be a politicization of judges and other court
advocates regarding the structural problems afflicting the demographic served
by the court. Part of the reformist potential of a decarceration model, then, is
that it may lead court participants to galvanize broader support for reallocation
of resources to better address these problems. Some mental health court person-
nel have begun this process by locating resources for housing subsidies and by
serving as advocates for court participants with potential landlords.279
It is important to acknowledge, though, that in some, perhaps even in many,
circumstances, a decarceration model may run up against a sense of tragic
futility—and the court and related diversionary programs may be unable to
address adequately the matters at hand, even with more extensive resources for
treatment and other social service alternatives.280 After all, simply improving
the employment and life prospects of particular individuals and shifting re-
sources to institutions that may support those individuals to become more
socially integrated, is unlikely to do a great deal to shift the structures of
opportunity in blighted urban and rural neighborhoods when, fundamentally, the
problems the courts aim to address are deep-seated, systemic problems.281 Yet,
under such circumstances, the limitations of specialized criminal courts may
facilitate larger-scale legislative reform that support effective decriminalization
of certain offenses, reduced incarceration regarding others, and reinvestment in
under-resourced areas. For instance, the limited capacity of drug courts in
California to address treatment and other needs in that state helped to facilitate
legislative reform along these lines. In 2000, when California voters passed
Proposition 36, the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act—permitting
drug arrestees to receive probation with drug treatment instead of incarceration—
the public was responding in part to criticism of drug courts that they served too
278. WOLF, A NEW WAY, supra note 68, at 10 (quoting Nancy Fishman, Project Director, Council of
State Governments’ Justice Center).
279. Shoaf, supra note 128, at 992.
280. See Robert Weisberg, Norms and Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal Law Scholarship,
93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 467, 589–90 (2003) (citing MERCER L. SULLIVAN, “GETTING PAID”: YOUTH
CRIME AND WORK IN THE INNER CITY 226–50 (1989)).
281. For instance, the relationship between crime and unemployment is complex—there is no simple
crime–unemployment correlation:
[K]ey is not the employment of the individual, but the density of consistent employment in the
neighborhood. . . . [I]t is not a singular material factor, because it includes, for example, the
efficacy of local job networks, which distinguish blue collar neighborhoods where education
rates are not necessarily high. And of course distant macroeconomic forces probably affect
crime rates, factors like the outsourcing of manufacturing . . . [as do] various local attitudes
that include tolerance, [and] exhaustion or resistance in the face of criminal victimization . . . .
Id. (footnote omitted).
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few drug offenders and involved too much judicial oversight.282 While Califor-
nia’s drug courts provided treatment to approximately 3,000 individuals annu-
ally before 2001, under Proposition 36 approximately 36,000 drug offenders
each year were receiving probation with drug treatment by 2004.283 Further,
supervision is delegated from the judge to probation officers and revocation of
probation is only considered under limited specified conditions; “flash incarcera-
tion” (short-term incarceration for technical violations) is not permitted.284
The Utah Drug Offender Reform Act provides another intriguing window on
to the systemic shifts set in motion by the relatively limited capacity of
specialized criminal courts. According to Dan Becker, Utah’s State Court
Administrator:
The focus that drug courts have put on treatment gave rise to a lot of interest
on the part of the larger criminal justice community in Utah. . . . All of the
criminal justice agencies got together and worked for several years on crafting
legislation that’s called the Drug Offender Reform Act, which provides for
screening and assessment for every single person charged with a felony where
there’s a drug offense involved. . . . The legislature last year stepped forward
and funded about half of the cost of implementation; they’ll fund the other
half next year hopefully. . . . And that’s a complete shift in public policy. . . . I
suspect you could trace that back to the roots of drug courts putting the
emphasis on treatment.285
As court personnel struggle against structural barriers, such as a lack of
adequate public health and mental health services, lack of affordable housing,
and geographically concentrated underemployment, the result may be some
measure of consciousness-raising and potentially responsive legislative change
but also an acute sense of the impossible situation in which many subjects of the
criminal law find themselves. Part of the reformist potential of a decarceration
model is that this experience will lead court participants to work to address
more comprehensively the structural problems at issue and to disseminate more
widely the truth that criminal courts cannot serve as a cure-all for social
282. See Gardner v. Schwarzenegger, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 232 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (recounting
the history of Proposition 36’s passage).
283. DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, PROPOSITION 36: IMPROVING LIVES, DELIVERING RESULTS 19 (2006).
284. See Gardner, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 238–40 (enjoining enforcement of flash incarceration
measures enacted subsequent to the implementation of Proposition 36).
285. WOLF, A NEW WAY, supra note 68, at 12. One interesting feature of the systemic shifts instigated
by specialized criminal courts in this respect is that they leave intact criminal prohibitions on certain
conduct but facilitate remarkable lenience with regard to that conduct. In other words, on a decarcera-
tion model, systemic change tending toward decriminalization need not involve statutory repeals of
criminal prohibitions. Instead, the existence of diversionary courts and the cognitive and institutional
shifts they work, adjust enforcement priorities and make available social service treatment alternatives
while leaving intact the expressive symbolic prohibition in the criminal statute. This may be a peculiar
instance of the sort of acoustic separation that Professor Meir Dan-Cohen theorized in his famous
article on “Decision Rules and Conduct Rules.” See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct
Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
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insecurity, social risk, and the underlying social problems the courts routinely
confront. Moreover, specialized criminal courts operating on a decarceration
model begin to expose the complexity of the problems at hand and the unavail-
ability of a complete resolution of that complexity. They can help all of us to see
that the problems that have found their way to criminal courts are often ones for
which there is no ideal solution, even though there are better, more humane
responses or worse, more brutal carceral means of imperfectly addressing these
problems.
In these various respects—through reframing understandings of criminally
charged conduct, shifting the roles of key systemic players and institutions, and
catalyzing resource reallocation and legislative change—a decarceration model
may begin to bring about substantial transformative shifts in how criminal law
is administered.
IV. PERILS OF SPECIALIZED CRIMINAL LAW REFORM
It remains to consider the perils presented by a specialized criminal courts
reform agenda generally—as distinct from the potential risks addressed above
with regard to the more predominant criminal law reformist models at work in
specialized criminal courts. Specialized criminal courts generally pose a number
of significant and concerning risks: excessive reliance on legal frameworks to
address complex social concerns; dilution of the expressive retributive or
deterrent force of criminal law; broadly diminished procedural protections;
inefficiently proliferating specializations; and legitimation of harshness in con-
ventional courts for less sympathetic, racial minority, or otherwise stigmatized
defendants. This Part will begin to address these risks and the ability of courts
adopting a decarceration model to respond to them.
A. EXCESSIVE LEGALISM?
Critics of specialized criminal courts reject the overarching premise that
criminal courts can be relied upon to address complex social problems. Profes-
sor Jane M. Spinak has argued that court-based approaches will be incapable of
managing either the structural problems the specialized criminal courts aim to
address, such as crippling caseloads in conventional criminal courts, or the
difficult social issues the courts seek to handle, such as addiction and social
dislocation.286 Specialized criminal courts will be unable to manage the courts’
structural problems, Spinak contends, because those problems are produced by
legislatures and public policies over which the courts exercise little control.
Simply put, so long as police persist in arresting and prosecutors persist in
286. Jane M. Spinak, Romancing the Court, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 258, 258–59 (2008); see also Levine,
supra note 74, at 1131 (“By placing social problems inside the criminal justice framework without
changing the fundamental orientation of the officials charged with addressing these problems, we
ensure that the traditional apparatus of the criminal justice system—conviction, punishment, and
surveillance—will be the only strategies considered by the problem-solvers.”).
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prosecuting drug offenders, the volume of drug offenders in the criminal courts
will remain high. Moreover, Spinak maintains, the societal and personal prob-
lems the courts seek to address are multifaceted and socially entrenched and
will be difficult, if not impossible, for courts to mitigate, absent broader
structural shifts. To substantiate these arguments, Spinak explores the history of
the early family courts, which, like contemporary specialized criminal courts,
had problem-oriented ambitions and fell short in resolving the relevant prob-
lems, largely because of the complicated socially ingrained character of family
dysfunction.287 Spinak concludes that we “need to develop resources beyond
the court” and focus on “more client-oriented solutions” rather than therapeutic
or court interventions.288 In Spinak’s view, though, any conceptual reorientation
within the courts toward building resources beyond the court and developing
client-oriented solutions “is not enough to stem the tide of judicial activism that
situates problem solving in the court itself rather than in the broader structure of
how people in need are served by our society.”289
Professor Mae C. Quinn has advanced a related argument against the legalist
orientation of a criminal law reform strategy located in specialized criminal
courts. Quinn’s analysis draws on the failure of another earlier Progressive Era
attempt to address a range of social problems through procedurally informal
specialized courts. Quinn provides a fascinating history of how one Progressive
Era female judge, the Honorable Anna Kross, convened specialized courts to
address the problems of domestic violence and juvenile delinquency. But
ultimately, Judge Kross’s experiments were disbanded and derided as failures
because they were so expensive that they could never be brought to scale.
Additionally, the “treatment methods” coordinated by the court were unable to
address the broader social issues at hand, and the outsourcing of treatment tasks
resulted in “overreaching and privatization of the judicial system.”290 The
Progressive Era endeavor to address social problems through specialized courts
was dismantled, legal protections for accused persons were expanded, and
observers concluded that, while social work intervention might be helpful to
persons in distress, this would be best achieved outside the context of criminal
law administration. The troubled juvenile courts are the one continuing institu-
tional component of this Progressive Era legacy. Quinn draws from this histori-
cal experience to suggest that contemporary criminal court reformers should be
much more skeptical than they are about the claimed newness of their interven-
tions and the capacity of court-coordinated “treatment” to resolve the targeted
287. See Spinak, supra note 286, at 258–60.
288. See id. at 271.
289. See id.
290. Quinn, supra note 14, at 77–78; see also Mae C. Quinn, Revisiting Anna Moscowitz Kross’s
Critique of New York City’s Women’s Court: The Continued Problem of Solving the “Problem” of
Prostitution with Specialized Criminal Courts, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 665 (2006); Mae C. Quinn,
Response, Further (Ms.)Understanding Legal Realism: Rescuing Judge Anna Moscowitz Kross, 88
TEX. L. REV. See also 43 (2009).
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legal systemic or social problems.291
Spinak and Quinn’s respective critiques apply with particular force to therapeu-
tic, judicial monitoring, and order maintenance models of specialized criminal
law administration. A decarceration model, however, is primarily invested in
shifting problems and resources to other extralegal sectors, making it less
susceptible to the charge of naı¨ve legalism. And on a decarceration model, the
diversionary programs are open to all persons, not just those referred through
the court, so it is not principally the courts themselves that are determining the
scope of the populations served or the precise content of the service providers’
interventions. To the extent courts remain involved, they aim to ensure some
measure of accountability for the service providers.
In response to the concern raised by Spinak—that the structural problems at
issue emanate from police practices, legislatures, prosecutorial prerogatives, and
the desolation of poor urban and rural neighborhoods and so cannot be resolved
by court innovation—a decarceration model directs attention to reframing
understandings of crime and punishment in ways that promise to shift police
practices and prosecutorial prerogatives, as explored earlier in Part III. A
decarceration model does not purport to use the court directly to resolve the
broader problems but, in reframing and publicizing a conception of drug
dependency, mental illness, and other matters as structural and social chal-
lenges, a decarceration model: (a) makes available other ways of conceiving
and managing these concerns and (b) actively enlists police and prosecutors in
the courts’ work, thereby influencing those agencies’ perspectives and conduct.
Empirical documentation of the courts’ progress may ultimately provide the
basis for legislative change, as described earlier in Part III. A decarceration
model, thus, promises to effect change in policing, prosecution, and to do so
through legislation rather than assuming that a legalist court-based strategy on
its own will effect desired change. Finally, in galvanizing resources for blighted
social service sectors and neighborhoods, a decarceration model may begin to
address (invariably only partially) some of the broader structural deficits to
which therapeutic, judicial monitoring, or order maintenance models are less
attuned due to the almost exclusive focus of these approaches on the presumed
pathologies of individuals.
A decarceration model also begins to account for Quinn’s objections regard-
ing the implausibility, due to cost, of bringing specialized criminal courts to
scale as well as the threat of judicial overreaching. On a decarceration model,
the courts are part of an interim decarceration strategy carried out by reframing
particular conceptions of crime, punishment, and its alternatives; by partially
reshaping the institutional roles of judges, defense counsel, prosecutors, and
criminal courts; and by shifting resources. A decarceration model need not be
brought to scale to stimulate some significant measure of cognitive reframing,
291. Quinn, supra note 14, at 79–81; see also MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING
JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO (2003).
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institutional reinvention, and systemic change, as certain specialized criminal
courts have already begun to do.
The problem of judicial overreaching to which Quinn attends, and which is in
part a product of excessive faith in legal fora to facilitate change, is mitigated on
a decarceration model due to the minimalist, diversionary approach characteris-
tic of the model. The central aspiration of courts adopting a decarceration model
is to divert cases to other social sectors, which fulfill some less formal surveil-
lant function and provide social services without enlisting judges in that work.
Although, as with any court-based reform strategy, a decarceration model runs
some risk of excessive legalism, the experimental, empirically, and sociologi-
cally oriented diversionary approach of a decarceration model mitigates this risk
considerably.
One might wonder, then, why involve the courts at all if a decarceration
model is primarily diversionary? The answer lies in the fact that the matters at
issue are currently lodged in criminal courts, and political process defects have
left the task of addressing these matters largely to judges in criminal courts
themselves. Judges devised specialized criminal courts as a creative work-
around of these political process defects. At this point, the courts hold consider-
able advantages as sites for reshaping public understandings of crime and
punishment, for shifting institutional roles, and for reallocating resources to
other sectors. Further, as Professor Michael Dorf has argued, specialized crimi-
nal courts have “convening power,” as well as “disentrenching capacity” to
“impose a ‘penalty default’ . . . so unpalatable to all parties that they have no
choice but to hammer out some solution.”292 Also, courts are perceived as
relatively neutral and morally authoritative institutions, lending greater force to
the experimental and empirical work ongoing there. Finally, courts may provide
some mechanism through which to render service providers accountable in the
transition to a diversionary regime. Along these lines, then, a decarceration
model may navigate some of the excessive legalism potentially associated with
specialized criminal courts and underscored by Spinak and Quinn, while taking
advantage of the institutional authority of the courts to initiate broader transfor-
mative criminal law reform.
B. CRIMINAL JUSTICE?
A separate question regarding specialized criminal courts is whether they
undermine the expressive force of criminal justice. Conveying blame and/or
deterring wrongdoing are arguably the most important features of the criminal
law.293 Plus, tying moral blame to criminal sanctions may play a critical role in
292. Dorf, supra note 206, at 946.
293. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the Junction of
Criminal Law and the Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97, 160 (1996) (arguing that
criminal law is “defined by the practice of blaming”).
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realizing the criminal law’s deterrent potential.294 Furthermore, Richard C.
Boldt has argued that criminal law “does more than simply express an intention-
alist perspective”—a perspective that affirms human agency and moral responsi-
bility—but additionally, “it is a vital societal mechanism by which that
perspective is created and maintained, and the causal or objective perspective
obscured.”295 For this reason, Boldt contends it is a mistake to medicalize
addiction and thereby excuse it; instead, decriminalization is preferable to
excusing categories of conduct which are ill-suited for criminal prosecution, in
part because appropriate excusing factors would undermine the fundamentally
intentionalist perspective of the criminal law.296 From this vantage point, special-
ized criminal courts might be understood to weaken the moral condemnatory
dimension of criminal justice and, hence, to undercut its deterrent force (insofar
as moral prohibition is necessary to make deterrence effective).
In beginning to address these concerns, at first blush it may appear that
retributivism is a theory of punishment irreconcilably at odds with the express
mission of decarceration. The crux of a retributive approach is to punish
offenders proportionally to their moral blameworthiness, based on the crime
committed. Leniency and harshness both violate the principle of proportionality.
Yet, upon closer examination, there may be a retributive defense of a
decarceration model after all. A retributive account of a decarceration model
would proceed on the following premises. First, if retributivist criminal law
administration is to impart moral blame and assign proportionate punishment, it
ought to focus on those forms of misconduct for which blame is apt—not on
conduct for which victims are absent or where moral agency is seriously in
question. Courts adopting a decarceration approach focus in large part, though
not entirely, on what Professor Sanford Kadish has characterized as “morally
neutral” criminal offenses or on offenders whose moral blameworthiness is
otherwise mitigated.297 For these categories of offense and offender, the retribu-
tive concern with imparting moral blame through criminal law holds less sway.
Still, in cases involving both morally neutral as well as more morally charged
offenses, courts adopting a decarceration approach limit defendants’ liberty in
significant ways, which are surely experienced by defendants as constraining,
sanctioning, and, in those respects, punitive. For example, a drug addict man-
dated by the court to undergo treatment or a person with mental illness
294. See, e.g., Seidman, supra note 123, at 336 (“Our most important collective institution for
teaching through blaming is the criminal law.”).
295. Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
2245, 2247 (1992).
296. Id. at 2253; see also Hoffman, supra note 174, at 1477–78 (“[W]e are judges, not social
workers or psychiatrists. We administer the criminal law because the criminal law is its own social end.
It is not, or at least ought not to be, a means to other social ends.”).
297. See SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 49–53 (1987).
Morally neutral criminal laws include regulatory offenses that do not involve harmful wrongdoing to
others as well as some offenses requiring only vicarious liability or imposing strict liability. See Luna,
supra note 28, at 722–23.
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mandated to comply with a mental health regimen, both have their liberty
undermined. In the throes of addiction or a psychotic manic episode, most
persons would prefer to use drugs or experience their mania. Specialized
criminal courts punish those persons by limiting their liberty and mandating by
force of law a socially preferred course of action. In other words, social service
intervention and punishment are not necessarily diametrically opposed. Such
intervention may be experienced as punitive. And in fact, such intervention “can
actually provide the ideological basis whereby the state exercises greater control
over the individual than is typical of a normal criminal court.”298 In this regard,
from a retributive standpoint, specialized criminal courts may enable more
meaningful punitiveness than conventional criminal courts. According to former
Kansas City drug court prosecutor Claire McCaskill, the diversionary programs
required of participants in her jurisdiction are “tougher than the alternatives.”299
In contrast, conventional jail, prison, and probationary sentencing often fail
on a retributive theory, either because of disproportionate harshness when an
inmate will be physically harmed and subject to brutal conditions, or when
prison, jail, and probation function as part of the anticipated life course—not as
especially stigmatizing punishment—for certain demographics of criminally
convicted persons.300 In this regard, diversionary sentencing may provide more
meaningful, proportionate, and significantly liberty-constraining punishment
from a retributive standpoint than conventional sentencing.301 Additionally,
because a decarceration model maintains no commitment to a purely therapeutic
neo-rehabilitative or purely deterrent judicial monitoring approach, there is
nothing to prevent specialized criminal court teams from incorporating propor-
tional sentencing constraints in devising diversionary sentences.
A decarceration model need not fundamentally undermine an agency-focused
intentionalist perspective of the sort, Boldt addresses, but merely reorganizes
society’s response to particular defendants and offenses, preferring mandatory
social institutional integration to jail or prison sentencing. Criminal prohibitions
remain intact until they are legislatively altered, so the expressive moral condem-
nation function of criminal law remains, in that regard, unchanged. The sen-
tence assigned in response merely shifts from prison, jail, and conventional
criminal supervision to other sectors.
This shift occurs on a decarceration model in part in the interests of a larger
concern for justice—for maintaining the legitimacy of a legal order that is
deeply compromised by overcriminalization and overincarceration. Even on a
Kantian retributive theory, it may be that some measure of lenience is warranted
298. NOLAN, supra note 10, at 52.
299. See id. at 53–54.
300. See Pettit & Western, supra note 35.
301. Cf. Freed Inmate Tries To Break Back into Prison, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 6, 2001, http://
www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Freed-inmate-tries-to-break-back-into-prison-1065029.php; Kate Mather,
Parolee Arrested Trying To Break Back into Sacramento Prison, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2011, http://
latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/08/parolee-break-back-into-prison.html.
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to “preserve the legal order on which justice depends.”302 Though much more
could surely be said, for now that concludes the retributive defense of a
decarceration model.
From the perspective of deterrence, a decarceration approach dissuades for
the same reasons that it may be experienced as punishment from a retributive
standpoint: diversionary sentences still substantially constrain defendants’ lib-
erty. A potential offender aware that apprehension may lead to a court-ordered
diversion program, will be inclined to desist from being apprehended for
conduct that will lead to a diversionary sentence, something that individual
would prefer to avoid. Critically, on a decarceration model, referral services are
open to all comers, not just those referred through diversionary courts, so there
is no incentive to offend in order to obtain services should those services be
desired. Further, for most eligible defendants—mentally ill persons, drug ad-
dicts, veterans suffering severe post-traumatic stress—their socially disruptive
conduct is unlikely to be carried out following reflective cost–benefit analysis,
so the deterrent potential of any criminal law administrative arrangement is
questionable.303 It must, of course, be acknowledged that a diversionary sen-
tence will not deter those individuals who wish both to commit an offense
subject to the jurisdiction of a specialized criminal court and who wish to enter
diversionary programming. But as noted above in reference to retributive
concerns, this same problem arises with respect to conventional jail, prison, and
probationary sentencing: for many criminal defendants, criminal law involve-
ment has become an anticipated part of the life course, a life stage through
which certain demographics of defendants expect to pass, and, in this regard, a
diversionary approach may not be appreciably less stigmatizing (and less
deterrent) than conventional sentencing.
One reason a decarceration model is preferable to a more jurisprudentially
specified model of specialized criminal law administration, such as therapeutic
jurisprudence, is because this jurisprudentially underspecified form permits the
courts to engage multiple complex meaning imparting functions involved in
criminal law administration. In certain criminal cases, the ideal role of the court
may be simultaneously to condemn a given offense and the possibly reprehen-
sible motivations behind it, to reaffirm the worth of the victim, to aim to craft a
sanction that will deter the offender and others from such conduct in the future,
but also to act mercifully. This is a complex undertaking, to be sure, and one
that cannot be easily captured under a single criminal law jurisprudential theory,
whether a therapeutic jurisprudential approach or an instrumentally deterrent
302. See Binder, supra note 112, at 356–58 (exploring conditions under which Kantian theory of
punishment would permit justice to be traded for justice and citing IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 138 (John Ladd trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 2d ed. 1999) (1796)).
303. To the extent that skeptics inclined to a deterrent theory of punishment may worry that these
courts would imperil public safety, there is considerable evidence that “measures to reduce prison
population may actually improve on public safety because they address the problems that brought
people to jail.” Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1942 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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model. As Dan M. Kahan and Martha C. Nussbaum have proposed: “A disposi-
tion that purports to answer only a single, abstract question—did the defen-
dant’s background ‘cause’ his crime? or even does the defendant ‘deserve’ to be
punished?—will never be rich enough to convey all of these meanings.”304 In
this respect, courts adopting a decarceration approach have overdetermined
meanings, rendering them potentially consistent with a range of differing
ideological and legal precommitments. Retributivists may favor diversionary
courts because they enable a tough and intrusive form of criminal law administra-
tion that is proportional to wrongdoing and lenient where in the interests of
justice, having the potential to both deter and prevent future offending, and
others may be drawn to diversionary courts for their rehabilitative and humanitar-
ian potential. Regardless of one’s criminal law theoretical commitments, a
decarceration model promises to reduce criminal law administrative costs,
increase efficacy, and reduce reliance on incarceration.
For the time being, a decarceration approach is best suited to misconduct for
which there is some considerable collective interest—among legal actors and
the public—in experimental alternative social response. But perhaps over time a
growing class of offenses and offenders will come to seem suitable candidates
for decarceration. There are surely some crimes of violence that will not be
amenable to decarceration processing at all, though it is not entirely clear what
those offenses are in the abstract. The conduct of the person who murders, who
rapes, who robs by violent means may not be subject to redirection through
court or other intervention, and the only politically and socially viable response
may be moral condemnation and incapacitation. As sociologist Jack Katz
explains in his studies in Seductions of Crime, certain violent acts may “emerge
from a dizziness in which conformity is the greatest spiritual challenge and
deviance promises the peace of transcendent significance.”305 But for others
who have killed, their deviant conduct may never again be repeated—it may
have occurred in a drug-induced haze that, following recovery, would no longer
threaten others and for which moral culpability is lacking. The experimental,
unfinished character of a decarceration model allows this question be resolved
incrementally over time.306
304. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 370–71 (1996).
305. JACK KATZ, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME: MORAL AND SENSUAL ATTRACTIONS IN DOING EVIL 296 (1988).
306. Because, even if criminal law scholar Paul H. Robinson and his collaborators are right and
there is a “core of agreement” about the relative wrongness of the most egregious types of criminal
offenses, this does not in the least entail that we know what to do to best respond to the offenses in
question or what to do to address the associated social problems. See Paul H. Robinson & Robert
Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829 (2007); see also
Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & David A. Hoffman, A Core of Agreement, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1655
(2010).
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C. REDUCED PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS?
Specialized criminal courts frequently adopt a collaborative approach that
entails, at certain stages, reduced adversarialism and reduced procedural protec-
tions—an approach that critics charge raises numerous due process concerns.307
Criminal defense attorneys object to these relaxed procedures on the grounds
that reduced procedural protections lead to outcomes that are bad for their
clients and that more generally are corrosive of the legitimacy and integrity of
criminal law.308 This line of objection continues that, when defense counsel
works as part of a diversionary sentencing “team,” they may be less than
vigilant in seeking to have illegally obtained evidence excluded and less willing
to challenge the legal or factual bases of the government’s charges.309 Defen-
dants’ interactions with social service providers outside the presence of counsel
also may entail due process violations as any incriminating statements may
affect the defendant’s revocation sentence.310 In certain drug courts, for in-
stance, judges may rely on progress reports from substance abuse programmers
in determining whether to apply sanctions to court participants; domestic vio-
lence courts similarly rely on reports from anger management programs to
assess compliance.311 This information is obtained in a “treatment” context and
is not subject to any measures that would ensure procedural fairness or regular-
ity.312
307. See, e.g., Lanni, supra note 68, at 383–87.
308. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 14, at 10–13.
309. Lanni, supra note 68, at 385; see also BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 86 (“Defenders,
who are accustomed to battling prosecutors to get the best deal for their clients, are often asked to work
alongside them as part of a collaborative team. These cooperative efforts often start on the ground floor
with traditional adversaries working together to design guidelines, eligibility criteria, and sanctioning
schemes. When a drug-court judge hands down a three-day jail sentence because an addict has failed to
attend his treatment program, defenders are often surprisingly silent, because they—and their clients—
have already accepted the idea of intermediate jail sanctions as part of the treatment sentence.”).
Another critical function of criminal courts is to police the police, and if specialized criminal courts
require an expeditious guilty plea, they make unavailable suppression motions or other motions practice
that may incentivize good police behavior. See Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the
Courts and the Prosecution, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315 (2005).
310. Lanni, supra note 68, at 385.
311. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 85.
312. Nevertheless, to the extent a proceduralist objection focuses on reduced adversarialism within
specialized criminal courts, it is worth bearing in mind that a pure form of adversarial criminal law
administration is incorrectly assumed to obtain in conventional U.S. criminal courts and, insofar as
adversarial procedures are present, these procedures’ desirability relative to various alternatives remains
uncertain. See, e.g., Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in
American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1019 (1974) (“European criminal procedures are
no more purely inquisitorial than ours are purely [adversarial].”); see also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN
JUSTICE (1980) (critically analyzing adversarial criminal justice administration and proposing modifica-
tions to address significant problems); LLOYD L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE
UNITED STATES (1977) (critiquing U.S. adversarial criminal processes and examining preferable alterna-
tives); Mirjan Damasˇka, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A
Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506 (1973) (critically examining adversarial criminal proce-
dures relative to continental alternatives); John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal
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Unlike on a therapeutic jurisprudence, judicial monitoring, or order mainte-
nance model, on a decarceration approach there is considerable room to incorpo-
rate robust procedural protections, thereby responding to most procedural
objections leveled generally against specialized criminal courts, even if there
remain inevitably some procedural rights trade-offs. Because the legal process
itself is not understood to have a therapeutic or other nonconventional orienta-
tion on a decarceration model, full due process protections should and have
been applied at the stage of revocation.313 To accommodate concerns regarding
judicial neutrality, courts adopting a decarceration model could readily assign
two separate judges, one to handle supervision and a separate judge to handle
revocation.314 The due process problems posed by labeling defendants in judi-
cial monitoring courts “sex offenders” prior to adjudication are so obvious as to
require little explanation—on a decarceration, model preadjudication judicial
monitoring need not occur. An additional substantial ground for procedural
objections is the often substantial disparity in specialized criminal courts be-
tween the relatively light sentence a defendant would have received in the
conventional court and the disproportionately harsh jail or prison sentence a
defendant will receive if he or she fails in the diversionary program. Because a
decarceration model’s primary aim is to reduce reliance on incarceration consis-
tent with maintaining public safety, such courts do not seek to obtain leverage
by imposing disproportionately harsh revocation sentences; in fact, empirical
analyses suggest that the severity of sanctions in drug courts does not appear to
reduce the subsequent number of crimes committed or days of drug use.315
Beyond these more obvious modifications on a decarceration model to ac-
count for procedural justice concerns, diversionary courts may operate in accord
with any of several different procedural configurations. Courts may be pretrial/
pre-plea, post-plea/presentencing, or post-conviction sentencing alternatives.
For example, some drug court programs provide for placement in a drug court
following adjudication but, if the terms of the program are violated, probation is
revoked and the court will sentence the defendant anew or based on a predeter-
mined revocation sentence.316 In contrast, in other specialized criminal courts,
failure to comply merely leads to the reinstatement of criminal proceedings, not
Procedure: “Myth” and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549 (1978) (analyzing preferable features of inquisito-
rial as compared to adversarial criminal procedure models).
313. See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 170 P.3d 881, 886 (Idaho 2007) (holding that drug-court-program
participant was entitled to due process protections during proceedings to terminate his participation in
the program and incarcerate him).
314. This solution is not as readily available on a therapeutic jurisprudence or judicial monitoring
model because the theoretical bases of those models turn on the continuing relationship between the
defendant/participant and the judge, whether that continued relationship emphasizes a presumed
therapeutic connection or deterrent influence. A more general proceduralist concern relates to the
potential role shift for the judge in specialized criminal courts, but on a decarceration model that role
shift is less pronounced than on a therapeutic jurisprudence or judicial monitoring model.
315. See ROSSMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 224.
316. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 166/35(a)(4) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2011); see also
State v. Bellville, No. 5-476/04-1634, 2005 Iowa App. LEXIS 963, at *2–7 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 31,
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to a previously bargained conviction or sentence.317
The decision to take a plea is a serious one and making an informed and
rational choice about pleading guilty is particularly difficult when the alterna-
tive is a possibly much lengthier prison sentence and when the defendant is
drug-addicted or suffering from mental illness.318 One way to attempt to
circumvent the procedural concerns that arise under such circumstances is to
have the diversionary alternative process occur prior to a plea being entered. On
this approach, a defendant would elect whether to opt in to the specialized
criminal court and upon successful completion of the diversionary program any
charges would be dropped. Egregious misconduct while in the program would
result in referral to the conventional criminal process for the prior criminal
conduct, but evidence from the diversionary period obtained through treatment
or other social service intervention could be excluded. The defendant would
then choose whether to plead guilty at the outset, pursue any motions practice,
or proceed to trial.
The due process concerns on this approach relate principally to the fact that
the diversionary alternative, to the extent it is intrusive and limiting of the
defendant’s liberty, is mandated prior to a finding of guilt. But the defendant’s
participation is optional, no more constrained than any choice made in light of
the background criminal law regime, and the specialized court participant may
at any point opt out and return to the conventional process.319
Still, the choice of the participant does not eliminate concerns about coercion
because any choice takes place against the coercive pressures of the criminal
law regime and the broader social and political setting in which the defendant
finds himself or herself. And if specialized criminal courts increase pressures to
arrest or for arrestees to enter diversion programs, they will have constrained
individuals’ options in a significant sense rather than having expanded them.
But the coercion at work in determining whether to enter the specialized
criminal court is no more than the coercion in play at any other critical phase of
proceedings in which a defendant decides to plead guilty or go to trial, and the
potential benefits to the participant are considerable.
The other available approach is to employ the diversionary court as a
post-conviction sentencing alternative, with egregious offending while in the
program punished by an alternative pre-agreed upon sentence. This avoids the
2005) (upholding sentence of consecutive jail terms following revocation of drug court program based
on prior plea agreement).
317. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-2(a) (2011). An alternative approach, of which there is a pilot
ongoing in Seattle, takes specialized courts out of the picture entirely and relies purely on police to
divert drug-involved offenders to treatment providers prior to any criminal charge. See THE DEFENDER
ASSOCIATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTED DIVERSION (LEAD) EVALUATION PANEL (2011) (on file with
author).
318. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (“[A] guilty plea is a grave and solemn
act to be accepted only with care and discernment . . . .”).
319. Specialized criminal courts leave the parallel conventional process undisturbed, with the full
panoply of procedural protections in principle available to defendants there.
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due process problems associated with court mandates prior to a finding of guilt
but increases the risk of coercive, less-than-voluntary pleas.
As far as the post-conviction configuration is concerned, due process and
coercion concerns may be mitigated if there is not too harsh a pre-agreed upon
or subsequently determined revocation sentence—that is, if the revocation
sentence is standardized to what the defendant would have received had he or
she not opted into the specialized court. The procedural concerns could be
further mitigated on a post-conviction model if both those convicted following
trial and those who pled guilty were eligible for alternative sentencing. This
latter, post-conviction approach would attend to the procedural rights of defen-
dants and would likely reduce incarceration and associated costs. Expanding the
ability of defendants to remain out of prison protects their interests in avoiding
carceral sentencing and their due process rights so long as defendants are still
able to challenge any illegally obtained evidence at the outset of the case, elect
to go to trial, and not be subject to a disproportionately harsh sentence upon
revocation.320
In sum, the trade-off is between a pretrial, pre-plea model that potentially
avoids criminal proceedings altogether and more closely renders participation a
choice, and a post-conviction model that avoids certain due process problems
by making the specialized criminal court program effectively a part of the
defendant’s sentence. But unless the post-conviction approach allows defen-
dants to enter following trial, it applies substantial pressure to plead guilty to
retain the option to avoid jail or prison, even under circumstances where the
defendant may contest guilt. The advantage of the experimental quality of a
decarceration model is that jurisdictions may test the various procedural configu-
rations and determine which best serves the range of interests at stake and raises
fewer due process and other problems—not merely in theory but in terms of
participants’ experiences on the ground.321
Finally, it is also critical to consider whether procedural protections are the
panacea their proponents assume for fairness in conventional criminal law
320. See FAROLE & CISSNER, supra note 132, at 5–7 (exploring drug court participants’ reasons for
and aspirations in opting into drug court).
321. A decarceration model takes empiricism and experimentalism seriously, seeking to engage in a
process of internal reform and improvement. This process is more likely to meaningfully occur on a
decarceration model than on a therapeutic jurisprudence, judicial monitoring, or order maintenance
model because there is not otherwise any commitment to a particular therapeutic, neo-rehabilitative,
deterrence-based, or order maintenance ideology. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 13, at 882–83. Dorf and
Sabel overestimate the rigors of self-monitoring and self-reporting in drug courts and specialized
criminal courts generally and neglect the strong incentives for entities to set limited but readily
achievable goals so as to be able to claim success, regardless of actual outcomes. Further, self-
monitoring and self-reporting may be less useful where the ultimate goal or measure at stake is in
dispute, as I have suggested it often is in specialized criminal courts. But see id. A decarceration model
is primarily concerned with reducing incarceration consistent with maintaining public safety and so
circumvents some of these complications.
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administration.322 Because there is such great pressure on the conventional
courts due to high case volumes, the vast majority of cases are handled through
guilty pleas. Often public defenders have little time to investigate a case before
a client is advised to plead guilty. But if greater numbers of cases were removed
from the conventional criminal courts to specialized criminal courts and other
sectors, fewer cases would remain in conventional courts, provided that special-
ized courts manage to avoid a net-widening enforcement effect. This would
permit more robust procedural protections and investigations in the conven-
tional criminal courts. Oddly then, it is plausible that the removal of cases to a
less adversarial specialized criminal context may enhance procedural justice
overall, improving procedural safeguards in conventional courts rather than the
outcome feared by proceduralists.
D. SPECIALIZATION FOR GOOD OR FOR ILL?
A further peril of a specialized criminal courts law reform strategy is that it
may require a profusion of specialized courts to address the myriad problems
requiring reform. Convening a separate court for each separate area in which
substantive criminal law reform is desired would be enormously costly.323
Additionally, reliance on criminal court specialization might well threaten to
undermine rule of law values centered on a model of judges as neutral general-
ists.324
Although these are legitimate objections to certain forms of criminal court
specialization, a decarceration model is less likely to entail these troubling
features of specialization for two primary reasons. First, a decarceration model
is an interim strategy for criminal law reform, focused specifically on reducing
reliance on incarceration by setting in motion broader reform processes as
discussed previously in section II.D and Part III. Diversionary courts need not
aspire to become a permanent criminal law administrative fixture. Thus, a
diversionary decarceration model poses a less significant threat of proliferating
courts endlessly in response to every criminal law problem requiring reform. As
a consequence, this approach stands to intrude less upon the predominant norm
of generalist adjudication. Second, courts adopting a decarceration approach
need not be particularly substantively specialized. A decarceration model could
322. See, e.g., Laura Sullivan, Inmates Who Can’t Make Bail Face Stark Options, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId122725819&ft1&33 (report-
ing that more than 500,000 inmates in the United States each year face a choice between pleading
guilty for crimes for which they claim innocence or remaining incarcerated until a trial date weeks or
months later to contest charges).
323. Roscoe Pound famously opposed court specialization on similar grounds because it would tend
to result in duplication of function, waste, and inefficiency. See, e.g., R. Stanley Lowe, Unified Courts
in America: The Legacy of Roscoe Pound, 56 JUDICATURE 316 (1973).
324. Although specialization is a feature of modern society, courts and judges have generally
constituted an exception to this trend. See BAUM, supra note 6, at xi–xii. There are, however, numerous
specialized courts outside the criminal context, such as the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces.
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incorporate within one court jurisdiction over a range of different matters for
which non-carceral sentencing is preferred. This too stands to reduce the risk of
endlessly proliferating specialized criminal courts and positions specialized
criminal court judges in a role more akin to the prototypical generalist judge.325
E. LEGITIMATION COSTS?
Finally, specialized criminal courts threaten to impose significant legitimation
costs. First, specialized criminal courts may legitimate increased harshness in
conventional criminal courts once more sympathetic criminal defendants have
been removed. With the removal of presumably more vulnerable or less blame-
worthy individuals from conventional criminal courts and prisons, one might
well envision an increase in punitive attitudes toward those remaining. This is
so even though it may be profoundly unfair to allow some criminal law breakers
access to specialized criminal courts because we perceive them to be more
worthy of our understanding, when others are really no more blameworthy.326
A related risk is that in removing more purportedly sympathetic defendants
from conventional criminal courts, racial and class disproportion will increase,
with more defendants of color and materially poor defendants remaining in the
conventional courts.327 Indeed, that is precisely what occurred under deinstitu-
tionalization in the 1960s when the racialization of mental hospitals in-
creased.328 And preliminary results from mental health courts suggest this trend
is a problem in that context too, as a study of case processing in seven mental
health courts found overrepresentation at the point of referral of older individu-
als, white persons, and women as compared to their proportion in the criminal
justice system generally.329 Though empirical monitoring enables identification
of the point at which racial disparities emerge, identification of the locus of the
problem does not by any stretch guarantee its elimination. The convergence of
interest between wealthier white defendants with mental health or addiction
problems and similarly addicted or mentally ill poorer defendants of color—an
interest convergence that likely contributed in large measure to the emergence
and widespread popularity of specialized criminal courts—will be able to
sustain a legitimate alternative sentencing regime only if all defendants, irrespec-
325. All this is not to say that a decarceration approach will necessarily reduce costs. To meaning-
fully address the complex social problems driving overincarceration will be resource-intensive, and
specialized courts often rely on an array of “services that simply don’t exist in most criminal courts.”
BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 7, at 64.
326. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 73, at 23. As Edward P. Mulvey, delivering the Presidential
Address at an American Psychological Association convention explained: “[T]he courts are being
established for groups of individuals who are seen as ‘deserving’ of better processing and more
individualized attention from the justice system.” Id. (quoting Edward P. Mulvey, Presidential Address
to the American Psychology–Law Society, Division 41 of the American Psychological Association,
Mar. 20, 2010).
327. See Robert V. Wolf, Race, Bias, and Problem-Solving Courts, 21 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 27, 28–30
(2009).
328. See Harcourt, supra note 209, at 4, 29–31.
329. Steadman et al., supra note 80, at 215.
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tive of socioeconomic status or race, have equal access to favorable diversion-
ary sentences.330
Separately, there is the problem of potentially legitimating the management
of particular social challenges through criminal law by vesting more authority in
specialized criminal courts to address social problems.331 These are all genuine
and profoundly concerning problems associated with a specialized criminal
courts law reform strategy.
There are several ways in which a decarceration model may attempt to
address these issues. At the outset, awareness of and careful attention to the
associated risks may help to minimize their occurrence and impact in the event
the problems identified come to pass. For example, ongoing empirical monitor-
ing may track any racial or class disproportion as it arises and direct attention to
the areas where the problem is greatest so that it might be addressed, explicitly
focusing institutional actors on confronting racial disparities in referral, termina-
tion, or wherever else they are occurring. Ultimately, many of the pathologies in
U.S. criminal law administration have to do with race and with racialization of
the category of the criminal defendant or incarcerated person, so meaningful
criminal law reform will almost certainly require grappling intensively with the
racial dimensions of criminal law enforcement.332
Insofar as a decarceration model seeks to unwind harsh punishment and
incarceration generally, this approach may serve more broadly to call into
question exceedingly punitive criminal law frameworks, both for those defen-
dants in specialized courts and those in conventional courts. Movement of
judges between conventional and specialized criminal courts may also serve to
limit stratification of the two systems.333 Admittedly, however, these cautionary
efforts may prove inadequate.
Even so, in taking stock of these legitimation costs, as well as the other
problems considered in this Part, it is crucial to compare the problems presented
on a decarceration model with (a) the limits of the other competing reformist
models of specialized criminal law administration considered earlier in this
Article, and then to compare each of these to (b) the status quo in conventional
criminal case processing in the United States. That is, the limits of a decarcera-
tion model or other specialized criminal law reformist model should be consid-
ered as compared, not just to the objector’s preferred utopian alternative, but
330. See Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 149 (2011)
(critically discussing the interest-convergence thesis, which holds that disadvantaged groups receive
favorable judicial treatment to the extent their interests coincide with the interests of majority group
elites).
331. Chrysanthi S. Leon, Should Courts Solve Problems? Connecting Theory and Practice, CRIM. L.
BULL., Winter 2007, at art. 2.
332. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 35.
333. Of course, it is possible that judges sitting in the specialized court would adapt a different
judicial perspective than when sitting in the conventional court.
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relative to the status quo in U.S. criminal law administration.334
Procedural protections may be found wanting on a decarceration model, but
are these protections more meaningfully enforced in the standard criminal
courts where well over ninety percent of criminal cases end in a plea, following
proceedings, the character of which Malcolm Feeley powerfully captured in his
book The Process is the Punishment?335 Is the liberty-infringing character of
surveillance on a decarceration model more onerous than in prisons and jails,
where many more specialized court participants might well be were the courts
to be disbanded? Retributivists must consider too the relative achievement of
retributive goals in the specialized criminal court setting as compared to the
standard criminal process, which Feeley described decades ago as follows, and
which remains in these respects unimproved:
[T]rials are rare events, and even protracted plea bargaining is an exception.
Jammed every morning with a new mass of arrestees . . . [t]hese courts are
chaotic and confusing; officials communicate in a verbal short-hand wholly
unintelligible to the accused and accuser alike, and they seem to make
arbitrary decisions, sending one person to jail and freeing the next. But for the
most part they are lenient; they sentence few people to jail and impose few
large fines.
. . . .
. . . Judges, bored by their jobs, become callous toward defendants who are so
different from themselves. Prosecutors, dulled by their repetitive work . . .
appear to be vindictive. Defense attorneys, depressed by feelings that their
efforts are not appreciated, can easily begin to treat their clients carelessly.336
And this picture is not unique to the second half of the twentieth century
when Feeley wrote his study of the New Haven criminal courts. Decades earlier,
Roscoe Pound decried a similar set of ills, which persist after what is now
approaching a century of efforts to improve conventional criminal law adminis-
tration:
The bad physical surroundings, the confusion, the want of decorum, the
undignified offhand disposition of cases at high speed, the frequent suggestion
of something working behind the scenes . . . create in the minds of observers a
general suspicion of the whole process of law enforcement . . . .337
More recently, in his study of the Chicago criminal courts, investigative
334. See Bratton Blom et al., supra note 13, at 42 (“All the criticisms of problem-solving courts—
that they violate due process rights, that they fail to rehabilitate, or that they represent a form of
undemocratic reform—apply to the reality of the court system today.”).
335. See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979).
336. See id. at 3–4.
337. ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 190–91 (Da Capo Press 1972) (1930).
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journalist Steve Bogira sounded strikingly similar notes:
Every day, Chicago police wagons swing onto the grounds of the Cook
County Criminal Courthouse and deposit their cargo at a rear door.
The prisoners being unloaded . . . are here for the usual reasons. . . . They
tried to buy heroin from an undercover cop. They pocketed a fifth of booze at
a grocery and failed to outrun the security guard.
. . . .
. . . The courtroom staff works . . . reflexively, not reflectively. The workers
have no time to give much thought to any but the most extraordinary case, or
to examine what they are doing.
. . . .
. . . [J]ustice miscarries every day, by doing precisely what we ask it to.338
The bottom line is that the status quo to which a decarceration model should
be compared, absent a viable alternative reform proposal, is a status quo that is
deeply inadequate whether one is concerned about procedural justice, liberty,
racial disproportionality, or retributive punishment. Because these challenges
are not unique to specialized criminal courts but rather reflect problems associ-
ated with conventional criminal law administration, it is no answer to simply
jettison specialized criminal courts and revert to conventional criminal law
frameworks.
Still, given the myriad perils associated with the competing models of
specialized criminal courts elaborated in Part I, the question invariably comes to
mind: are the potential benefits of a decarceration model worth the risks
identified in specialized criminal courts in the preceding pages? This Article’s
short answer is yes. Yes, that is, if the courts are able to employ the three
strategies elaborated here and in which some specialized criminal courts are
actively engaged: reframing social understandings of crime, punishment, and its
alternatives; institutionally reshaping the courts and associated agencies them-
selves; and effecting systemic change, shifting a wide range of social concerns
to other sectors better equipped to address the problems at hand.
CONCLUSION
In this moment of increased openness to thoroughgoing criminal law reform,
after decades of escalating criminal sentences, thousands of specialized criminal
courts have emerged across the country and around the globe. These courts have
become the location of a contest between competing criminal law models.
Certain models at work in specialized criminal courts are configured in such a
way that threatens to produce a series of unintended and undesirable conse-
quences—increased and unnecessary criminal supervision, diminished proce-
338. STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURT-
HOUSE 3, 21–22 (2005).
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dural safeguards, and potentially even increased incarceration. But a less
predominant criminal law reformist model—a decarceration model—may pro-
vide a way of developing different approaches to certain of the social problems
currently managed through criminal law.
The greatest promise of a decarceration model—if it succeeds at engendering
a certain degree of cognitive reframing, institutional reinvention, and systemic
change—is to remove particular categories of offenses and offenders from
conventional criminal courts to be addressed both more effectively and more
humanely elsewhere. Primary candidates for such removal through existing
specialized criminal courts include drug offenders, mentally ill persons, and
individuals suffering the post-traumatic stress of war. Removal of these matters
to other sectors would reduce volume pressures on conventional criminal courts
so that they might more meaningfully and fairly address the relatively few cases
of serious violent and property crime, for which alternative processes seem
inappropriate or would be exceedingly unpopular. These more serious criminal
matters may not be handled best in the standard criminal process either, but we
have yet to identify a better approach. In due course, if specialized criminal
courts set in motion some measure of systemic change in criminal law adminis-
tration, they may both focus and improve responses in cases of serious crime
and simultaneously improve community economic development, accessible
public health services, employment, and more generally, human well-being. It is
also possible that specialized criminal courts will achieve none of these things—
that their perils rather than their possibilities will be their legacy—but, given the
grave inadequacies and injustices of the status quo in U.S. criminal law adminis-
tration, these courts are well worth trying.
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